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The Problem of Education Quality
in Developing Countries
Naomi Hossain and Sam Hickey
Introduction
Universal basic education was set to be one of the great development successes
of the twentieth century, as countries all around the world enthusiastically
expanded provision, enrolling ever more of their young in primary and sec-
ondary schools. Yet by the early 2000s, it was already evident that not only
were millions still out of school, but that a majority dropped out early,
attended sporadically, or learned little while there (UNESCO 2014). As one
observer summarized it, ‘schooling ain’t learning’ (Pritchett 2013): there is
more to learning than placing children in schools. The ‘learning crisis’ is
acknowledged in the Sustainable Development Goal 4 to ‘ensure inclusive
and quality education for all and promote lifelong learning’,1 an emphasis on
quality and equality in contrast to the focus on access in Millennium Devel-
opment Goal 2. This learning crisis is widely yet unevenly spread, varying
between countries, classes, genders, and social groups (World Bank 2017). But
whereas expanding primary schooling was a comparatively popular andmeas-
urably successful policy goal, addressing poor quality teaching and low levels
of learning has so far proven less so (Bruns and Schneider 2016). A few
countries have managed to expand their education systems while enhancing
learning. But it is easier to build schools, abolish fees, recruit more teachers,
and instruct parents to send their children, than it is to ensure that schools,
teachers, and students are equipped and motivated for teaching and learning
once there.
1 http://un.org/sustainabledevelopment/education/ (accessed 12 June 2017).
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This book contributes to making sense of this global learning crisis, by
exploring the conditions under which reforms likely to shift education provi-
sioning onto a higher-quality pathway are undertaken and enacted. It takes as
its starting point the view that politics is likely to matter in explaining why
this is the case. As a recent review put it, education reform is:
a highly charged and politicized process; what gets implemented—and its
impact—depends as much or more on the politics of the reform process as the
technical design of the reform. (Bruns and Schneider 2016, 5)
There are good reasons to believe that variations in how countries adopt and
implement reforms necessary to promote learning relate to differences in their
political economies. These differences may play out in the design of reforms
that are attempted and adopted, and in what gets implemented—including
that it is more politically popular and less taxing of often weak state capacities
to expand school provision than to improve learning outcomes. Yet, barring
some notable exceptions (e.g. Grindle 2004), there has been little political
analysis of education in general (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011; Gift and
Wibbels 2014), and still less on the political economy of education quality in
developing countries—a gap that has been noted and bemoaned in several
recent reviews (Kingdon et al. 2014; Nicolai et al. 2014; Wales, Magee, and
Nicolai 2016; Bruns and Schneider 2016). As a contribution to filling this
critical gap, this book sets out and tests hypotheses about how different
types of political context interact with the education policy domain in ways
that shape the uptake and implementation of reforms designed to improve
learning outcomes.
The book features comparative analysis of the politics of education quality
reforms across six low- to middle-income countries—Bangladesh, Cambodia,
Ghana, Rwanda, South Africa, and Uganda—all of which were relatively
successful at rapidly expanding access to primary schooling, but which have
all found it much harder to improve learning outcomes, in part (we suggest)
because of the variable levels of political commitment that exist in each
context for reforms aimed at improving the quality of education. In this
volume, we understand political commitment to reflect the incentives and
ideas that predominate amongst political elites, and which are shaped by the
underlying character of politics and power in specific contexts. The concept
we use to describe ‘the balance or distribution of power between contending
social groups and social classes, on which any state is based’ (di John and
Putzel 2009, 4) is a ‘political settlement’, and we have chosen our cases to
represent different types of these settlements.
The comparison explores how different distributions of power shaped
incentives and ideas around education quality reforms and the institutions
and processes of implementation, tracing the politics of reform from the
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political centre down through different levels of governance to the school,
taking into account the impact of the external environment (for example, aid)
and the policy legacies and challenges in each context. What we want to
examine here is less the broad question of ‘how politics shapes educational
outcomes’ per se, than the ways in which politics shapes the commitment and
capacity of elites and governments in developing countries to promote
reforms that are aimed at improving learning outcomes. In particular, and
following several systematic reviews of what works to improve learning out-
comes in developing countries (e.g. Glewwe et al. 2011; Tikly and Barrett
2013), we focus on efforts to improve the level andmanagement of resourcing
accorded to schools, and the quality and presence of teachers through train-
ing, incentives, and oversight mechanisms.
What we know about quality reforms is that they are inherently more
difficult to design and to ‘sell’ to the public: there is less certainty about
‘what works’ and results are harder to measure (Nelson 2007). It is easier to
design and implement top-down command-and-control responses to build
more schools and recruit more teachers and children than to devise workable
solutions to the ‘craft’ challenge of the interpersonal, transactional nature of
effective teaching and learning (Pritchett 2013). Strengthening local account-
ability is difficult. Teachers, the group whose interests are most likely to suffer
from reforms to enhance their performance accountability, tend to be well-
organized, influential, and equipped to resist them (Corrales 1999, 2006; Moe
and Wiborg 2017; Kingdon et al. 2014; Béteille, Kingdon, and Muzammil
2016). Parents and communities, particularly in developing countries, are
often less well-equipped and informed to articulate demand for quality
improvements from their political leaders or frontline providers (Dunne
et al. 2007; Mani and Mukand 2007). This means that for parents and com-
munities, both the ‘long route’ (via the process of political representation) and
the ‘short route’ (via relationships with frontline providers, teachers, and
schools) to accountability for the delivery of high quality education, may be
obstructed or subverted (World Bank 2003). A recent review concluded that
three features of the politics of education are particularly relevant in analysing
the prospects for reform: (i) the strength of teacher unions compared with
other education stakeholders or labour unions; (ii) the ‘opacity of the class-
room’—the need for reforms to shape teacher behaviour in the classroom,
over which direct control is impossible; and (iii) the slow or lagged nature of
the results of quality reforms (compared, for example, with the abolition of
fees, learning reforms will yield no instant or obvious political return) (Bruns
and Schneider 2016).
The World Bank identifies children’s unreadiness to learn, along with
teacher and school management skills, and inadequate school inputs, as the
proximate determinants of the learning crisis (World Bank 2017). It argues
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that the intractability of education quality reforms is not inherently a matter
of inadequate resources, although many failing systems are also under-
resourced (UNESCO 2014; World Bank 2017). Instead, it is a problem of ‘mis-
alignment’ between learning goals, policies, and practices, in which the dom-
inant role of teacher unions and other forms of ‘unhealthy politics’ plays an
important and persistent role (World Bank 2017). It concludes that ‘healthier’
forms of politics—in particular the use of information to increase ‘the political
incentives for learning’ and broad-based pro-reform coalitions—are critical to
align goals, policies, and practices around improved learning. While highlight-
ing the significance of the politics of teacher and school management on
the frontline of the learning crisis, the emphasis on ‘alignment’ sidelines the
significance of contention in education reform, and fails to address the ques-
tions to which it gives rise: under what conditions do broad-based, pro-reform
coalitions come about? In which political contexts does information about
education performance become embedded in functioning mechanisms of
accountability? Why do some states visibly devote more capacity to learning
and more political resources to quality reforms than others?
This book seeks to pick up the analysis at the point where the World
Development Report (WDR) 2018 leaves off, pursuing a political explanation
of the misalignments and contentions that shape the uptake of learning
reforms. The analysis seeks to test assumptions that political settlements
where elites have shorter time-horizons (competitive and clientelistic settle-
ments, such as those in Ghana and Bangladesh) are less likely to take up the
politically intractable task of redistributing power in the education system
than those (the dominant settlements of Cambodia and Rwanda) where elites
are better insulated, can adopt longer-term horizons and might be more likely
to take up developmentally important projects. It also seeks to explore how
different political settlements interact with systems of governance within the
domain of education, ranged from traditional hierarchically organized bur-
eaucracies tomulti-stakeholder models, to create a range of different outcomes
in ‘the many layers within a specific sector in between the top levels of
policymaking and the service provision frontline’ (Levy and Walton 2013, 4).
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 sets out the intellectual
rationale for a political settlement-based approach to the analysis of education
quality reforms, and establishes the theoretical framework and methodo-
logical approach used to research the politics in the cases presented here.
Chapters 3 through 8 comprise the set of six country cases, each of which
gives an account of the quality of basic education and its development in that
country; of the political settlement and its influences on education policy and
the reform agenda; and of the implementation of policies aimed at improving
learning from the national level downwards through sub-national levels of
governance and, in most cases, through to schools themselves. Chapter 9
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draws together the theoretical, methodological, and empirical findings from
the comparative analysis, and points towards areas for further conceptual
development and empirical research. The book concludes with two commen-
taries from leading authorities in the field on the arguments and cases pre-
sented in the book.
The Global Learning Crisis
From an access point of view, progress towards universal primary education
in low-income countries accelerated markedly in the past two decades (see
Figure 1.1). Globally, 93 per cent of children now attend primary school at
the appropriate age, up from 84 per cent in 1999. By 2015, 20 million more
developing country children had completed primary school than would have
done so had the rate of school expansion before 2000 continued. In seventeen
countries, age-correct enrolment rates increased by more than 20 per cent
between 1999 and 2012, implying a remarkably rapid expansion. And gains
were concentrated in the poorest world regions of Sub-Saharan Africa (where
the net enrolment ratio [NER] rose from 59 per cent in 1999 to 79 per cent in
2012) and South and West Asia (where it went from 78 to 94 per cent over the
same period). Between 2000 and 2010, NER increased from 27 to almost 64 per
cent in Niger, from 42 to 76 per cent in Guinea, and in Burundi, from less than
41 to 94 per cent in 2010. The proportion of children who had never attended








School enrolment, primary (% gross) high income
School enrolment, primary (% gross) lower middle income
School enrolment, primary (% gross) low income
Figure 1.1 Primary enrolment rates worldwide, 1970–2015
Source: World Development Indicators (accessed 12 July 2017).
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school dropped in Ethiopia from 67 per cent in 2000 to 28 per cent in 2011, and
in Tanzania from 47 per cent in 1999 to 12 per cent in 2010. Globally, gender
parity in enrolment was achieved at primary level and almost achieved at
secondary level over the period, in part due to the push on girls’ education
from MDG3 on gender equality; of countries with data, 69 per cent were
set to achieve gender parity at primary level, but only less than half at
secondary level by 2015.2
However, the idea that mass education was ‘one of the successes of the
MDGs’ has been tempered by ‘more sobering trends’ (Unterhalter 2014,
181). Large numbers of children remain excluded from school, with 58 million
children aged six to eleven unenrolled in 2012, many in conflict-affected
regions. At least one-fifth of all children were likely to drop out before com-
pleting primary in 32 countries, most of them in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNESCO
2015). And rural–urban location, socio-economic class, and marginalization
and social exclusion continued to determine which children enrolled and
stayed on in school. Despite gains in gender parity on literacy in many places,
progress towards adult literacy has been slow; in fact, almost all gains have
been due to the transition of schooled youth into adulthood, rather than
programmes of learning for adults. About half a billion women still lacked
basic literacy in 2015 (UNESCO 2015). And while most children in most
countries can now attend school, in a great many, a minority learn as much
as their governments expect them to. By their own standards, a large number
of developing country school systems are failing to endow their students with
even minimum competencies of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Globally,
some 125 million children do not attain functional literacy or numeracy
even after four years of school, while the majority—in some cases the vast
majority—of primary school students in many education systems do not
attain even the basic competencies in reading or arithmetic needed to con-
tinue their learning (World Bank 2017).
The poor quality of the education received by the majority in developing
countries is of particular concern because of the potential role of good quality
education in reversing—or reinforcing—economic and related inequalities.
The quality of education is increasingly understood to be a more powerful
driver of economic growth than the size of an education system, and higher-
quality basic education is associated with more inclusive and equitable forms
of growth (Hanushek 2009; Hanushek and Woessmann 2007). However, the
learning crisis aggravates, and is aggravated by, social and economic inequal-
ities of all kinds. Differences in learning attainments between lower- and
higher-income regions and countries are substantial, as a comparison of
2 All figures here are from UNESCO’s 2015 Global Monitoring Report, which took stock of all
progress towards the EFA goals over the period (UNESCO 2015).
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PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) test scores shows: the
average student in a low-income country performs worse than 95 per cent of
students in OECD countries—that is, would require remedial lessons in any
developed country school system. Differences within a region can also be
significant: Colombian students attain basic literacy six years earlier than
their Bolivian counterparts, while only 19 per cent of young Nigerian primary
school completers can read, compared with 80 per cent in Tanzania (World
Bank 2017). Girls, rural students, and children fromminority or other socially
marginalized groups generally learn less, compared with boys, city children,
and other advantaged groups (World Bank 2017). This reflects how gender and
class disadvantage, remote geography, andmembership of marginalized social
groups amplify unequal learning outcomes; these then accumulate as children
transition through the education system and on into the labour market
(UNESCO 2012, 2014). Nonetheless, some countries outperform others on
learning indicators: Vietnam, for instance, performs much better than pre-
dicted by its per capita income; students in Latvia and Albania similarly learn
more than expected from their other social and economic indicators (World
Bank 2017). This again reinforces the sense that the drivers of educational
quality are not simply related to economic or cultural factors, and that polit-
ical factors are likely to play a significant role here.
Roots of the Learning Crisis: Lessons from Efforts at Reform
Why is the learning crisis so pervasive and apparently stubborn, when policies
of educational expansion were so rapidly and enthusiastically adopted across
the developing world? Improving quality is recognized to be more expensive
and more difficult than increasing school places, and there is a perceived
trade-off between keeping unit costs low and maximizing learning achieve-
ment (Nicolai et al. 2014, 2). Enabling high quality learning is particularly
challenging amongst low-income populations because of: institutional or
personal biases against children from poor or marginalized groups (UNESCO
2010); challenges in the home environment (Smith and Barrett 2011); the
adverse cognitive effects of early and chronic malnourishment (Crookston
et al. 2010, 2013; World Bank 2017); and dropout, poor attendance, child
labour, and other characteristic features of childhoods lived in extreme pov-
erty (Rose and Dyer 2008). School meals tend to raise participation and
attendance rates, for instance, but evidence that school meals improve learn-
ing outcomes is more mixed (Adelman, Gilligan, and Lehrer 2008; Snilstveit
et al. 2015). Poverty and inequality may be the biggest obstacles to education
quality (Tikly and Barrett 2013), but while good quality education may be the
surest pathway out of poverty and towards more equitable societies, there are
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few simple solutions to raising education standards in such settings. There is,
in any case, limited consensus about what works to improve learning, as a
recent ‘review of reviews’ found (Evans and Popova 2016).
Under-resourced and poorly managed systems lead to persistently poor
quality basic education, but more finance is not necessarily the answer. Low-
and middle-income countries typically spend too little on education: only 41
of 150 countries for which data is available spend the recommended 6 per cent
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on education, and 25 countries spend
less than half that. Globally, the average proportion of public spending on
education was only 15 per cent (against a recommended 20 per cent), a
proportion that has barely changed since 1999; in some low- and middle-
income countries, the share of education in public spending dropped below
5 per cent of GDP during the MDG period (UNESCO 2014). Under-resourcing
does not explain all of the problems of education quality, but it helps to explain
why fewer than 5 per cent of Tanzanian students have their own reading
textbook, why 130 Malawian students cram into the average first-year class-
room, and why only one in four Chad schools has a toilet (UNESCO 2014).
Yet the extent to which resources shape education quality is known to be
highly variable, depending on how they are governed and managed at the
different levels of education systems. The resources that do reach schools
are often poorly deployed, usually because of over-centralized control, so
that the meagre resources are inefficiently and ineffectively used, and the
evidence on how more resources contribute to better learning via lower
pupil–teacher ratios and more qualified teachers is mixed and context-
specific (Glewwe et al. 2011). In their review of seventy-nine studies in
developing countries, Glewwe et al. (2011, 41) concluded that a reasonably
functional physical classroom tended to matter, but so did teachers with
more subject knowledge, longer school days, and the provision of tuition; by
contrast, teacher absence had a ‘clear negative effect’. Many teachers freelance
as private tutors or find other ways to supplement their income (Bray 2006).
Leakage is common, particularly through loss of public sector employee time
(Chaudhury et al. 2004).
Where teachers do show up, they are often themselves too poorly educated
to impart high quality learning: most new teachers in The Gambia, Botswana,
Lesotho, Chad, Togo, Guinea-Bissau, and Cameroon did not even meet
secondary school minimum qualifications for teachers in the 1990s (UNESCO
2004). And, despite massive investments in teacher training in the 2000s, in
one-third of countries less than 75 per cent of teachers are trained even up
to (often quite low) national standards (UNESCO 2014). Tikly and Barrett
(2013, 4) found that while low reading and mathematics attainments were
closely linked to poverty and inequality, ‘schools can make a difference’, even
more so in lower-income countries than in richer countries, particularly
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through effective school leadership and teacher management. As the World
Bank (2017) summarized it, the four determinants of the learning crisis are:
(i) children do not arrive ready to learn; (ii) teachers often lack the needed
skills and motivation; (iii) school management skills are low; and (iv) school
inputs have failed to keep pace with expansion. A critical lesson is that
learning crises are systemic, not merely errors at the margin: entire education
systems generally fail to deliver adequate levels of learning. This reflects
the ‘misalignment’ of the goals and practices of the education system
with the learning outcomes it needs to generate, notably on matters such
as setting learning objectives and responsibilities, monitoring learning,
financing, and the motivations and incentives of key actors within the
system (World Bank 2017).
What causes these misalignments? The World Development Report 2004,
Making Services Work for Poor People, undertook a political analysis of service
delivery failures, linking them to weak or dysfunctional relationships of
accountability between citizens and service-users (with respect to education,
parents, and students) and service providers (teachers, officials, politicians)
(World Bank 2003). Four dimensions of accountability most needed strength-
ening in relation to education performance: (i) voice, or how well citizens
could hold the state—politicians and policymakers—accountable for perform-
ance in discharging its responsibility for education; (ii) compacts, or how well
and how clearly the responsibilities and objectives of public engagement were
communicated to the public, and to private organizations that provide ser-
vices (Ministries of Education, school districts); (iii) management, or the
actions that created effective frontline providers (teachers, administrators)
within organizations; and (iv) client power, or how well citizen-clients could
increase the accountability of schools and school systems (World Bank 2003,
113). Central insights included that accountability for public service provision
could be exercised via the ‘long route to accountability’, whereby citizens and
civil society mandate political actors to provide education services, politicians
then direct state actors to design such services, and the central state then tasks
local governments and frontline service to deliver the services (and they are
potentially punished electorally for failures at education service delivery); or
via the ‘short route’, through which service-users hold frontline providers
directly to account, through the use of their powers as consumers or rights-
bearing citizens to demand services and sanction failures (World Bank 2003).
Recognizing the central importance of accountability, efforts to strengthen
the ‘short route’ to accountable education provision took the form of
interventions and experiments to promote community participation in
school-based management; induce community monitoring of school quality
indicators, such as enrolment, attendance, and performance; introduce vou-
chers and other ‘school choice’ initiatives; and efforts to monitor teacher
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performance, amongst others. It seems clear that teachers perform best when
motivated and monitored to do so (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011; Bruns
and Luque 2014), yet efforts to enhance learning by strengthening ‘client
power’ have yielded mixed results (Bruns et al. 2011; Carr-Hill et al. 2015;
Snilstveit et al. 2015; World Bank 2017). Carr-Hill et al. (2015) found that
community participation in school management yielded positive and large
effects in middle-income countries, but smaller and more uneven results in
poorer countries, where, amongst other things, community members lacked
the capacities or incentives to engage with school performance (see also
Dunne et al. 2007).
Some of these interventions, particularly the quasi-experimental efforts at
information and monitoring, were introduced with limited reference to the
political contexts within which they needed to operate, something which
recent reviews of social accountability have found to be critical (Devarajan,
Khemani, and Walton 2011; Hickey and King 2016). These ‘widgets’—pared-
down tools for project intervention that failed to engage with the deeper and
wider politics of school provision—had little prospect of strengthening
accountability for public service delivery (Joshi and Houtzager 2012).
Citizen power involves a transformation of political relationships, notmerely
the ‘teeth’ or consumer power tomake choices at the frontline, but the ‘voice’
to mandate public action, and to demand accountability (Fox 2015). In the
terms of theWDR 2004, the short route to accountability needs the ‘voice’ of
political claims- and policymaking for it to be effective, while at the local
level, education service delivery only has ‘teeth’—the ability to punish
failures—when citizens and service-users have the capacities to demand,
and receive, improved performance on the frontline (see also Westhorp
et al. 2014).
These bottom-up pressures also need to be backed up by top-down pressure
from within the political and bureaucratic system (Booth 2012), often
through combined forms of diagonal accountability that join up oversight
mechanisms in pursuit of more responsive and effective performance (Goetz
and Jenkins 2005; Joshi and Houtzager 2012). The nature of the ‘craft’ in the
interpersonal activity of teaching and learning means that effective school
systems need to be organized like starfish—independently functional and
responsive to differences in environment, yet connected to the whole—rather
than, as most are, like spiders, directly controlled from the centre (Pritchett
2013). Yet central control remains an important political objective in many
school systems, whether under democratic or authoritarian rule, and whether
state capacity can be judged strong or weak.
These lessons have renewed attention to the politics of the ‘long route’ to
accountability in education provision. In the first World Development Report
on education (World Bank 2017) the roots of the learning crisis are framed as
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both technical and political. In one important example, national learning
assessments are seen as vital to create ‘measures for learning [to] guide action’
as well as ‘measures of learning [to] spur action’, by increasing public partici-
pation and awareness of school performance; providing parents with evidence
needed to make better choices; and raising voice via ‘the long route of
accountability, where learning metrics may help citizens use the political
process to hold politicians accountable for learning’ (World Bank 2017, 94).
Yet, while ‘political impetus’ has been critical to the adoption and implemen-
tation of learning reforms, powerful political incentives, including
‘unhealthy’ relationships between teacher unions and political and bureau-
cratic interests, can also ensure the goals and practices of the system remain
misaligned with those of children’s learning (World Bank 2017).
Understanding the Political Economy of Education
Quality Reforms
It may be true that ‘education systems are what they are, and indeed, the
schools are what they are—everywhere in the world, regardless of the nation—
because politics makes them that way’ (Moe and Wiborg 2017). Yet political
science has paid little attention to education, for reasons that include lack of
data and the specific disciplinary challenge (for political science) of accessing
household dynamics and decision-making processes at multiple levels (Gift
and Wibbels 2014; Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011; Ansell 2010). There has
been some interest in the comparative politics of education, including in
developing countries (for instance, Baum and Lake 2003; Brown and Hunter
2004), but it remains a new thematic area for the discipline, and one in which
theorizing is in its infancy. The next section briefly discusses existing political
science theories of education provision in light of the distinct challenges and
concerns of developing countries, before moving on to the literature on the
politics of education quality in developing country settings. This includes a
discussion of the need to maintain a distinction between the politics of
education in advanced, industrialized societies with long-established systems
of mass education, and the politics of education in societies whose population
includes many first-generation learners, where mass education is still a nov-
elty and where transnational influences may be stronger.
Gift and Wibbels (2014) argue that the basis for a political science theory of
education is as a function of the interaction between demand and supply: how
much education a society receives is a function of: (a) the demand for skills
emanating from the labour market and the economy; and (b) how, and the
extent to which, those skills are supplied through the education system.
Parents are assumed to ‘naturally prefer’ schools that are good for their
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/2/2019, SPi
The Problem of Education Quality
11
children, and, to a greater or lesser extent, to mandate politicians to deliver
them. How successfully they organize to assert their demands will determine
what states provide. Ansell (2010) similarly notes that a political theory of
education must rest on insights (a) that education is essentially redistributive
and, depending on how resources are spent, can be progressive or otherwise;
and (b) that ‘public education policy is heavily affected by the nature of the
global market for educated labor’ (Ansell 2010, 3).
Not all the assumptions made by Gift and Wibbels (2014) hold in contexts
where mass formal schooling is still new. Gift and Wibbels view the outcome
as a matter of magnitude, with the dependent variable being public spending
on education. But if the heart of the problem is that schools and teachers are
unaccountable to the parents and pupils they are supposed to serve, this
implies a change in the relative political power of these groups, and not—or
not only—more resources. In fact, more resources may exacerbate the prob-
lem, entrenching public sector interests in the existing system, making
teacher unions stronger, expanding poorly managed services to an even
wider population. Parents may know neither what to expect nor what to
demand (for instance, Martínez 2012; Dunne et al. 2007; Mani and Mukand
2007). The capacity of citizens to demand and achieve improved levels of
service provision is in general closely shaped by issues of poverty, exclusion,
and inequality (Hickey and King 2016).
In developing countries with limited state capacity, the strongest demand
for an educated population may come from the state itself. Many developing
countries lack the human resources to staff the state; as we have already seen,
many low-income countries cannot recruit enough educated teachers. Educa-
tion provision may thus be insulated against state weaknesses and/or the
problems of personalized as opposed to programmatic policy regimes, but
with limited implications for quality: ‘in an environment of weak state cap-
acity, democracy may prompt governments to increase education access,
but not education inputs’ (Harding and Stasavage 2014, 230). The likely
absence of programmatic education agendas in developing countries may
also be related to the general absence of programmatic class-based parties;
the political history of education in developed countries indicates that parties
and coalitions on the left and centre are more likely to promote wider access
to education, and are associated with higher public spending on education
(Busemeyer 2014).
Demand for educated labour from employers may be weak in low-income
developing countries with large ‘reserve army’ populations, or because low-
capital enterprises generally need little skilled labour. It seems clear that the
‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach to understanding differences in education
policy on the basis of ‘a functional complementarity between skill formation
and welfare state policies’ (Busemeyer 2014, 35) offers limited insights into
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situations where the relationship between labour, capital, and the state is
informal, paternalistic, and unorganized. Corrales argues that it is possible
that ‘more exposure to capitalism prompts governments and constituents to
protect education expenditures’, but that how domestic politics interacts with
opportunities and constraints in the global economy shapes the politics of
investment in education (Corrales 2006, 240). Doner and Schneider (2016,
635) note that informality, inequality, and a reliance on foreign direct invest-
ment can fragment business and labour, and ‘undercut the potential demand
for upgrading institutions’.
Of the available scholarship that does focus on the political economy of
education in developing countries,3 it is possible to differentiate between
those studies which focus on how national-level politics shapes educational
policies in broad terms (e.g. Stasavage 2005; Kosack 2009; Kosack 2012) and
those that look more specifically at how politics (e.g. Grindle 2004) and
governance arrangements (Pritchett 2013) play out within education systems.
Within each of these literatures, there is a further distinction between a focus
on formal institutional arrangements (e.g. Ansell 2008 and Stasavage 2005 on
democracy; Pritchett 2013 on education sector governance; World Bank 2003
on formal accountability structures) and those that focus on informal power
and politics (e.g. Kosack 2012 on political coalitions; Grindle 2004 on policy
coalitions; also, Wales et al. 2016).
Analysis of the relationship between democracy and education tends to
find that democracy exerts a positive influence on governments’ financial
commitments to education (Stasavage 2005; Ansell 2008). But this may not
advance understanding of reforms aimed at learning, as opposed to access.
Nelson (2007) argues that competitive elections may create pressures to
increase but not to improve or reallocate provision, because the political
incentives to do so are so weak and non-urgent. Kosack (2012) also goes
beyond regime-type explanations in search of a less formal and institutional
analysis, arguing that none of the three most common political–economic
explanations (relating to regime type, education cultures, and governmental
commitment to economic performance) predict the realities of education
policies. In his analysis of Taiwan, Ghana, and Brazil, Kosack concludes that
answers to two questions can explain patterns of education investment:
whose support does a government need to stay in power? What sort of
education do those citizens want? Kosack identifies situations in which polit-
ical entrepreneurs help disorganized groups to organize around common
interests on education, as through the formation of coalitions between popu-
list leaders and rural constituencies (Kosack 2012; also Corrales 1999). By
3 We are grateful to Sophie King for producing an excellent annotated bibliography on the
politics of education in developing countries, on which this section is based.
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extension of the same logic regarding the role of coalitions in shaping policy
preferences, it may well be that developing countries lack the kinds of organ-
ized groups that might constitute a coalition in favour of a better trained
citizenry and labour force (e.g. middle-class parents, organized capitalists).
This focus on informal forms of politics seems to characterize the most
insightful comparative work to date on education politics. Merilee Grindle’s
(2004) seminal work on education sector reform in Latin America notes that
whereas access reforms were ‘“easy” from a political economy perspective’
(Grindle 2004, 6), reforms aimed at improving quality in the 1990s:
involved the potential for lost jobs, and lost control over budgets, people, and
decisions. They exposed students, teachers, and supervisors to new pressures and
expectations. Teachers’ unions charged that they destroyed long existing rights
and career tracks. (Grindle 2004, 6)
The wider literature supports the presumption that teachers are typically the
best organized and most vocal group empowered to influence education
policy and reforms, and that influence is not always benign (Moe and
Wiborg 2017; Bruns and Schneider 2016; Kingdon et al. 2014; Rosser and
Fahmi 2018; Béteille et al. 2016). Nevertheless, Grindle’s cases of education
quality reforms in Latin America show that reforms could succeed, depending
on how they were introduced, designed, approved, and implemented. Reform-
oriented coalitions within the education sector were particularly important in
her cases. Corrales (1999) similarly suggests that policy entrepreneurs tend to
emerge in response to high-level government commitment to reforms. But a
recent review of the politics of education quality in developing countries found
that the visibility and ‘political returns’ of educational investments, informa-
tion asymmetries, particularly around performance assessment, and patterns of
demand and accountability, including capacities for collective action, tended to
limit commitment to quality reforms (Nicolai et al. 2014, 5).
In terms of studies on the significance of formal governance arrangements
within the education sector, there has been a focus on both the national- and
local-level systems, and within each of these on the appropriate balance
between top-down and bottom-up forms of accountability mechanisms.
Pritchett (2013) argues that school systems are often highly centralized,
which can work well to deliver expanded provision quickly, but which may
exclude local parents and teachers from influence, and so deliver schooling
without learning. A similar point is made by Tikly and Barrett (2013, 20), who
conclude that ‘weighting accountability towards top-down control . . . can
constrain the space for teacher autonomy, reducing responsive inclusion
and curricula relevance at the classroom level’.
However, formal governance arrangements rarely play out according to
design in developing countries (Andrews 2013). Kingdon et al. (2014, 2)
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note that the supposed benefits of decentralization ‘do not accrue in practice
because in poor rural areas the local elite closes up the spaces for wider
community representation and participation in school affairs’. They suggest
the effects of decentralization are ‘especially problematic when accountability
systems are weak, and there is little parental information or awareness of how
to hold schools responsible’ (Kingdon et al. 2014, 28). A good deal of work has
been undertaken at the level of schools themselves, particularly in terms of the
type of oversight and accountability measures associated with improved levels
of performance. Westhorp et al.’s (2014) systematic review of the circum-
stances under which decentralization, school-based management, account-
ability initiatives, and community schools influence education outcomes,
particularly for the poor, found that a wide range of approaches had achieved
some degree of success. These include the introduction of rewards in conjunc-
tion with sanctions; performance monitoring by the community members,
including traditional authorities and politicians; and the introduction of
direct accountability relationships, including the power to hire and fire
between school management committees and staff. However, school-level
interventions are rarely enough on their own: to work, they depend on
a supportive political context, an adequately-resourced education sector
with a strong national system for assessment, and high-capacity local
actors, including school management committees, head teachers, and local
community actors.
Some research into the politics of education in developing countries has
focused more on the ideas (rather than only the incentives) that shape elite
behaviour. A good deal of work on elite perceptions and commitment has
identified education as being an area that attracts a high level of consensus
from ruling elites, as compared with other aspects of social policy (e.g. Hossain
2005; Hossain and Moore 2002). Contemporary developing countries are part
of a world system in which mass education is, or is becoming, the norm, so
that integration into that world system depends on the provision of mass
education, and provision of mass education legitimates state authority (Boli,
Ramirez, and Meyer 1985; Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992; see also Corrales
2006; Tikly 2001). Policy and political elitesmay ‘demand’ education as part of
a developmentalist agenda of nation building or economic development, or as
an instrument for achieving other social policy goals (e.g. fertility control:
Colclough 2012; Ansell 2010).
Finally, international actors have played a significant role in driving up the
levels of investment in education in developing countries, and in ensuring
that a significant effort is made to target this provision at poorer groups. This
is in part through the transnational advocacy coalition that comprised
the Global Campaign for Education (Gaventa and Mayo 2009), as well as
the strong pressures that international aid agencies have often exerted over
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education policy within countries that rely on overseas development finance.
The Millennium Development Goals helped to provide further impetus here.
However, the influence of aid agencies within the global South is declining,
and there is little evidence to date that donors or international agencies have
succeeded in promoting reforms targeted at improving the quality of educa-
tion, despite efforts in this direction (Wales et al. 2016), including through the
Sustainable Development Goals.
Overall, then, there have been some important studies of the politics of
educational quality in developing countries, even if these are few in nature.
Of these, the ones that most closely address our concern with the politics of
promoting difficult reforms aimed at tackling the learning crisis have tended
to emphasize the role of informal as well as formal institutional processes,
ideas as well as incentives, and actors operating at multiple scales, from the
global through to the local, and often in the form of coalitions. Given that
none have presented a conceptual framework that can help capture these
multiple factors, we try to address this failing in the next chapter, where we
set out an approach that helped guide the studies reported on here and which
we hope can be of some use in guiding further work in the field.
Conclusion: Understanding Education Quality Reform Demands
a Political Approach
The global learning crisis manifests itself in low learning attainments in each
of the six countries studied here. Their experiences are reflected across the
struggles faced by low- and middle-income countries to grow their education
systems in an increasingly competitive global economy dependent on skills.
This book helps to make sense of the global learning crisis by exploring the
proposition that politics matters, centrally, in explaining why some countries
are doing better at raising the quality of education than others. But howmight
politics matter? Political analysis of education is limited, both empirically and
theoretically, and both in developed and in developing countries. While there
are good reasons to believe that the difference in the uptake of quality reforms
and their implementation relates to differences of a political nature, there is
little conceptual work with which to build a theoretical framework for analys-
ing how that works, or evidence to test it. This book contributes both evidence
of how politics influences reforms in developing countries, and to the con-
struction of theory about how this comes about. It does this by setting out and
testing hypotheses about how the political settlement and its relationship to
the domain of education have shaped the uptake, success, or failure of recent
efforts to bring about education quality reform.
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Education quality reforms tend to be less politically tractable than pro-
grammes of expansion. The nature and distribution of power over the vital
resource involved in education quality—teaching—are necessarily at the
centre of this analysis. Quality reforms are difficult to design and difficult to
deliver: less is known about ‘what works’ and achievement is hard to measure.
Weak state capacity has not prevented children from attending school, but it
is very likely to shape what happens once they get there. Yet strong state
capacity in relation to educationmay not necessarily or onlymean centralized
power; effective education systems must be responsive and adaptive to local
needs, granting enough autonomy for schools to be accountable to the local
communities they seek to educate. The governance and institutional reforms
needed to build effective schools are intensely political and involve struggles
over power, whether in terms of the authority to define the content and
direction of nation building, the power to deploy the vast national teaching
force, or the resources to spend on school buildings and teachers’ pay.
The following chapters look at how politics is shaping the level of capacity
and commitment of elites to improving the quality of public education and its
governance in developing countries. These chapters explore variations in the
extent to which countries have adopted and implemented reforms aimed at
improving learning outcomes, and in how those reforms have played out in
terms of improved learning. Next, Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework
for understanding the politics of education in developing countries within
which such analysis can be conducted.
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2
Researching the Politics of Education
Quality in Developing Countries
Towards a New Conceptual and
Methodological Approach
Sam Hickey and Naomi Hossain
Introduction
The literature on the political economy of education is underdeveloped in
geographical scope, robustness of methods utilised and theoretical rich-
ness . . . large parts of the world, especially most countries of Africa and
South-east Asia, remain virtually untouched by research on the ways in
which political economy forces affect their education sector decisions,
processes and outcomes.
(Kingdon et al. 2014, 46)
That politics plays a major role in shaping educational outcomes in the global
South is increasingly recognizedwithin academic and policy communities alike.
However, there is little agreement on which forms of politics really matter, how
to conceptualize these factors, and how to actually investigate them in practice.
The quote above, drawn from the most systematic survey of existing scholarly
work on the politics of education in developing countries, emphasizes how far
we still need to go to arrive at a more rigorous and complete sense of
this important field. The analysis of the learning crisis in developing countries
suffers not only from large empirical gaps, but also from the lack of theoretical
frameworks specifically oriented towards understanding the politics of edu-
cational quality (Wales, Magee, and Nicolai 2016) and from systematic and
comparative analysis of how these relationships unfold in practice (Kingdon
et al. 2014).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/2/2019, SPi
In Chapter 1, we reviewed the small body of work that does exist in this area,
and drew out themain dimensions and factors towhich it draws attention. This
chapter sets out a new framework for analysing the political economy of educa-
tion in developing countries that foregrounds these factors, and which can help
guide comparative work on the politics of educational reform in developing
countries. We also describe the methodological approach that was deployed to
undertake the research presented in this volume. It is important at this stage to
re-emphasize what this volume is trying to explain, namely the political factors
that shape the extent to which elite actors become committed to adopting and
implementing educational reforms aimed at improving learning outcomes. This
meanswe are not addressing the question of howpolitical factors help shape the
nature and extent of the learning crisis per se, or of educational outcomes (which
would need a very different methodological approach), but rather the political
conditions under which elites decide to tackle this crisis and howpolitics shapes
the nature and success of this response. To close the gap between this question
and actual learning outcomes, we focus on those reforms that recent reviews
suggest have a strong chance of tackling the sources of the learning crisis,
particularly those aimed at tackling deficits in teacher training, problems of
teacher absenteeism, and issues of oversight and performance management.
Rethinking the Politics of Education: A ‘Domains
of Power’ Approach
Studies (on the political economy of education) have tended to employ a
very general understanding of ‘political economy’ . . . future work needs to
develop more conceptual clarity and more nuanced political theories
about change and particularly about how alternative structural, historical
and institutional conditions determine varied possibilities and constraints
within which actors in different polities have to work thereby generating
differing developmental paths.
(Kingdon et al. 2014, 46–7)
The task of formulating a conceptual framework that can capture the ways in
which politics shape processes of educational reform in developing countries
is, then, a considerable one. Here we set out one possible response to the
challenge set out by Kingdon et al. (2014), by trying to capture the most
salient political factors that seem to shape educational reform and outcomes
in developing countries within a coherent conceptual framework. To recap
the findings of the literature reviewed in Chapter 1, these factors include the
ways in which material aspects of a country’s political economy shape
the capacity of different groups to make demands; the powerful role
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played by informal as well as formal institutions in developing countries; the
particular forms of political agency (e.g. leadership, coalitions) required to
navigate these structural conditions at multiple levels; the role of governance
arrangements and relationships within the state, as well as between the state
and citizens; and the role played by ideas as well as the incentives in shaping
elite behaviour. A framework for understanding the politics of education in
developing countries would also need to avoid the methodological national-
ism that pervades much political analysis, and incorporate a sense of how
transnational factors also shape domestic policy processes.
Our conceptual effort to capture these features, which draws on recent
theoretical advances aimed at understanding the politics of development, is
termed the ‘domains of power’ framework. This seeks to capture the inter-
action between the political settlement, which refers to the broad configuration
of power within society, and the policy domain, in this case the domain of
education (see Figure 2.1). This focus on domains of power represents an effort
to go beyond a focus on how formal institutional arrangements shape devel-
opment processes and outcomes (e.g.World Bank 2003), and an effort to bring
together the approaches used within the most insightful and (importantly)
comparative work on the political economy of education discussed in
Chapter 1 (Grindle 2004; Kosack 2012).
Political Settlements
Going beyond the mantra that ‘institutions matter’, development theory has
increasingly recognized the central role that politics plays in shaping uneven
E C O N O M I C  S T R U C T U R E ,  H I S T O RY,  N O R M S
ELITE COMMITMENT 
STATE CAPACITY
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Figure 2.1 Domains of power
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patterns of development between different countries and the economic and
social progress that countries are able to make. Major contributions have
centred on the forms of politics and power relations that shape which kinds
of institutions emerge and how they actually function in practice (Acemoglu
and Robinson 2012; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Khan 2010). A shared
focus within this body of work is on the significance of inter-elite bargaining,
whereby powerful groups within society struggle with each other for influence
over the rules of the game that distribute resources and status. The nature of
these struggles and their outcomes is critical to understanding why similar
forms of institutions, including rules regarding the exchange of political
power and the distribution of resources, function in very different ways in
different contexts. Within this increasingly influential body of literature,1 the
conceptual approach that has been subject to the greatest level of theory-
testing (Whitfield et al. 2015), and which goes furthest in terms of incorpor-
ating a strong political economy perspective (Gray 2016), is the political
settlements approach advanced by Mushtaq Khan (2000, 2010, 2017).
Political settlements analysis focuses on how the balance of power between
social groups tends to ensure that institutions function primarily to distribute
goods and status to powerful groups, in order to maintain their agreement
with the basic rules of the game.2 Political settlements are shaped by ‘the
relative holding power of different groups and organizations contesting the
distribution of resources’, with holding power ‘partly based on income and
wealth but also on historically rooted capacities of different groups to organ-
ize’ (Khan 2010, 1). A political settlement, in terms of political order and
relative stability, emerges when enough elites are sufficiently satisfied that
status and resources are being distributed in line with the prevailing balance of
power in society. The historical moments at which such settlements become
established, or experience some kind of rupture, have been identified as
creating the conditions for significant shifts in policy approach, including
within the domain of education. For example,
In their comparative study of African countries, Evans et al. (1995) underline the
role of political imperatives and contexts in ‘triggering’ reviews of education
policy between the 1970s and early 1990s. National reviews of education arose
in Benin, Mali and Uganda after a new, often revolutionary and/or newly elected
democratic government came to power (Benin, Mali, Uganda). They also arose
at the end of a period of conflict or war (Mozambique, Uganda), when public
1 For example, this new turn to politics within mainstream development theory has had a direct
influence on successive flagship publications from the World Bank, most notably the 2017 World
Development Report on ‘Governance, Law and Development’ (also World Bank 2011).
2 For a political settlements analysis of education in Ghana, see Abdulai and Hickey (2016), from
which the following paragraph is substantially derived.
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dissatisfaction with the condition of education could no longer be ignored
(Benin, Ghana, Guinea). (From Kingdon et al. 2014, 35)
To this, we can add the case of South Africa, whereby prior to the reforms that
accompanied the move towards a multi-racial democracy in 1994 (see
Chapter 6), the threats to the apartheid era political settlement generated by
the 1976 Soweto uprising, school boycotts, industrial unrest, and skilled
labour shortages triggered wholesale reforms of the education and training
system (Chisholm 1983).
The personalized processes of bargaining between powerful actors leads to
‘deals’ rather than ‘rules’, in the first instance, and helps explain why formal
institutions, such as multi-party elections and rational bureaucratic processes
for allocating budgetary resources, may not easily displace the ‘informal’ logics
of the personalized and clientelist rule that preceded them (Khan 2010; North
et al. 2009). This makes it difficult for institutions to operate on an ‘imper-
sonal’ basis, and likely that they will instead take on highly personalized
modes of functioning (Levy 2014).
Going further, Khan (2010, 2017) argues that the predominance of informal
institutions in developing countries is underpinned by the nature of their
political economy, whereby relatively small formal sectors are outweighed by
the much larger informal economy. This has two types of effect on the realm
of politics and governance.
First, the limited size and scope of the formal productive economy means
that governments lack the tax base required to allocate resources to powerful
groups, other than through informal, off-budgetary processes. This helps
ensure that processes of rent-seeking and the clientelist distribution of public
resources and positions are systemic features of such political economies, in
ways that directly undermine the quality of the public bureaucracy and of
service provision in domains such as education.
Second, the limited scope of the formal sector reflects the limited level of
capitalist development that characterizes most developing countries, most of
which lack a domestic capitalist class of any significant size or influence. This
means that most developing countries lack organized social groups with the
capacity to accumulate wealth other than through their relationship with
political elites, on whom they rely for various rent-seeking opportunities
(involving subsidies, contracts, procurement opportunities, and so on).
Again, the nature of the political economy helps ensure that the politics of
patronage and rent-seeking are structural (rather than cultural) features of
governance in most developing countries. Importantly for our focus on edu-
cation, this means that not only are public institutions frequently turned to
purposes other than distributing resources in line with a broad public interest,
but also that developing countries lack a critical mass of capitalists with
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sufficient ‘holding power’ to pressure governments into producing more
highly skilled workers through educational ‘upgrading’ (Doner and Schneider
2016; Kosack 2012).
These two features—the configuration of power and the nature of institu-
tions, and how they interact—constitute the central features of a political
settlement. We briefly discuss each here, before setting out how they can be
used to construct a typology of political settlements whereby different coun-
tries can be understood as representatives of heuristic types, each of which
establishes different conditions for achieving development.
The configuration of power amongst different social groups in society plays
a significant role in shaping the capacity and commitment of those in control
of political power, a group that Khan refers to as the ‘ruling coalition’. If the
ruling coalition considers itself vulnerable to threats from excluded factions
with significant holding power, it is more likely to be driven by short-term
calculations than to undertake institutional reforms and distribute resources
with a longer-term vision of the national interest in mind (Khan 2010; also
Kelsall 2012). Khan argues that the highest levels of state capacity for devel-
opment are likely to occur where the vulnerability of ruling elites is low, due to
the absence of powerful excluded factions and also strong lower-level factions
which may be able to block reforms. This level of regime security can encour-
age these ‘dominant coalitions’ to adopt a longer-term time horizon, and
reduces the transaction costs involved in implementing policies. Conversely,
where there is a credible threat to the ruling coalition from powerful excluded
groups, who may be able to wrest power away from them (e.g. through
elections), and where lower-level factions are strong enough to make multiple
demands on the centre, then the prospects for developmental governance are
diminished. Within this ‘competitive clientelist’ type of political settlement,
elite incentives are loaded towards the use of public institutions for securing
short-term political gains (Khan 2010; also Levy 2014).3 In terms of education,
this may involve strong incentives to invest more in the quantity and visibil-
ity of provision (e.g. school buildings), rather than the quality of provision,
which may involve challenging the interests of groups with significant hold-
ing power (e.g. teachers’ unions).
Through their interaction with the configuration of power in society,
institutions are mutually constitutive of political settlements. The nature
of institutions can be arranged along a continuum that runs from being
‘personalized’ to ‘impersonal’ (Levy 2014). Institutions here refer to the
‘rules of the game’ that help govern and shape the behaviour of actors in
3 The triggers of educational reform have been associated with many factors that would be
captured within the political settlements analysis proposed here, including threats to political
stability, changes between ruling coalitions, and the ideological preferences of leaders.
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economic, political, and social spheres (North 1990), including firms, polit-
ical parties, bureaucratic organizations, and civic associations. Where insti-
tutions are highly personalized, such organizational forms largely exist as
the vehicles of particular interests, rather than on the basis of a wider and
programmatic platform, as is generally the case with political parties in many
developing countries.
The interactionbetween these twodimensionsof anygivenpolitical settlement
is critical. On the one hand, the configuration of power can shape the extent to
which institutions function in more or less personalized ways. Where the ruling
coalition is relatively dominant, it may be willing to undertake investments in
building bureaucratic capability and enable institutions to function in ways that
are largely impersonal and can constrain thebehaviour of elites aswell as ordinary
citizens (e.g. through ensuring that the rule of law applies to all). Conversely,
where levels of elite cohesion are low and exacerbated by high levels of inter-elite
competition for power, the incentives for rulers to use institutions to distribute
public goods and positions to maintain political survival are much higher.
The influence can also run in the opposite direction, with the nature of
institutions also helping to shape the strategies of rule deployed by elites, as
numerous studies of political development have shown. For example, com-
petitive politics can further embed the politics of patronage if it emerges
before significant levels of state capacity (in terms of strong and impersonal
bureaucratic organizations in particular) have been built, as this presents
strong incentives to capture public organizations as a means of ensuring
political survival. Conversely, where institutional capacity has been devel-
oped, competitive politics can help underpin moves towards meritocratic
forms of civil service system (Fukuyama 2016; Grindle 2012).
The interplay between the configuration of power and institutions produces
four main types of political settlement that prevail in the majority of devel-
oping countries (Figure 2.2). These are countries that have achieved a degree of
political order and relative stability that is reflected in some sort of political
settlement, but which have not moved towards what North et al. (2009) refer
to as ‘open access orders’, characterized by economic and political institutions
that are largely rule-based, impersonal, and open to all. Each of these four
types offers different incentives, opportunities, and constraints in terms of
governance and development (Levy 2014). Note that political settlements are
always in flux, with countries characterized by the same broad type potentially
moving in different directions along one or more dimensions; there is no
expectation that countries will move forward in a particular direction, with
reversals and sideways movements always possible, depending on how the
interaction of power relations and institutions plays out.
Type 2: dominant-personalized settlements include countries that have the
potential to make rapid developmental advances because elite cohesion
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enables rulers to enact and implement reforms in line with a long time-
horizon and state-building project, with relatively little opposition (e.g.
South Korea in the 1960s). Contemporary examples may include Ethiopia
and Rwanda. It is worth noting here that many of the ‘score outperformers’
on charts of educational attainment (such as South Korea, Vietnam, Japan,
Singapore, and several ex-Soviet states) were, for an extended period, under
dominant rule systems (see Chapter 10). However, the reliance on particular
leaders renders such settlements prone to personalized forms of capture and
potential backsliding into instability and conflict (e.g. Democratic Republic of
Congo). Unless public organizations are robust, competitive pressures are
likelier to incentivize rulers to double-down on the personalized use of insti-
tutions to secure political survival (e.g. Uganda), rather thanmake longer-term
investments in building impersonal institutions.
Type 3: competitive clientelist settlements characterize much of the develop-
ing world, and illustrate the difficulties of forming credible institutions under
the pressures of inter-elite competition for power and resources, with strong
incentives for ruling elites to distribute public resources and positions to
secure political loyalty. Examples include Bangladesh (before 2009), Malawi,
Kenya, and Zambia. However, the iterative process of political power changing
hands between elite factions may strengthen political institutions over time
(e.g. Ghana).
Type 4: dominant with rule-by-law settlements are generally those dominant-
personal settlements that have managed to institutionalize ‘rules’ around the
exchange of political power and distribution of resources. This allows for a




























Figure 2.2 A typology of political settlements
Source: Adapted from Levy (2014).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/2/2019, SPi
Researching the Politics of Education Quality
29
include South Korea during the 1980s to 1990s, Singapore, and arguably
China (with the now erstwhile rules limiting presidential terms), and also
South Africa, where the electorally dominant Africa National Congress
inherited relatively high levels of state capacity when it came to power in 1994.
Type 5: competitive with rule of law settlements have managed to secure
agreements amongst elites that power should exchange hands on a competi-
tive basis and that they are also subject to the rule of law. India would be one
contemporary example of this type of settlement.
Our selection of cases, which we discuss in relation to this typology below,
enables us to explore the extent to which these different types of political
settlement shape the capacity and commitment to delivering on educational
reforms aimed at improved learning outcomes.
Political settlements analysis thus operates at the broad level of how polit-
ical power is organized within societies, and how this shapes the functioning
of institutions.We have suggested that the ways in which political settlements
are formed and shift over time, how the balance of power between different
groups is configured within them, and the extent to which institutions oper-
ate along personal or impersonal lines, are all likely to play significant roles in
shaping the capacity and commitment of elites to different aspects of devel-
opment, including education. However, the specific ways in which this plays
out are likely to differ within different types of policy areas or sectors; for
example, the challenge of promoting economic growth, and the vested inter-
ests involved in lobbying for different approaches, differs from concerns
with social provisioning. As such, and in line with calls for this macro level
of analysis to be joined up more effectively with more proximate frames of
analysis that are better attuned to capturing the politics of reform at lower
levels (Grindle 2017), our conceptual framework includes a second domain
of power, namely the ‘policy domain’. This will enable us to explore how
political drivers interact with the specific character of education as a policy
domain. Here we set out some of the general features of a policy domain,
before identifying the most salient of these for our focus on education.
Policy Domains
A ‘policy domain’ can be defined as a meso-level social field of power
relations within which actors promote competing agendas.4 Different types of
policy domain will play different roles in terms of maintaining the political
4 For other efforts to conceptualize how political settlements and policy domains interact, see
Bebbington et al. (2018) on natural resources, Hickey and Lavers (2016) on social protection,
Nazneen, Hickey, and Sifaki (forthcoming) on women’s empowerment, and Pritchett, Sen, and
Werker (2013).
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settlement, particularly through the provision of the rents and/or popular
legitimacy required to keep political elites in power. The nature of this political
role is likely to shape the degree of political interference and the relative
autonomy that domain-specific actors have to act within their domain. Given
that education can deliver both popular legitimacy, particularly in terms of
offering access to previously excluded rural voters, and a great many divisible
goods that can be distributed directly to favoured regions and groups (e.g. jobs,
schools), this suggests that it is a type of policy domain that will be prone to
being highly politicized. This leaves open the question of whether this politi-
cization has more or less developmental consequences: for example, too little
politicization can lead a policy domain to becomingmarginalizedwhen it comes
to budgetary allocations and prioritization regarding implementation, whereas
too much can generate problems such as political interference and elite capture.
Specific policy domains are further defined by their governance arrange-
ments, the range of actors and ideas (or ‘policy frames’) involved, and the
legacies of past policies. Governance arrangements include the processes
through which policies are formulated and implemented, and the mechan-
isms in place to ensure accountability. These processes, which may be
more or less centralized or decentralized, and involve top-down, diagonal,
and bottom-up accountability mechanisms, have been identified as central to
how different aspects of education reforms are enacted and implemented
(World Bank 2003). However, while these formal arrangements provide the
institutional architecture within which different types of actors manoeuvre
and seek to exert their influence within the domain, in clientelistic political
settlements they may only function as intended insofar as they are aligned
with the interests of powerful actors (Levy and Walton 2013). Within the
domain of education, this often involves a large range of players, including
politicians and bureaucrats at multiple levels, teachers’ unions and associ-
ations, aid agencies, traditional leaders, community-based organizations,
and school-level players such as management committees, headteachers,
and parent–teacher associations. The incentives of these actors to behave in
particular ways will do much to shape the possibilities for different types of
reforms to emerge and gain priority. However, the ideological projects of
different actors may also matter here, as we go on to discuss in more detail
next. Finally, policy legacies can also play an important role in shaping what is
politically and technically feasible with regards to contemporary reforms. This
may occur through processes of ‘policy feedback’ (Pierson 1993), whereby
first-generation reforms empower particular actors or modes of practice that
may then act as obstacles to future generations of reform. For example, a
recurring theme across the cases we present here concerns the impact that
access-based reforms, such as universal primary education, have had on efforts
to promote improved learning outcomes.
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The Cross-cutting Role of Ideas
Ideasmatter to the politics of development, both in general andwith reference
to specific policy domains in developing countries. This is particularly true in
the case of education. Going beyond a purely materialist and rational-actor
sense of what drives political elites and projects, ideas are conceptualized here
as integral dimensions of both domains of power within our framework,
namely the political settlement and the policy domain. At the level of the
political settlement, certain ideas are required to bind elites together, securing
their commitment to upholding a certain set of institutions (Blyth 2002),
while also being deployed more instrumentally by elites to help secure loyalty
amongst followers. Ideas around education have played an important role in
both of these regards. For example, nationalist elites, who themselves bene-
fited from a modern education, have often conceived of education as being
central to their wider ideological projects of nation building and commitment
to development (Hossain 2005), and a commitment to education often cuts
across party loyalties. Ruling elites have also often used promises of educa-
tional expansion to secure popularity at opportune moments of the electoral
cycle, as indicated by the correlation between elections and expenditure in
this sector (Stasavage 2005), and as ameans of forming ruling coalitions across
otherwise disparate social groups (Kosack 2012). Ideas are not simply the
preserve of elites, of course, and the strong emphasis that elites often place
on education is partially in recognition of the emphasis that many parents
place on the value of education for their children.
More specific forms of ideas also matter within the educational policy
domain, from campaigns for improved access, through to the proposition of
specific solutions to the problem of quality (e.g. around teacher-training and
specific accountability mechanisms). There is an important transnational
dimension to the flow of ideas around education and education reform, with
several international agencies, such as UNESCO and the World Bank, seeking
to shape the content and direction of reforms within developing countries
through a variety of means. For example, ideas about the value of universal
primary education circulated in the international community and influenced
national political and bureaucratic elites through aid programming and global
conferences (e.g. the 1990 Jomtien Conference on Education for All).
Oneway toconceptualize the roleof ideaswithinandacross these twodomains
of power is to draw on the field of ‘discursive institutionalism’ (Schmidt 2008,
2010). Discursive institutionalists conceive of ideas at threemain levels:
 paradigmatic ideas that offer ‘a relatively coherent set of assumptions
about the functioning of economic, social and political institutions’
(Béland 2005, 8),
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 problem definitions that frame particular social issues as problems that need
to be resolved, and
 policy ideas that provide potential solutions to the problems deemed
worthy of addressing.
Paradigmatic ideas can be seen as operating primarily at the level of the
political settlement, while problem definitions and policy ideas are promoted
and struggled over primarily at the level of the policy domain (see Figure 2.1).
As discussed in the case study chapters, powerful ideas around education, the
social role it plays, and the way the delivery of education should be governed,
all play important roles in shaping the extent to which higher-quality learning
has been prioritized and achieved in developing countries.
Researching the Politics of Education
Our contention here is that the interaction between particular types of polit-
ical settlement and the domain of education in a given context will do a good
deal to determine the extent to which new reforms, including those aimed at
promoting higher-quality learning, gain political priority in terms of both
adoption and implementation. In broad terms, this is what we set out in
Figure 2.1. However, to explore these interactions in more depth requires a
further move towards operationalizing this framework. Here we draw on
ground-breaking work by Levy and Walton (2013), which shows how differ-
ent types of political settlement interact with, and help shape performance
within, sectors like education that are involved in social provisioning
(Figure 2.3). Throughout the different levels of the framework, from national
through sectoral and sub-national levels of governance to the frontline of
service delivery, there is a strong focus on the de facto as well as the de jure
processes at work here, responding to the sense that powerful actors can often
override formal rules in clientelistic political settlements. Their framework
also focuses on how ideas and discourse as well as material incentives shape
political and policy-related behaviour. This would include, for example, the
informal strategies of reform entrepreneurs and coalitions (Corrales 1999;
Grindle 2004) as well as formal accountability mechanisms (World Bank
2003). This seeks to overcome the problem of emphasizing formal relation-
ships between formally constituted sets of actors (citizens, bureaucrats, poli-
ticians), given that multiple studies of the politics of service delivery (and of
politics in developing countries in general) have found that a wider range of
players matters and that informal forms of politics, process, and relation-
ships are highly significant. A political settlements perspective explicitly
draws attention to these informal as well as formal institutions, and seeks
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to show that the ways in which they actually function are shaped by under-
lying sets of power relations. Levy and Walton’s effort to operationalize a
political settlements approach in the domain of service provision directly
encourages a focus on ‘the many layers within a specific sector in between
the top levels of policymaking and the service provision front line’ (Levy
and Walton 2013, 4); an important proposition here is that these ‘in-
between spaces’ are major domains of political, stakeholder,
and organizational behaviour. This helps identify the ‘politically salient
stakeholders’ that are critical to shaping the success or failure of reforms
at localized levels of governance, which our case study analysis shows
stretches to traditional actors and local-level coalitions, rather than only to
citizens and service providers. This in turn helps to overcome the tendency
within political settlements analysis to focus on the role of elite actors at the
national level.
Political settlement and its
local/sectoral manifestation
Service provision front-line





Intermediate level #1: 
rules, monitoring & 
enforcement mechanisms 
over lower levels
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Figure 2.3 A framework for researching the politics of social provisioning
Source: Levy and Walton (2013).
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Process Tracing and Comparative Case Study Analysis
This conceptual framework is best suited to being deployed and tested within
the kinds of small- andmedium-n comparative research efforts that have so far
been largely absent within research into the politics of education, and of
development more generally. This type of approach can help move beyond
both the generalities of large-n dataset analysis and the highly context-specific
findings from single-shot case studies. The use of a theory-driven typology to
select cases can enable theory-testing and also offer more policy-relevant
findings that can ‘fit’ with particular types of context (George and Bennett
2004), as opposed to identifying either one-size-fits-all solutions or exaggerat-
ing the unique character of every case.
The comparative research project that we report on here was undertaken in
six countries that represent three of the four different types of political settle-
ment identified by Levy (see Figure 2.2).
 Type 2: Rwanda, Uganda, Cambodia: personalized elite bargains and
limited institutional complexity, with dominant party/leader. However,
each country reflects different levels of dominance and commitment to
building impersonal institutions.
 Rwanda: highly dominant, higher commitment to impersonality
 Cambodia: dominant, limited commitment to impersonality
 Uganda: weakly dominant, highly personalized
 Type 3: Bangladesh, Ghana: personalized elite bargains and limited insti-
tutional complexity within competitive clientelism.
 Type 4: South Africa: more impersonalized elite bargains and greater
institutional complexity within a relatively dominant setting. However,
the ruling African National Congress (ANC) coalition in South Africa is
itself made up of several factions, which renders it as a ‘negotiated’ form
of dominance; the country is also characterized by significant sub-
national variation, whereby some provinces reflect different types of
sub-national political settlements, due to differing levels of political com-
petition and institutional legacies. This sub-national variation is
exploited through a comparative study of the Western and Eastern Cape
Provinces in Chapter 6.
The aim was to help enable the identification not only of different rates and
levels of progress made between different types of political settlement, but also
to test whether similar types of political settlement that were experiencing
different dynamics led countries to go down similar pathways or trajectories of
policy reform. These cases also reflect a diversity of geographical, historical,
and cultural contexts, which should further help to test the extent to
which a political settlements framework can explain similarities across these
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differences. It is important to stress here that we did not choose these cases
because they represent particular forms or levels of the learning crisis, and nor
do we set out to offer an explanation for actual learning outcomes within
these countries or the variance between them. This would have required
a different research design and the selection of a much wider set of country
cases, and it is not clear that the available data on outcomes would have
allowed for this in the types of countries engaged with here. Instead, we
wanted to examine the conditions under which elites and governments
become more or less committed to, and capable of addressing, the learning
crisis, and how politics shapes this process. This choice of our research focus is
further validated by the fact that while there is some consensus on what kinds
of reform are likely to have positive impacts on learning outcomes (such as
reforms aimed at teacher-training and accountability mechanisms designed
to enhance performance), we know far less about whether elites are likely to
commit to deliver on these reforms, or what it takes to enact them effectively.
In focusing on how committed and capable elites and states are to deliver
reforms aimed at improving educational quality, we are able to gain traction
on an important route through which learning outcomes can improve in
developing countries.
To test whether the nature of a political settlement has an influence on elite
commitment and state capacity to improve learning outcomes, as we have
hypothesized above, we therefore needed to choose countries that reflect
different types of political settlement. Here we briefly identify some of the
key ways in which these cases, while also being different in other significant
respects, represent these types of political settlement.5 The categorization of
cases into different types of political settlements is not a precise science; the
configurations of power that define political settlements are dynamic, rather
than static—particularly concerning the shifting relations of power between
social groups and how this interacts with institutions—and therefore subject
to change over time.6 Here we have allocated countries to types based on our
reading of the configuration of power in these countries during the main
historical period under discussion. In terms of our contextual analysis, our
time period covers the post-colonial period as a whole, in order to set the
political significance of the educational policy domain within a political
5 The nature of the educational policy domains in each country is discussed in more depth in
the case study countries.
6 Since we completed the research for this project, the ANC-led ruling coalition in South Africa
has become increasingly vulnerable to threats by excluded factions, while the Awami League in
Bangladesh has undertaken several measures designed to crush the opposition and secure
dominance for itself. Recent elections in Uganda (2016) deepened the sense that its settlement is
both increasingly competitive and that presidential dominance remains a key feature of the
landscape. Elections in Cambodia in 2018 look set to erode the dominance of the ruling
party there.
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settlements perspective. Within our primary research, we examine the same
time period within each country, namely the 20-year period from the mid-
1990s until around the early 2010s. This timeframe is important, as it extends
over the period in which the international policy agenda on education has
shifted from one focused on access, to one that is increasingly concerned
with issues of quality (see the shift from the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on education in
this regard, also World Development Report 2018 (World Bank 2017)). Look-
ing across the same timeframe in each country also helps to control for the
important role that international actors and ideas have played in shaping
policy reforms.
In two of our dominant cases, Rwanda and South Africa, the respective ruling
coalitions have both been in power since 1994, during which time they have
largely been able to determine their own priorities, with relatively little organ-
ized or substantial opposition from rival elite factions. This dominance has
been helped in both cases by the manner in which each ruling coalition took
power, which in both cases involved major upheavals to the existing order,
and came amidst promises to bring a post-ethnic political order in Rwanda
and multi-racial democracy in South Africa. Both countries exhibit strong
tendencies towards centralized and top-down modes of governance, even if
certain functions have been devolved to local levels. Election results help
illustrate the dominance of each ruling party, although the ruling party’s
regular achievement of over 90 per cent of the vote in Rwanda contrasts
with the far more tempered results that flow from South Africa’s institution-
alized system of multi-party competition—within which the ANC’s share of
the vote has been declining—and longer-standing modern state bureaucracy
(Hirsch and Levy 2018). It is this degree of institutionalization that leads us to
characterize South Africa as a ‘Type 4’ political settlement, where dominance
interacts with ‘rule-by-law’.
Cambodia and Uganda represent similar trajectories, in that periods of civil
conflict in both cases were ended when an organized political force gained
supremacy, took political power, and sought to impose their dominance on
the polity. One of these forces, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in
Uganda has, since the mid-1990s, placed a strong emphasis on increasing
access to education—an emphasis that seems to flow from a mixture of
genuine ideological commitment to development and a populist appeal to
the rural masses on which the NRM relies. However, the last decade or so has
seen this political dominance come under increasing threat in both countries
as a result of elite defections from each ruling coalition; the development of
stronger organizational capacities amongst rival factions; and growing popu-
lar pressures from below, including social constituencies brought into the
ruling coalition through the promise of free education. Interestingly, whereas
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heightened levels of competition have tended to generate more personalized
forms of governance in Uganda, similar pressures appear to be encouraging a
more programmatic and technocratic approach in Cambodia, including in the
arena of social service delivery. A graphic illustration of this, as reported in our
respective case study countries, is that whereas the threat of increased electoral
competition led the President in Cambodia to appoint a technocrat to the
position of Education Minister (see Chapter 7), the same pressures in Uganda
led the President to appoint his wife to this role, despite her having no prior
competence in the domain (see Chapter 8).
Since the early 1990s, both Bangladesh and Ghana have been largely
characterized by political settlements with high degrees of competition over
political power between rival factions, each of which is more or less as capable
as the other of gaining power. In both settings, formal institutions (constitu-
tional arrangements, multi-party electoral systems) have become closely
entwined with, and have arguably deepened, clientelist tendencies, in line
with the suggestion that there are strong incentives within competitive cli-
entelist settings for institutions to become highly politicized (Khan 2010; Levy
2014). The result has often been a high level of dysfunctionality within each
country’s public bureaucracy, as jobs and other resources are exchanged for
political loyalty, leading to large gaps between stated policy commitments and
actual implementation and outcomes. In the last few years, the ruling party in
Bangladesh has sought to assert its dominance over government and other
institutions, and appears to have significantly reduced the level of competi-
tion for political power, while also increasing the levels of factionalism within
the ruling coalition. In Ghana, meanwhile, the fact that there have been three
peaceful turnovers of power since 1992, the most recent in 2016, suggests that
certain political (if not bureaucratic) institutions may be becoming more
impersonalized and rules-based.
In line with Figure 2.3, in-depth qualitative research was undertaken at each
level of interaction between the political settlement and educational policy
domain, flowing downwards through sector-level politics and governance
arrangements to frontline performance in schools. The methods used were
primarily key informant interviews with all significant actors, along with
focus group discussions and documentary analysis. An important first step
involved each team producing detailed mappings of the political settlement
and the education domain, in order to assess the relative power of the key
actors, incentives, and ideas involved in shaping both policy formulation
and policy implementation in education. These mapping exercises were
very helpful in identifying leads to pursue with regards to the types of
reform undertaken and actors to interview, while also generating substantive
findings on the politics of the domain. For example, the mapping revealed a
gap between those actors involved in policy adoption and those involved in
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implementation, which helped to explain at least part of the shortfall between
the policy objectives on paper and what was implemented in practice.
To give a concrete focus to the work, and to enable us to process-trace
reforms across multiple levels of the education system, each team chose one
or more of the key policy reforms identified in the recent literature as being
central to efforts to improve quality. In particular, we focused on efforts to
improve the quality and level of resources and resource management within
schools, and efforts to improve the quality and presence of teachers through
training, incentives, and oversight mechanisms (Glewwe et al. 2011; Tikly
and Barrett 2013). We did not take such reforms as proxies for achieving
improved learning outcomes, but rather sought to identify whether elites are
committed to adopting and implementing reforms that are directly targeted at
improved learning outcomes.
Matching this menu with actual reforms that had been undertaken within
each country led us to focus in particular on investments in human resources
(e.g. teacher training) and the kinds of accountability and incentive mechan-
isms (including transparency and information-based initiatives) employed to
monitor and improve performance at local government and school levels.7
The focus was sharpened further at the frontline, with each team identifying
two different socio-economic contexts (one relatively wealthy, one relatively
deprived) and then choosing a high- and low-performing school in each of
these contexts for further investigation, in order to try and identify the specific
effects of politics and governance vis-à-vis other factors (e.g. the class status of
pupils and parents). Differing levels of performance were identified via a range
of sources, particularly school tests. This level of research enabled us to exam-
ine interactions between local levels of governance and the school, including
the role of traditional authorities, and also the immediate governance arrange-
ments of the school itself (e.g. senior management committees, parent
and teacher associations, unions). A particular focus here fell on efforts to
combat leakage of funds, school-based management reforms that give local
stakeholders greater control over how schools are run, and teacher incentive
reforms, such as different kinds of employment contract arrangements,
rewards for attendance, and performance-related pay. The multi-levelled,
process-tracing approach adopted here has, we would argue, helped generate
useful and original insights into the multiple ways in which political and
political economy factors shapes the progress of educational quality reforms.
This approach responds to the challenge set out by Kingdon et al. (2014), by
undertaking theoretically driven, comparative, and methodologically robust
research on the question of the political economy of education quality
7 Other reforms include the development of national assessment systems, methodology-based
reforms, and early years education.
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reforms. The central focus is on how, and the extent to which, the nature of
the political settlement helps explain why generating high levels of commit-
ment and capacity to improve basic education quality has been so challenging
for developing countries. Given that poor quality provision seems to be
fairly typical across low-income countries, the focus is less on the causes
of this generalized problem, than on understanding how the political settle-
ment influences whether and how the problem of quality becomes politically
salient and to what extent it is effectively addressed; in other words, what
shapes capacity and commitment to addressing the learning challenge in
developing countries?
By theorizing this problem in terms of the interaction between key ‘domains
of power’, we seek to draw attention to the key forms of politics that shape
capacity and commitment to delivering higher-quality learning in developing
countries. This includes a focus on informal as well as formal institutions, and
on the incentives, ideas, and influence of actors and coalitions atmultiple levels
of both the political settlement and policy domain. This approach allows us to
build on, but also move beyond, the existing literature, much of which has
tended to focus on quantitative expansion either of enrolment or numbers (e.g.
Ansell 2008; Kosack 2012), or on the influence of organized interests (Moe and
Wiborg 2017) and formal accountabilitymechanisms (World Bank 2003) in the
education sector. We hope that by focusing on the political drivers that shape
reforms, and by going beyond unions to investigate the roles of bureaucrats and
policymakers, we can provide an approach that is policy relevant, while also
providing theoretical and empirical clarity to an under-explored area. Nonethe-
less, we would also acknowledge that the approach could be developed further.
For example, and like much political analysis, our approach does not reach
down to the most local domains of power that shape educational performance,
namely the household and familial dynamics that are crucial to the functioning
of education systems (Gift andWibbels 2014). Further research in this area may
therefore consider adding further, more localized domains of power to the
framework mapped out here.
Conclusion
The existing literature on the political economy of education remains under-
developed in all aspects: theoretical, methodological, and empirical. However,
the growing range of studies of education in developing countries that have
placed politics at the centre of their analysis has started to indicate which forms
of politics are likely to matter most. These include the ways in which material
aspects of a country’s political economy shape not only the capacity of
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different groups to make demands, but also the nature of its institutions;
the powerful role played by informal as well as formal institutions in developing
countries; the particular forms of political agency (e.g. leadership, coalitions)
required to navigate these structural conditions; the role of governance arrange-
ments and relationships within the state, as well as between the state and
citizens; and the role played by ideas as well as the incentives in shaping elite
behaviour. This chapter has taken these insights and placed them alongside
recent theoretical advances around the politics of development to propose a
conceptual framework that can usefully guide work in this area, one which
focuses on the interaction between ‘domains of power’ at national and policy
levels. It has also suggested that, particularly at this stage of theorizing the
politics of education in developing countries, comparative case study research
that uses a typological approach is particularly well suited to testing out and
refining certain propositions, and to generating policy implications that are of
relevance to different types of political context. In line with the challenge set by
Kingdon et al. (2014), the deployment of a ‘political settlements’ typology seeks
to capture how different types of ‘structural, historical, and institutional condi-
tions’ prevail within different polities. The remainder of this collection deploys
this approach to set out new evidence and analysis on the politics of addressing
the learning crisis in developing countries, before inviting leading commenta-
tors to discuss how far we have helped push forward this important field of
enquiry and action, and where attention could usefully turn next.
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Decentralization and Teacher Accountability
The Political Settlement and Sub-national Governance
in Ghana’s Education Sector
Edward Ampratwum, Mohammed Awal, and Franklin Oduro
Introduction
The question of how politics shapes social services provisioning in Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) has centred on the extent to which democratization, or at least the
consistentholdingof electionsover time,will lead tohigher levelsofexpenditure
on goods and services that benefit non-elite groups (Carbone 2012; Stasavage
2005). Although this is an interesting and worthwhile question, it may obscure
themain characteristics of both politics and education, and thus prevent a clear
understanding of the links between the two. In terms of politics, this approach
tends to ignore theextent towhich ‘democratization’ remains ahighly contested
process, which has yet to displace other often ‘informal’ political processes and
relationships (Oduro, Awal, and Ashon 2014; Whitfield et al. 2015) that exert
more powerful influences over processes of resource allocation and service deliv-
ery (Abdulai and Hickey 2016). In terms of education, the approach tends to
focus mainly on the provision of access (visible infrastructure and enrolment),
rather than on the quality of education that is being delivered (Darvas and
Balwanz 2014; Lenhardt, and RochaMenocal, with Engel 2015).
Ghana is a particularly interesting setting in which to explore the debates
around democratization, politics, and education provisioning. Though the
country has performed relatively well in terms of increasing access to educa-
tion (albeit at a slower rate than some other poorer, less democratic countries),
it has achieved less in terms of securing outcomes, and there is evidence of a
learning crisis. A recent study found that 75 per cent of those leaving school
after five to six years could not read, and the youth literacy gap between rich
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/2/2019, SPi
and poor is 50 per cent (Rose 2014). High levels of teacher absenteeism have
been identified as one of the key inefficiencies in the education sector,
accounting for poor education outcomes (World Bank 2010). Rates of absen-
teeism amongst teachers for reasons other than sickness increased from 4 per
cent in 1988, to 13 per cent in 2003 (World Bank 2004, 2010), and 27 per cent
in 2008 (CDD 2008). All of this presents a puzzle, not only because democratic
and (lower) middle-income Ghana could be expected to perform better, but
also because Ghana has undertaken some key reforms for raising learning
outcomes, most notably the decentralization of power and resources within
the education sector (Pritchett 2013). This suggests that the problem of edu-
cational outcomes in Ghana cannot be understood through a focus on formal
political institutions associated with democracy and decentralization per se,
but, more importantly, through focusing on kinds of political relationships or
relational forms of politics that exist between political elites and poor groups
in society (Kosack 2009).
This chapter seeks to unravel this puzzle, following the power domains
approach outlined in Chapter 2. This builds on Levy and Walton (2013),
who make the case for exploring the political drivers of educational quality
through a multi-levelled approach that starts with the nature of the ‘political
settlement’ at the national level and then works through multiple levels of
governance arrangements at the sub-national level, right down to the front-
line schools. This chapter will therefore examine the local political drivers of
quality educational performance through a political settlements lens. From
this perspective, the education sector in Ghana needs to be understood not
simply in a technical sense, but as a domain of resource allocation that can
play a political as well as a developmental function with regards to maintain-
ing the legitimacy and longevity of the ruling coalition.
Taking up the issue of teacher absenteeism, this chapter argues that imple-
mentation of education quality reforms is significantly shaped by district-level
dynamics in Ghana’s political settlement. In particular, the level of inter- and
intra-party competition influences the ability for ‘developmental coalitions’
to emerge at district level, and for the incentives and interests of politicians,
bureaucrats, and school-level state and non-state actors to be aligned around
collectively addressing the challenge of teacher absenteeism.
The chapter draws on qualitative research conducted between 2012 and
2015, using in-depth case studies of two pairs of schools in two different
districts within the Central region of Ghana. The methods used included
documentary analysis, school surveys, and thirty-six key informant interviews
with stakeholders at national, regional, district, and school levels.1 Informants
1 The key informants included former and acting directors of Ghana Education Service, former
minister of education, Ministry of Education chief directors, chairman of Education Reform Review
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were purposively selected on the basis of a mapping exercise, which identified
key actors in the education system at different hierarchical levels. Four focus
group discussions, two in each district, with forty key stakeholders2 at the
community and district levels, were also undertaken as part of the field
research. The choice of schools and districts is discussed in more detail later
in this chapter.
The Political Settlement and the Education Sector in Ghana
The political settlement in Ghana has been defined as ‘competitive clientelist’
(Oduro et al. 2014), combining elements of multi-party political competition
with clientelistic practices.3 Elections in Ghana have developed into a highly
competitive political game since 1992, in which two parties, the National
Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), have consist-
ently challenged each other in closely fought national elections. The highly
competitive nature of the country’s electoral process and the constitutionally
imposed four-year-term limits have combined to generate strong pressures for
governing parties and elites to answer to the short-term socio-economic needs
of voters and their supporters, and the needs of their own short-term political
survival. This political context strongly incentivizes ruling elites to adopt a
politicized approach to public policy formulation and implementation, result-
ing in the public bureaucracy becoming increasingly personalized and infor-
mal in character.
The fact that the public bureaucracy is personalized rather than program-
matic in character, has particular implications for the education sector in
Ghana, which has historically been seen by its ruling elites as critical to
legitimizing their status and staying in power (Antwi 1992; Casely-Hayford
2000). The political significance of education has seen it become a critical
arena within which elite incentives and ideas are played out. Education
sector reforms in Ghana over the past three decades have, on paper at
least, focused on the twin imperatives of improving both the quality and
quantity of education. For example, the Free, Compulsory, Universal Basic
Education programme, introduced in 1993 under the NDC regime focused
Committee, civil society actors, district chief executives, district directors of education, circuit
supervisors, executives of teacher unions, members of the DEOCs, assembly members, etc.
2 The FGD participants were representatives of parent teacher associations, school management
committees, community-based organizations, faith-based organizations, selected parents, and
traditional authorities.
3 For detailed discussions of Ghana’s political settlement and its implications for development,
see Mohan and Asante (2015); Oduro et al. (2014); Whitfield (2011); and Whitfield et al. (2015).
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on increasing enrolment and expanding physical infrastructure, to the
detriment of teacher education and pedagogical resources (Inkoom 2012;
Tagoe 2011). Similarly, the NPP government, shortly after gaining
political power in 2001, ordered a review of the ‘goals and philosophy’ of
Ghana’s education system. This review eventually led to the launch in 2007
of the National Education Reform Programme (Darvas and Balwanz 2014).
These reforms reaffirmed the government’s responsibility for the imple-
mentation of the Free, Compulsory, Universal Basic Education programme,
setting out a framework for decentralization, in addition to several initia-
tives aimed at improving the quality of education (Darvas and Balwanz
2014).
With the electoral pendulum swinging back to NDC regime in 2009,
further reforms in the education sector were introduced. Although these
reforms were broadly in line with the reforms highlighted in the Education
Act of 2008 (Act 778), promulgated and passed into law under the previous
NPP regime as part of the National Education Reform Programme, there was
a stronger focus on enhancing education delivery and outcomes through the
deepening of decentralized structures (Little 2010). Outside the decentral-
ization reforms, which were largely sustained, the NDC regime in 2009
subsequently reversed the NPP’s policy of extending secondary education
from three to four years. This singular move, in addition to a few other
politically engineered initiatives, reinforced the sense that the frequency of
reforms within the education sector in Ghana tends to increase under the
conditions of intense electoral competition, at the expense of both coher-
ence and technocratic control.
Indeed, many key decisions affecting education continue to be made
outside of the Ministry of Education (Darvas and Balwanz 2014). This situ-
ation is driven by the increasing politicization of education, as well as bureau-
crats’ fear of victimization by political actors within the sector (Booth et al.
2005; Casely-Hayford et al. 2007). Politicians and political actors, informed by
party manifestos, ultimately drive policy formulation processes in the educa-
tion sector in Ghana (Casely-Hayford 2011).While a focus on quality has been
apparent in the discourse of political and policy stakeholders, this appears to
have been outweighed by the political imperatives of providing more tangible
goods via the access and quantity agenda. Similarly, ensuring that critical
constituencies such as the teaching force and district-level bureaucracies are
appeased is essential, with a strong union focused on teacher salaries and
welfare issues, and not (unlike the professional teacher associations) on
teacher performance (Casely-Hayford 2011; Prempeh 2011). Consequently,
the balance of power between the different actors active in the education
sector, and their specific interests, helps to explain how reforms actually play
out in practice, including why some gain priority over others.
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Mapping Key Actors within Decentralized Education
Governance in Ghana
Recent efforts to decentralize power and responsibilities within Ghana’s
education sector need to be understood within the wider context of decentral-
ization that was launched in 1988, and further extended following the return
to democracy under the Fourth Republic in 1993. Under this programme, the
country has developed a three-tier structure of sub-national governments at
the regional, district, and sub-district levels. Institutionally and functionally,
the decentralization framework structured local governance around themetro-
politan, municipal, and district assemblies (MMDAs, here referred to as district
assemblies [DAs]).
The DAs are the highest political authorities entrusted with the political,
administrative, and legislative powers to initiate, facilitate, and execute devel-
opment activities in their respective districts. Reforms aimed at decentralizing
line management functions to the District Education Directorates (DEDs) and
at devolving decision-making and financing authority to the DAs were first
put in place by the Ghana Education Service Act of 1995 (Act 506). Following
this, the Education Act of 2008 (Act 778) deepened the decentralization of
education service delivery, by creating new mechanisms and structures to
empower regional- and district-level stakeholders to play active roles in the
management of education service delivery. The Education Act of 2008 (Act
778) provided Ghana with a four-tier structure for the decentralized govern-
ance of the education sector, running from regions, through districts to








Figure 3.1 Structure of education policy implementation at the district level, Ghana
Source: Authors’ construction.
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The DAs have broad responsibility for development outcomes, including
ensuring education is available and responsive to local needs, across basic,
secondary, and functional literacy levels. The DAs are headed by centrally
appointedmetropolitan,municipal, and district chief executives (here referred
toasdistrict chief executives [DCEs]),whoarepolitical anddevelopment agents
of the ruling political party. DCEs are expected to represent the interests of the
ruling party and government at the district level. The DAs are made up of
elected and appointed members of the various localities under the DAs. The
ruling party and government appoint 30 per cent of DAmembers and these are
largely party activists and loyalists. It is also worth noting that although two-
thirds of the membership of the DAs are elected on a non-partisan platform,
there is anecdotal evidence of the alignment of these assemblymembers to the
two main political parties at the central level of government, the NDC and
NPP. Hence, centre–local relations are critical to understanding decentraliza-
tion and implementation of decentralized reforms in Ghana (Crook 2017).
The decentralization of education sector governance in Ghana has centred
on efforts to ensure higher levels of authority for local political actors over
more centralized and technical actors, and on empowering non-state actors
to be involved in governing the sector. Democratic oversight is organized
through the district education oversight committee (DEOC), which is chaired
by the central government-appointed DCE, who is also the political head of the
District Assembly. Other members of the DEOC include the district director of
education, chairperson of the education committee at the DA and representa-
tives fromparent–teacher associations (PTAs), schoolmanagement committees
(SMCs), the Private Schools Association, teacher unions, traditional authorities,
and faith-based organizations (FBOs). Although the Education Act of 2008
(Act 778) called for the creation of DEOCs and empowered them to directly
participate in the management of teachers and the provision of support, in
practice they have weak incentives and authority to drive up performance over
the long term, andare therefore largely anadvisorybody. For instance,where the
DEOC takes decisions on education at the district level, which may not be in
accord with national policy, the committee has no real power to enforce its
decisions on education at the district level, leading sometimes to conflict and
contestationswith theDEDs and implementation challenges at the school level.
Members of parliament (MPs) also mediate between the central and local
levels. MPs are ex-officio members of the DA and operate outside the formal
structures of the DEOC.MPs are elected on the competitive electoral platforms
of political parties and hence are subject to inter- and intra-party pressures, in
terms of their decisions, initiatives, and ideas to improve teacher accountabil-
ity and education performance at the district and community levels. MPs have
often undertaken programmes to improve education performance at the local
level in partnership with the DEDs and DAs, especially when they represent
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the ruling party at the central level of government. Where the MPs represent
the opposition party, they often directly implement policies without recourse
to the DAs, and to some extent the DEDs, which sometimes leads to conflicts
and a focus on ‘visible’ goods to the detriment of quality reforms.
The Ghana Education Service (GES), the technical arm of the Ministry of
Education, implements education policy at the district level through the DED
in accordance with the GES Act of 1995 (Act 506) (Mankoe 2006; Baffour-
awuah 2011). A centrally appointed district director, who is accountable to the
central appointing authority at the GES, heads the DED. Relative to other
actors at the district level, the DEDs have high powers and strong incentives to
influence district education policy- and decision-making. However, the DEDs
have no influence in changing national policies affecting education delivery
in Ghana. The DED mainly works around existing policies and adapts these
policies to suit the needs of their districts. TheDED represents a de-concentrated
rather than devolved form of governance.
Circuit supervisors operate as the interface between the DED and school
authorities, responsible for particular zones within each district4 and for
inspecting school facilities, providing assistance and support to teachers and
headteachers, and using the outcomes of training programmes and the cen-
trally produced headteacher appraisal guides to assess performance (Baffour-
awuah 2011). Headteachers of both primary and junior high schools in Ghana
are responsible for monitoring teaching and learning in their schools and are
directly accountable to the district directorates (Baffour-awuah 2011).
The reforms emanating from the Education Act of 2008 (Act 778) resulted in
the increased involvement of non-state actors at both district and school levels
(Bogaert et al. 2012). These include FBOs that play a major role in the provision
of school infrastructure and management (Casely-Hayford 2011). It is worth
highlighting, however, that from the perspective of the GES, FBOs have no
institutional legitimacy to intervene in education service delivery, including
with regards to the recruitment of teachers at school level (Casely-Hayford
2011). Consequently, at the district level, FBOs have little power to improve
education outcomes. However, they seem to wield some influence over head-
teachers and teachers at the school level, and over other non-state actors at the
school level, such as PTAs, especially in the schools they establish.
Other key actors at the community level include SMCs,5 PTAs,6 and local
traditional authorities. PTAs and SMCs are tasked with working alongside
headteachers to ensure effective school management and improvement,
4 The district is zoned into circuits. There are also inspectors at the regional level.
5 Membership of the SMCs includes parents, teachers (including the headteacher), a
representative from the traditional authority, a representative from the old students’ association,
a male assembly member, and a female representative.
6 The PTAs are made up of parents and teachers (including the head of the school).
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including defining how financial allocations will be used, improving learning
outcomes, and monitoring teacher attendance. Teacher unions are indirectly
involved in the implementation of education decentralization, and they have
a strong and effective voice, stemming from their large membership numbers
and the electoral importance of their constituency to political actors (Casely-
Hayford 2011). Teacher unions such as the Ghana National Association of
Teachers, National Association of Graduate Teachers, and Concerned Teachers
Association, have representatives at the national, regional, district, zonal, and
school levels (Casely-Hayford 2004).
Ghana has put in place many of the governance measures that experts
perceive as critical for the promotion of higher levels of educational perform-
ance, particularly in terms of decentralisation (Pritchett, 2013). These reforms
in the governance of the education sector in Ghana have enabled the entry
of a myriad of sub-national actors with particular interests and ideas into
the domain of education. Given wider problems with political manipulation,
local capture, and deficits in state capacity associated with decentralized
service delivery in Ghana, it is essential to examine the extent to which the
formal institutional reforms actually play out at the district and school levels,
particularly in terms of promoting improved teacher accountability and asso-
ciated performance outcomes in education (Crawford 2009; Crook 2017;
Crook and Manor 1998).
The Politics of Education in Ghana: A District- and
School-level Analysis
To establish a clear view of how politics shapes education sector governance at
the district and school levels in Ghana, we identified differing levels of perform-
ance within contexts that were otherwise similar in terms of their levels of
development, geographical features (e.g. urban–rural balance), and ethnic com-
position.We focusedontwodistrictswithin theCentral regionofGhana that are
amongst the poorest districts in Ghana, and are similar in most respects other
than their educational outcomes, referred to here as AK and TM. In each we
randomly selected two schools to examine variation in performance in more
depth, referred to here as AK Schools A and B, and TM Schools A and B.
Table 3.1 provides comparative performance statistics of the education sys-
tem in the two districts. District-level figures conceal considerable school-level
variation, however. While the two schools selected in TM for the case study
recorded overall Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE) pass rates of
88 per cent (TM School A) and 80 per cent (TM School B), those selected in AK
recorded 33 per cent (AK School A) and 27 per cent (AK School B) for
the 2013–14 academic year.
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Schools in TM district had a better record of teacher attendance than in AK
district. Indeed, schools in the Central region of Ghana have a lower record of
teacher attendance, with an average of about 50 per cent, compared with a
national average of 65 per cent (see Figure 3.2). Set against this, TM’s ability to
ensure relatively high levels of teacher attendance is notable; given the evi-
dence that teacher attendance is critical to achieving improved learning out-
comes (see Chapter 1), we would expect to see further improvements in TM in
the coming years.
As noted above, teacher attendance in TM district was reported at an average
of 79 per cent in the 2014–15 academic year. In TM Schools A and
B attendance was 80 per cent and 75 per cent respectively, well above the
national average and the Central regional average of 65 per cent and
50 per cent respectively (see Figure 3.3).
Table 3.1 Comparative educational statistics for two districts in Ghana
Indicators District AK District TM
District league table 2014 (DLT) ranking7 173 out of 216 180 out of 216
13th out of 20 14th out of 20
Number of schools 312 419
Enrolment of pupils 35,381 21,887
Number of teachers 1,132 875
Percentage of untrained teachers 49% 44.6%
Teachers engaged in primary schools 470 444
Pupil–teacher ratio 20.1 21.1
Pupil–trained teacher ratio 31.1 55.1
Average BECE pass rate for the four core subjects (2012–13) 53% 59%
Teacher attendance on average per term for the year 50% 79%














Teacher attendance in primary level for 2014–15
Figure 3.2 Teacher attendance at primary school level, Ghana
Source: CDD-Ghana field data, 2015.
7 Note that the District League Table ranking is based on a composite of six indicators (health,
education, security, governance, rural water, and sanitation). Although data suggests that TM is
higher achieving than AK in terms of education, in other respects AK outperforms TM.
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In AK district, on the other hand, teacher attendance on average per term
for the year was 50 per cent, similar to the regional average, but below the
national average of 65 per cent. Average attendance was the same in AK
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Figure 3.3 Teacher attendance at primary school level in TM district, Ghana




























Figure 3.4 Teacher attendance at primary school level in AK district, Ghana
Source: CDD-Ghana field data, 2015.
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Comparing teacher attendance rates across the two districts, we found that
schools in TM district outperformed those of AK, the Central regional, and
national averages. We also found similar patterns of better performance at the
school level in this regard.
Given the clear variation in teacher attendance and educational outcomes
described above, a key question for us is whether this variation can be
explained by differences in the dynamics of the political settlement at the
sub-district level. This means examining the ways in which sub-national
politics and institutional dynamics shape the implementation of local gov-
ernance reforms intended to secure higher levels of teacher accountability and
performance. From this perspective, it is interesting to compare the levels of
political competition across the two districts.
Analysis of election results since the return to democracy in 1992 indi-
cates that there are slight differences in voting patterns, with a higher level
of competition between the two main parties in AK compared with the
higher-performing TM. In TM, the NDC has secured a majority in every
presidential and parliamentary election between 1992 and 2012. The mar-
gin of victory in the presidential elections ranged from 34 per cent at its
highest in 1996 to a low of 6 per cent in 2000, while the margin in the
parliamentary elections ranged from 17 per cent in 1996 to 11 per cent in
2012. In AK, NDC has secured a majority in all presidential and parliamen-
tary elections since 1992, with the important exception of 2004, when
the NPP won with a majority of 8 per cent in the presidential election
and 11 per cent in the parliamentary election. Despite the NDC winning
both presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008 and 2012 in AK, with
a higher margin of 23 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively, than in TM,
AK has a higher level of political competition amongst political elites.8
In this sense, AK more closely reflects the Central region’s reputation as a
‘swing’ region than TM. A crucial difference between the two districts, in
this regard, is the level of inter- and intra-party competition between elites.
The perception of political insecurity in AK, stemming from the historical
victory of the NPP, has resulted in political elites perceiving other political
leaders and also bureaucrats as potential political rivals, and has signifi-
cantly decreased the scope for collaboration.9 From a political settlements
perspective, therefore, we expect the pressures generated by intense levels of
political competition flowing from the central to the local levels could have
an adverse effect on capacity to enforce reforms in teacher accountability at
district level, with implications for education sector performance.
8 Interview data (2015). 9 Interview data (2015).
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The Politics of Tackling Teacher Absenteeism
in Ghana: The Role of Coalitions
This section explores why the variation in educational quality exists between
AK and TM districts, focusing on the challenge of teacher accountability and
performance. By comparing how the challenge of teacher absenteeism is dealt
with across the two districts, we arrive at an understanding of how the
political settlement—and in particular, political competition and the import-
ance of district-level ‘development coalitions’—impacts on the delivery of
teaching at the frontline.
Significance of Political Competition
The differing levels of inter- and intra-party competition across the two dis-
tricts significantly influenced the ability of political leaders and bureaucrats to
address teacher absenteeism coherently. In AK, intense intra- and inter-party
competition between the main political actors undermined the ability to
promote teacher accountability and decrease absenteeism. The DCE in AK
who, at the time of research, had served for two years of a four-year mandate,
aspired to elected office in competition with the existing MP and other actors
and party activists. Within the bureaucracy, the DCE perceived the DED and
other highly trained bureaucrats as threats to his political ambitions, and as
being aligned with the political opposition; he thus often refused to commit
the resources of the District Assembly to support the budgets of decentralized
institutions at the sub-national level.10 Because of his political ambitions, the
local MP, who belongs to his political party, was also perceived as a direct
political rival to the DCE. As a result, the DCE was incentivized to undermine
the local MP, in order to increase his chances of gaining the party candidature
during the next election, and the MP was similarly engaged in efforts to
undermine the DA and the DCE’s role in promoting teacher accountability
and district-level development as a whole. Indeed, mistrust between the MP,
DCE, and DED in AK resulted in the appointment of trainee teachers who had
loyalty towards either the MP or the DCE. These teachers were often difficult
to control, decreasing the ability to reduce absenteeism. The competition
between these political actors also resulted in the need to create visible pro-
jects within the districts to show or garner support, rather than antagonize
non-performing teachers, which could have had implications for the political
ambitions or the fulfilment of the political mandates of theMP and DCEs. The
DCE tried to undermine the MP for the constituency by presenting local
10 Interview data (2015).
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government projects, such as the construction of schools, teachers’ quarters,
and other facilities, as his personal contribution to the constituency. One of
the political actors in AK explained the over-emphasis on visible infrastructure
projects in the light of intense political competition as follows:
When it comes to infrastructure, we [the DCE and the DA] have been providing
them classroom blocks and teachers quarters among other things since 2011.
I have been able to put up about six teachers’ quarters, some were abandoned
and we have completed them. We have six classroom unit blocks and KGs [kin-
dergarten blocks] among many others. The District Assembly also supports the
activities of DEOC financially and the District Assembly [under the leadership of
the DCE] is involved in organizing ‘my first day at school programmes’ [to wel-
come new students into schools in the district].
The DCE perceived such projects as more effective at promoting his political
ambitions, at the expense of ‘invisible’ projects aimed at promoting improved
accountability andhigherperformance. Thedeterminationof theDCE tounseat
the sitting MP also led to covert scheming in internal party elections, including
underhand dealings to control the hierarchy of the party at the grassroots level,
through handouts to influential political party executives, scheming to get
favourable executives elected at the grassroots level of the ruling party. This
strategy also led to the appointment of influential community leaders and
stakeholders asmembers of theDEOCand as government appointees to theDA.
In TM, on the other hand, less intense inter- and intra-party competition
shaped the relations between the MP, the DCE, and officials of the DED,
leading to far greater coherence in the application of strategies to address
teacher absenteeism. The MP was the longest serving of the three officials,
and theDCEand theDEDdeferred decisions to theMP. TheDEDaligned closely
with officials of the ruling party in the constituency, working with key political
officials to promote and achieve the political goals of the ruling government and
party in the constituency. TheMPwas kept informed of allmeetings and events,
participating personally or through intermediaries to ensure strong political
leadership in the constituency, and to ensure the party, rather than individual
actors, were identified with projects and service provision.
As a result, key political actors controlled internal political machinery and
minimized the potential for internal political competition with its ramifica-
tions for policy implementation. The MP and DCE collaborated to provide job
opportunities for party loyalists through an elaborate patronage system. Using
proceeds and resources of cocoa allocated from government through the dis-
trict assemblies, aswell as collaborationwithowners of commercial plantations
in the constituency, the MP channelled resources to party loyalists and key
political actors in the constituency to consolidate his position, bothwithin and
across the political spectrum. TheMP also aligned with key political actors and
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bureaucrats at the district level by channelling national- and regional-level
funded programmes to the constituency. This enabled the MP to align intra-
party interests to promote the district, rather than undermining the DCE.
In TM, the MP and DCE were also willing to sponsor potential teacher
trainees, especially those belonging to the ruling party, for short-term training
programmes under the Untrained Teacher Training Diploma in Basic Educa-
tion programme. This government-funded distance-learning in-service pro-
gramme is aimed at addressing geographical disparities in teacher allocation
and improving the quality of education at the basic school level in Ghana
(GES 2011; Sofo, Thompson, and Kanton 2015). The primary reason for
training these party activists was to build a cadre of party-friendly teachers
in the district, who could populate the classrooms in the district’s deprived
communities where regular GES teachers refused to accept postings. In add-
ition, a political alliance between the MP, DCE, and officials at the DED at the
district level ensured the appointment of party loyalists and activists through
the National Youth Employment Programme. The teachers employed on this
programme, who were mainly untrained personnel, filled the classrooms in
the districts where the regular teachers were absent to attend distance-learning
and sandwich programmes held at the two teacher education universities in
the region, the Universities of Cape Coast, and Education in Winneba,
respectively. The lower rates of teacher absenteeism that this ensured
increased contact hours between tutors and pupils and ultimately improved
school performance, as a DA official described:
. . . this [arrangement to appoint teachers from communities in the district] is
improving teaching and learning. To our surprise, this district never scores
0 per cent [BECE] as compared to the previous [period] whenwe [someof the schools
in the district] were getting 0 per cent, 14per cent, 17per cent, 18per cent in schools.
But this year, because of the strategies we [the DA, MP, and DED] have put in place,
performances have improved. Children are going to second cycle institutions [after
successfully passing theBECE], so teaching and learning in the district has improved.
While this arrangement may raise questions about the politicization of edu-
cation provision, in practice it enabled the political actors, the DAs and DED,
to ensure adequate provision of teachers in school at all times, rather than
relying on the regular teachers posted from the GES or the centrally appointed
National Service Scheme personnel, whose appointment the political actors
had little or no control over.
The Roles of District-level ‘Developmental Coalitions’
The level of political competition at the district level had implications for
relations betweenpolitical actors andbureaucrats chargedwith the responsibility
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/2/2019, SPi
Decentralization and Accountability: Ghana
57
of implementing education policies, and their ability to enforce sanctions on
absentee teachers. In the context of TM, the limited nature of political competi-
tion enabled the emergence of ‘developmental’ coalitions at the district level,
which shaped the higher performance identified in that district, particularly in
terms of the lower levels of absenteeism. There was evidence of the emergence of
adevelopmental coalitionbetweencommunity-, school-, anddistrict-level actors
in education, which was able to circumvent the problems emanating from
conditions of competitive clientelism, incoherent district- and school-level gov-
ernance arrangements, and vested interests at the local level. In particular, an
alliance was forged not only between the key political and bureaucratic actors
involved in governing education at the district level, most notably the members
of the education committee at the DA, the DEOC, and DED, but also with the
teacher unions in the district.
This coalition was critical in overcoming opposition to policies from
teachers and other local-level politically powerful stakeholders and promoting
the enforcement of accountability mechanisms from the district to the
school levels. The coalition helped to develop a range of context-specific
approaches to the problem, which had proved to be critical constraints to
higher levels of accountability and performance. For example, the DED in
higher-performing TM had put in place several formal and informal arrange-
ments to improve supervision and address teacher absenteeism and perform-
ance that went beyond the national policy framework on teacher attendance
and absenteeism. These included deductions from teachers’ salaries for
unsanctioned absences, embargoing teacher salaries without challenge from
teacher unions11 or DA politicians,12 and initiating community monitoring
and reporting on absentee teachers. A bureaucrat in TM summarized some of
the measures the DED had put in place:
When teachers complete the college of education, instead of serving for three
years, they quickly apply to upgrade themselves at the universities in the region.
Unfortunately, the schedule for the university academic calendars for those
courses conflicts with the GES timetable, and so they would even leave the
classroom to pursue their programme without informing the District Education
Directorate. We decided to embargo their salaries and invite them to the district
office to arrange with the potential interim replacement during their absence from
the classroom. First, the teacher is encouraged to prepare lessonnotes ahead of time
to reduce the workload on whoever is coming to replace them in the classroom.
Second, we encourage the absentee teachers to arrange with people in the commu-
nity who are qualified and have applied for recruitment in the Ghana Education
11 In other districts, where there are no developmental coalitions, teacher unions sometimes
choose to protect members’ interests over those of students.
12 For political actors at the DA, teachers constitute a significant voting bloc.
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Service . . .They are not trained teachers, but have completed university and are not
employed . . . So such people can hold the fort in the absence of the teacher.
In TM there was also evidence of improved collaboration between political
officials at the DA, DED officials, and teacher unions, which facilitated
enforcement of sanctions for teachers who absented themselves from school
without official permission. Themain teachers’ union in the district, the Ghana
National Association of Teachers, often held dialogues with headteachers,
PTAs, FBO representatives, and traditional authorities to devise mechanisms to
monitor teacher attendance and develop strategies to replace absentee teachers
without formal recruitment. Collaboration between education stakeholders
was further entrenched in TM,where the political and administrative officials
of the DA informally co-opted key executives of the teacher unions into the
DEOC and relevant committees in education at the DA. DA officials also
provided financial and logistical support to the activities of the teacher
unions at the district. This collaboration between political, bureaucratic,
and union executives at the district level resulted in the creation of a strong
district-level coalition to promote teacher attendance and promote greater
accountability amongst teachers.
In the lower-performing district AK, by contrast, competition between the
government-appointed DCE and the directors of the DED resulted in an
incoherent application of sanctions for absentee teachers. Rooted in compe-
tition between theMP and DCE, political officials at the DA did not effectively
collaborate with the bureaucratic officials of the DED to implement a joint
action plan to promote teacher accountability. Officials at the DA and the
DED focused on their own initiatives and ideas to reduce teacher absenteeism,
such as building teachers’ quarters in politically important localities, without
reference to local demands or needs. Meanwhile, the DED did not wholly
support and enforce recommendations of the DEOC and the DA and its DCE,
such as in relation to sanctioning absentee teachers in schools in the district.
At the same time, the DA, which had a general mandate for oversight of
education, often declined to allocate and release budgetary resources to sup-
port DED initiatives for improving teacher accountability.
The absence of an effective coalition between political officials at the DA
and the bureaucratic heads at the DED in the low-performing district, AK,
resulted in teacher unions undermining the capacity of DEDs to enforce
sanctions against absentee teachers. Indeed, executives of the teacher unions
seemed to benefit from the disharmony between political and bureaucratic
elites in the district; this discordant relationship sometimes resulted in absen-
tee teachers being promoted or transferred to another school or district with-
out recourse to local school governance structures, rather than being
sanctioned in accordance with existing GES regulations.
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Community-level Dynamics
The emergence of ‘developmental’ coalitions in education at the district
level, underscored by the sub-national political settlement, was mirrored at
the community level. Key actors within community-level ‘developmental’
coalitions included circuit supervisors and headteachers, comprising a vertical
axis of accountability, and PTAs, FBOs, and traditional authorities, supply-
ing a horizontal axis of accountability (see Chapter 1). Actors in this coali-
tion possessed differing levels of power and political influence at the
community level.
Due to the alignment of political interests between key political actors at the
district and community levels, Circuit Supervisors and headteachers in the
higher-performing TM district schools liaised effectively with community-
level political party officials, who also doubled as SMC officials. These ‘polit-
ically salient stakeholders’ (Levy and Walton 2013) were able to use their
connections with both political and bureaucratic actors at the district level,
namely the DAs and DEDs, to create strong incentives and pressures amongst
headteachers and teachers to reduce absenteeism and drive up teacher and
student performance at the school level.
In addition to liaisingwith SMCs topromote accountability amongst teachers,
circuit supervisors in TM also devised mechanisms to benefit from the intra-
party alignment at the district and community levels by tapping into the power-
ful influence and networks of the traditional authorities, PTAs, and FBOs within
their jurisdictions, who controlled politically salient blocs of voters in their
localities. The membership of the PTA, FBOs, and traditional authorities in TM
mainly comprised retired district education officials13 and former assembly
members with strong political party connections,14 and political party constitu-
ency and polling station executives. They could thus leverage their power and
influence over key political actors in the district, such as the MP, DCE, and
executives of the ruling party, amongst others, to exert pressure on school-
level officials to generate positive incentives for teacher accountability.
In the poorly performing schools in AK, on the other hand, the political
misalignment between the MP, DCE, and grassroots activists of the ruling
party at the district level affected the ways in which vertical and horizontal
structures promoted or undermined teacher accountability at the community
and school levels. Partisan PTA and SMCmembers often accused headteachers
and teachers of promoting opposition party interests in the constituency by
13 They were former directors and assistant directors of education, former teachers, and local
managers of the FBO schools, amongst others.
14 This included former members of the education sub-committee of the MMDA, retired public
servants, and representatives of the traditional council.
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undermining efforts to monitor and sanction teachers, and contestation over
the power to sanction or enforce sanctions on absentee teachers was common.
Conclusion
This chapter emphasizes the extent to which teacher accountability in Ghana’s
education sector is shaped by the dynamics of the country’s political settle-
ment, from the national level through districts, to schools themselves. A key
finding was that while Ghana’s competitive clientelist settlement generates a
high degree of policy incoherence and politicization within the sector, the
drivers of improved performance and accountability do not flow from the
national to the local level, but instead need to be (re)generated at the level of
districts and schools. Ghana’s decentralization reforms in the domain of edu-
cation have to some extent opened up space for manoeuvre amongst key
stakeholders at both district and school levels and, when political conditions
are conducive, this can result in the emergence of some forms of ‘developmen-
tal coalitions’, as was observed in the relatively high-performing TM district.
In TM, teacher accountability reforms were successfully implemented at the
district and school levels thanks to a functioning and resourceful District
EducationOrganising Committee, strong technocratic leadership of the District
Education Directorate, a well-supervised cadre of circuit supervisors, active and
functioning PTAs and SMCs, and (some) progressive teacher unions. In add-
ition, and more importantly, the ways in which these different actors could be
brought together into a coherent developmental coalition accounted for their
interaction in ways that promoted effective teacher accountability. Such coali-
tions addressed teacher absenteeism through local and often informal solutions
and governance arrangements, which needed to be recognized in order to
improve teacher accountability. These developmental coalitions could then
provide a critical basis to offset the collective action problems that characterize
the education sector in Ghana, with its often incoherent reforms and govern-
ance arrangements, both of which are nested within, and flow from, the
country’s competitive clientelistic political settlement.
Critical for the emergence of such coalitions is an alignment between
political and bureaucratic elites, something which the high-levels of inter-
and intra-party competition undermined in the case of AK. Although more
research is required to unearth the underlying drivers of these incoherent
relations between actors and institutions at the sub-national level in the low-
performing district, we hypothesize that higher levels of political competition
faced by and within the then-ruling political party in AK may be reducing the
level of collective action amongst district-level elites, as compared with the
relatively more ‘dominant’ position enjoyed by elites in TM.
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4
The Politics of Learning Reforms
in Bangladesh
Naomi Hossain, Mirza M. Hassan, Muhammad Ashikur Rahman,
Khondoker Shakhawat Ali, and Md. Sajidul Islam
Introduction
Why has Bangladesh failed to raise quality in basic education after it success-
fully expanded school provision? The country successfully eliminated gender
disparities and raised enrolments at primary and lower secondary in the
1990s, expanding provision with innovative schemes and non-formal non-
governmental provision (Hossain 2007; Chowdhury et al. 2002, 2003). An
elite consensus about the need for mass education to stimulate national
development in a labour-rich, resource-poor economy generated the political
will, resources, and administrative capacity for rapid expansion of provision
(Hossain, Subrahmanian, and Kabeer 2002). Primary education statistics are still
cited as evidence of Bangladesh’s ‘surprising’ human development achieve-
ments (Asadullah, Savoia, and Mahmud 2014). But by the early 2000s, con-
cerns about quality were widespread, partly as the rapid expansion appeared
to push average standards down (CAMPE 2005; Ahmed et al. 2007). Rates of
completion were low, of grade repetition high, and learning attainments
lagged behind expected levels; teacher capacity was below par, and children
receivedwoefully inadequate instruction time (CAMPE2005, 2009;DPE2014b).
If politics helped to explain the successful expansionary reforms, can
politics also explain why Bangladesh has been slower to address the persistent
problem of quality in basic education? This chapter explores this question
through a power domains approach, analysing the influence of the poli-
tical settlement on the design and uptake of education reforms in the
2000s, the extent to which they prioritized efforts to improve quality,
and how effectively those efforts transmitted through to the governance of
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schools and the delivery of education on the frontline. Through review of
reform design and sector performance documents, key informant interviews,
and comparative primary research into how efforts to increase teacher motiv-
ations for performance played out in four schools, the chapter documents
how the elite consensus on basic education in Bangladesh runs out when it
comes to raising education standards.
The analysis concludes that this outcome reflects how competitive pres-
sures in Bangladesh’s clientelistic political settlement have until recently
been aligned with expansionary, rather than quality-focused, reforms: elites
have competed to build more schools with more teachers, children, and
textbooks in them, rather than promote reforms to raise the standard of
general education. This partly reflects the holding power of teachers within
the political settlement: this ensures that on both sides of the political
divide, reformers tread carefully around their interests, offering more train-
ing, better remuneration packages, and new entitlements, rather than dis-
ciplinary reforms designed to hold them to account for their performance.
The centralized administration and its weak incentives to enforce unpopular
reforms ensure discretion at the frontline of educational provision within
schools. In the absence of system-wide pressures to deliver higher-quality
education, teacher performance depends ultimately on their inherent motiv-
ations and the quality of school-level governance, which leads to highly
variable outcomes in practice. These motivations have arguably been under-
mined by the declining status of the teaching profession as a whole, the
result of broader sectoral and social change, contributing to great political
sensitivities regarding the treatment of public school teachers in Bangladesh.
This was clearly demonstrated by the nationalization of registered non-
government primary schools in 2014 in response to teacher protests about
pay and conditions.
If teachers may be expected to resist reforms that demand greater account-
ability and scrutinize performance, the literature suggests business interests, and
the governance and personnel needs of the state itself, may have countervailing
incentives to improve the education system. But in Bangladesh, there have
been few signs that even large employers view the quality of public schooling
as amatter of concern (cf. Doner and Schneider 2016). Nonetheless, the political
equilibrium that has kept tough learning reforms off the basic education agenda
in the past decades may now be shifting. In the past decade, concerns about
quality have galvanized initiatives to monitor education performance more
closely from the centre. While these efforts have yet to bear fruit in terms of
improvements in learning attainments, they are a sign that the state is taking
the challenge of learning seriously enough to track it, despite the potentially
embarrassing effects. Moves such as the introduction of publicly available
National Student Assessments, school censuses andAnnual Sector Performance
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Reviews, which are clearly intended to strengthen the state’s capacity to
improve learning across the system, are consistent with the longer time-
horizons of more dominant party systems. This stronger capacity to monitor
may reflect the ways in which the political settlement in Bangladesh has, since
2009, been less competitive and increasingly dominated by the Awami League,
which has placed a strong emphasis on promoting development, in part to
legitimize its project of securing political dominance. It remains too soon to
be sure, but signs from the education sector at least indicate that a somewhat
more developmentalist and programmatic—as distinct from short-term and
clientelistic—approach to education policy may be in sight, even if the results
have yet to showup in the formof improvements in classroom interactions and
learning outcomes.
The Problem of Education Quality in Bangladesh
The primary education system in Bangladesh is large and complex, with 18.7
million children enrolled at primary level in 127,000 schools of 24 different
types. Some 80 per cent of all children attend schools managed by the central
government, and almost 70 per cent of the half million-strong primary
school teaching force, 57 per cent of whom are women, are in the govern-
ment system. Almost 8 million children from poor families receive cash
stipends, and over 3 million receive school meals. All of this was achieved
with an annual budget of only US$8 billion (2014), and although primary
education comprises 10 per cent of all public expenditure, it comes to less
than 2 per cent of GDP.1
By some indicators, educational performance improved over the 2000s. In
terms of completion and repetition, this improvement has been compara-
tively fast: the primary completion rate rose nearly 25 percentage points
between 2010 and 2013, and now stands at 81 per cent (DPE 2014b). The
repetition rate improved from 50 per cent in 2008 to only 7 in 2013, dropping
further to 6 per cent in 2016 (DPE 2017). Improvements in learning attainments
have been slower: 75 per cent of grade 3 students performed at or above grade
level inBangla in2013, up from68per cent in2011, butwith little improvement
amongst grade 5 learners. In mathematics, 43 per cent of grade 3 students and
75 per cent of grade 5 students were behind expected grade-level learning out-
comes in both years. The most recent National Student Assessment found,
furthermore, that attainments had worsened slightly, a finding explained in
the National Student Assessment 2015, due to the lagged nature of education
reforms, as ‘assessment instruments [are] aligned with the new curriculum but
1 Information from the 2013 school census, also DPE (2014b), MOPME (n.d.).
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classroom practice in many respects continues to be tied to the old curriculum’
(DPE 2016, 22). Despite this depressing performance, 99 per cent of the more
than 2.5 million students who took the Primary Education Completion Exam-
ination in 2013 and in 2015 passed (DPE 2014b, 2017).
Low performance is a feature of the South Asia region. One study noted that,
with the exception of (far higher-performing) Sri Lanka, the region was not
part of international student learning assessments, and attainment indicators
were extremely low everywhere. In India, fewer than half of grade 5 students
passed basic reading comprehension tests in 2011, while 43 per cent of grade 8
students could not do simple division. It was only by grade 4 or 5 that most
students recognized two-digit numbers (supposedly taught in grade 2). One
national assessment found that not even half of all grade 6 students were able
to identify a number between five and eight. While rural Pakistani students
performed somewhat better than their Indian counterparts on comparable
arithmetic questions, regional studies showed up variations, with most stu-
dents in Punjab unable to perform simple arithmetic until late into their
primary school careers. In Sindh, most students could do basic addition, but
subtraction was a challenge for around half.2
Within Bangladesh, official assessments have attributed these problems to a
weak organizational framework; poor physical environment in schools; short
contact hours, due to the shift system; lack of support materials and inad-
equate numbers of trained teachers; and traditional classroom teaching and
learning practices (DPE 2014b). Teacher capacity has been a key concern. In
2008, only one-fifth of teachers were trained in the core curriculum, and
40 per cent of women and nearly 60 per cent of men teachers had no subject
training (CAMPE 2009). Although subject training has been shown to make a
difference, experience only affects student learning when teachers have
worked for more than twenty years; then students tend to doworse, suggesting
teacher motivations actually decline over time (DPE 2014c). Lesson observa-
tion studies suggest pedagogical skill has been limited and rote learning from
textbooks routine (FMRP 2006).
Student backgrounds matter, but school-level factors may matter more.
CAMPE (2009) argued that performance depended on students’ socio-
economic background (including whether they could afford private tuition).
However, DPE (2014c) found that most variation in educational outcomes in
publicly funded schools was due to differences between schools, rather than
students (also World Bank 2013). This indication of frontline discretion
(Lipsky 1980) gains support from our four-school comparative case analysis,
which found that variations in the governance regimes at the school level
2 These figures are from assessments cited in Dundar et al. (2014).
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explained differences in teacher motivation and performance, perceived qual-
ity, and educational outcomes.
Discretion with respect to the time devoted to teaching and learning helps
explain variation across schools. One study found only 67 per cent of govern-
ment primary school (GPS) students were present during unannounced
visits, and only 45 per cent in publicly funded ebtedayee madrassahs (FMRP
2006). Lesson observation found teachers out of the classroom on average
14 per cent and students off-task 12 per cent of the time (FMRP 2006, 177).
The need for more time to achieve basic competencies was underlined by one
study that found the average Bangladeshi student has to get through much
of secondary school to achieve a primary school education (Asadullah and
Chaudhury 2013), suggesting children are simply not getting enough learn-
ing time in primary.
Time-on-task is low for several reasons. Scheduled hours are low, and chil-
dren in grades 1 and 2 in double-shift schools get only 520 hours per year on
average (DPE 2014b), compared with an international average of 900–1,000.
Unplanned closures mean schools operate between 42 and 78 per cent of
planned school days (Tietjen, Rahman, and Spaulding 2004), although that
situation may be improving (DPE 2014b; FMRP 2006). Teachers are fre-
quently absent (Chaudhury et al. 2004), although rarely on unauthorized
leave (FMRP 2006; CAMPE 2009). Teachers are often late, end class early, or
use classroom time for other activities. So while pedagogy remains a prob-
lem, a critical determinant of education quality is the quantity of instruction
time (DPE 2014c, 62; see also Rose, Lane, and Rahman 2014). In the class-
room, students learn little from the many teachers who have no subject or
pedagogical training, or who are demotivated and busy with private income
activities (World Bank 2013).
Political Settlement and Education Policy
Elite Consensus on Mass Education across Political Settlements
An elite consensus on the need to expand basic education provision in
Bangladesh was inspired by a vision of transforming the country’s sole
wealth—its human resources—into an income-earning asset, in the style of
the East Asian ‘tiger economies’ (Hossain 2017). Consistency across political
regimes on the directions of economic and social development was rooted in
aid dependence (Sobhan 1982), but contending elites shared a belief in mass
basic education as the foundation for national development (Hossain 2010a).
Policies of expanding access have typically ‘gonewith the grain’ of competitive
clientelistic pressures on state and political actors. They have enabled politi-
cians to provide resources and services to constituents, and sources of political
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capital, patronage, and rents to local elites, contractors, teachers, and other
interest groups. And because of the significance of the national curriculum in
imparting versions of nationalist identity, each incoming government has also
had a strong incentive to expand provision, competing to reach a larger portion
of the new generation. In addition, governments have had to competewith the
highly visible role of NGOs such as BRAC providing schools for rural girls and
the poor. It is no coincidence that government schools and education-related
services (such as the Primary Education Stipend Programme) grew in parallel
with NGO innovations in non-formal schooling (Hossain et al. 2002).
Judged in terms of its share of public spending, the political will to educate
has plateaued with the achievement of near-universal primary education by
the 2000s. Public spending on education has lost its share of the total, and
remains static at an internationally and regionally low level of around
2 per cent of GDP (Islam 2010). But in real terms, spending rose 30 per cent
between 2001 and 2005 alone (Al-Samarrai 2007). Spending remains concen-
trated on teachers’ pay and benefits, and tightly controlled from the centre,
however (see Rose et al. 2014). But because poor children attend public
schools, the incidence of recurrent spending on primary education has been
broadly pro-poor (Steer, Rabbani, and Parker 2014).
The thrust of basic education policy has closely tracked the changing polit-
ical settlement since 1971. On independence from Pakistan, the nationalist
party the Awami League and its left-leaning allies installed a ‘socialistic’,
secular, statist programme of economic and social development, nationalizing
26,000 community primary schools and declaring that education would be
compulsory, secular, and modernized—the last a reference to madrassahs/
Islamic schools. But, shortly after establishing this new mandate to educate
the population, Bangladesh entered into a period of clientelistic military rule
that lasted 15 years. The dominant elite coalitions during this period broadly
accommodated Islamist political and social elites with latitude and financing
for madrassahs, and with strong links with teacher unions. To earn the regime
external and popular legitimacy, public administration was decentralized and
state ideology Islamicized, both of which influenced education policies.
Attempts to consolidate power during this period entailed political comprom-
ises with powerful social actors—for instance, in the 1990 Compulsory Primary
Education Act. The Act aimed to appease student groups aggrieved by pro-
tracted authoritarian rule, but it was too late: student groups led the movement
that toppled the regime later that year. However, the Act had other effects,
reversing privatization and the Islamization of public education, and establish-
ing free universal primary education as a goal and policy of the state.
Since the return to multiparty democracy in 1991, the political settlement
has mainly presented as ‘elitist competitive clientelist’ (Levy and Walton
2013) with respect to the balance of power. This means that whichever elite
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faction happened to be in power was vulnerable to being displaced by the
other, and also that ruling elites were under growing pressure from local-level
factions on whom they relied to maintain themselves in power; this has
tended to reduce the time-horizons of ruling elites and increase the incentives
to use public resources and services to secure political loyalty (Hassan 2013).
Since 1991, the emphasis on nationalization and Islamic education has oscil-
lated. Across governments of both parties, however, there has been a growing
emphasis on expanding access, through building schools, pro-poor condi-
tional transfers, recruiting teachers, and using the curriculum to instil partisan
versions of national identity. All governments have used public finance to
expand the formal ebtedayee (primary madrassah) system, but it remains under-
resourced compared with the mainstream GPSs. Nonetheless, this ‘holy alli-
ance’ of support to madrassahs and to poor girls’ education helped expand the
system rapidly (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2009), as did the space for the non-
formal schools of non-governmental organizations (Chowdhury et al. 2003).
Enrolment rates of girls rose sharply on the return to democracy, as did recruit-
ment of teachers (particularly women). It is notable that the democratic period
has been closely associated with the feminization of public education.
Demand for Skills: Weak Support from Business
In Bangladesh, the average attainment from basic education is low, and public
education does not equip graduates for the most ordinary interactions in work
and life (World Bank 2013). Business and industrial elites appear to have at best
mixed incentives to coordinate action to raise the quality of basic education.
This may reflect the fact that in Bangladesh’s flagship readymade garment
(RMG) industry, labour has been transformed into considerable export wealth
at, to date, very low overall levels of education. At the industry level, there has
been less interest in raising average skill levels than in keeping wages low, and
major employers view middle management, not assembly line workers, as
where the key skills deficit lies. This situation may change as Bangladesh’s
main export industries are forced to raise productivity gains to stay competitive
with rising domestic wages, political troubles at home, and new competitors
(Saxena and Salze-Lozac’h2010; Kathuria andMalouche 2015), and as a tighter
rural labour market (Zhang et al. 2013) reduces the reserve army of labour. But
to date, business interests in improved education quality have been muted.
Teachers and Schools in the Political Settlement
Despite the ebb and flow of secularism and statism, the emphasis on expan-
sion has remained steady. This has brought growth in teacher numbers,
and their associations now unite the interests of half a million organized
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/2/2019, SPi
Politics and Education in Developing Countries
70
middle-class voters with clout in the national policy space. Teacher interests in
Bangladesh are prominent on the education agenda, and substantially pro-
tected against performance accountability, in a similar way to the dynamics
observed in certain regions of Ghana. Some 90 per cent of education spending
goes on teachers, and education accounted for 29 per cent of all directly
employed government employees (400,000) in 2010. The strongest sign of
their political significance is that a further 344,000 teachers employed in the
nominally independent registered non-government primary schools (RNGPS)
(BBS 2011) were recently made fully fledged government employees of newly
nationalized primary schools.
State policy officially acknowledges sensitivities around teachers’ declining
social position (GoB 2010). Teachers are comparatively poorly paid (Asadullah
2006), and have ‘low levels of teacher job satisfaction and motivation’ (Haq
and Islam 2005, 21; also Rahman, Shahriar, and Anam 2014; World Bank
2013). Teachers are more likely than not to be women, and the gender of
the profession brings its own status issues. Yet teachers continue to be central
to the vital business of the state, providing 500,000 polling officers during
general elections (IRI 2008); it is believed that political parties view teachers as
important allies, particularly because of their role in staffing polling stations
duringgeneral elections.However, there isnoevidence that teachersmanipulate
electoral procedures or results on any significant scale, nor that occupational, as
opposed to partisan, considerations would matter in any such manipulation.
Teachers have customarily fronted public health and other government cam-
paigns (Mahmud 2002). Over and above its role in imparting the ‘three Rs’, the
school is at the interface between state and society, developing basic citizenship
skills, for example, communicating with officialdom, and imparting identities
and knowledge of rights and responsibilities (Hossain 2010b).
Party Political Competitive and Local Clientelistic Pressures
One way in which party political competition connects public education to
the political settlement is through the use of the curriculum to transmit
competing partisan visions of nationhood and identity. Despite some vari-
ations, the policy recommendations of successive Education Commissions
have typically been secondary to issues of national identity, which is the
one issue over which the main political parties compete (Chowdhury and
Kabir 2014, 3). Competition over the content of national history teaching is
politically contentious, with each incoming regime rewriting textbooks with
their version of history (Rosser 2003, 144).
The expanding school system created opportunities for local elites to earn
rents, often through building or repair contracts, or through access to jobs (to
a limited extent, as government school teacher recruitment is mainly centrally
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controlled and generally well-governed). School patronage is itself an important
source of political capital, as an obvious means of demonstrating benevolence,
raising social status, and building a profile. School management committee
(SMC) membership is an established perk/responsibility of local councillors,
and even MPs. While some forms of local political competition can have a
benign influence on schoolmanagement and teacher performance, others have
been shown to paralyse local provision (FMRP 2007).
Education Policy Reforms
Recent Reforms: PEDP3
The Third Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP3) was an
ambitious five-year (2011–15) sector-wide programme that aimed to establish
efficiency, inclusion, and equity in primary education through action on learn-
ing outcomes, participation, reducing disparities, decentralization, effective use
of budget allocations, and programme planning and management (DPE
2011b). In key respects, PEDP3 maintained the focus on institutional changes
and quality reforms started under previous reforms, so thatmany of the reforms
examined here had been underway for over a decade. PEDP3 marked a stronger
emphasis on teacher-training investments, including increasing the profes-
sional certification of teachers, and widening access and increasing equity, as
the poorest and most marginalized groups remained stubbornly hard to reach
(Cameron 2010; Hossain and Zeitlyn 2010).
The two reforms that most directly addressed the issue of quality focused on
learning outcomes, and decentralization and effectiveness (see Table 4.1).
Recognizing the central need for effective teachers, reform efforts were com-
bined in a bid to equip teachers with better knowledge and skills and increase
theirmotivationsandaccountability.Competitivepressuresdriving theongoing
expansionwerealsoexpected to raisequality, by reducing student–teacher ratios.
Under PEDP3, more teachers were set to be properly trained in subjects and
pedagogy on recruitment, and then providedwith regular in-work and refresher
training. Professional certification now comes with the Diploma in Education
qualification, gradually to be extended to all qualified teachers. The profession-
alizationof the teachingcorpswas also tobe enhanced through thedevelopment
of teacher support networks and demand-based training programmes.
Twomatters of direct relevance to teacher performance—headteacher train-
ing, and community mobilization (including SMC training)—were dropped
from PEDP3 priorities. The current core feature of decentralization program-
ming, the School-Level Improvement Plans were rolled out after a shaky start.
By 2013, these funds were still only reaching two-thirds of schools (DPE
2014b). However, minimum quality standards under PEDP3 showed progress,
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including the timely delivery of textbooks, a rising proportion of teachers
meeting the minimum professional qualification, in-service subject and sub-
cluster training, and in student–teacher ratios (DPE 2014b).
Across the board, reforms were sensitive to teacher status and interests, and
sought to raise performance without sanctioning failure. However, efforts to
build teacher capacity were to be matched by new school and student assess-
ment systems, and gathering other performance data, such as school censuses;
these would enable monitoring, and provide the database for accountability
with respect to learning outcomes. These efforts are more consistent with the
learning reforms of a dominant political power, unconcerned about any
possible short-term political effects of such new information sources, and
may reflect the changing political settlement in Bangladesh.
National Level
The primary education sector is multi-stakeholder, with a few formal actors
supporting the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, and pressure groups
Table 4.1 PEDP3 components and key reforms in Bangladesh
Component Key reforms
Learning outcomes • fresh pedagogies
• [holding] teachers accountable for each child’s learning
• revised curriculum and textbooks
• classroom and school-based assessment
• teacher pre-induction training upgraded to Diploma in Education
Participation and
disparities
• one year pre-primary education through GPS
• equivalency of formal and non-formal education
• broadening the concept and mainstreaming inclusive education
• providing education in emergencies and disasters
• improving communications
• reducing overcrowded classrooms through needs-based infrastructure
development
• providing sanitation and water to schools on a needs basis
• providing school health and school feeding programmes
• providing stipends to the poorest children
Decentralization and
effectiveness
• school-level leadership development
• field offices strengthened
• increased decentralization of school management
• mainstreaming school and upazila grants initiative
• strengthening capacity at central-level institutions.
• strengthening grade 5 examination, annual school census, and National
Student Assessment systems




• strengthening results-based management
• formalizing public–private partnerships
• assuring adequate sector finance
Source: DPE (2011b).
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(teachers’ associations or unions) and civil society groups playing an
informal role.
The PEDP3 steering committee, PEDP3 surveillance unit, and programme
support office were designed to be inter-ministerial fora for deliberation over
primary education policy. In theory, these were powerful entities; in practice,
they were largely defunct. Some informants credited the inactivity of these
committees to a lack of ownership amongst ministers and senior officials over
the content of PEDP3, possibly reflecting the weak political support from the
centre for systemic improvements in quality. Political governance was dom-
inated by the powerful Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), so that accountability
relations between parliament and the ministry were weak. Parliamentary
debates on governance and quality of education generally have limited effect,
and MPs have little incentive to act, since education quality has to date been
absent from electoral politics. Despite efforts by civil society groups to articu-
late demand for higher education standards, parent concerns about school
quality appear to be chiefly expressed in exit from the system; hence the
recent growth of the private sector.3 Neither middle-class parents nor civil
society activists have generated the political interest necessary to champion
systemic learning reforms, nor have they succeeded in winning either major
political party to their cause.
The more than a dozen national teachers’ associations—the groups that
represent teacher interests, frequently divided by party affiliation and official
status—by contrast, present a formidable platform for the articulation of
teachers’ collective demands. Recent successful claims have included national-
izing RNGPS schools, so that all public school teachers’ salaries, rank, and status
are now part of the government system. It is notable that this costly and
dramatic reform was undertaken during the lifetime of PEDP3, but not as part
of the plan, or with reference to other stakeholders in the system. This high-
lights the extent to which education policy can be held hostage to the interests
of groups with holding power within a competitive and clientelistic system.
Field Administration
The politicization of education policy also contributes to the policy incoherence
or ‘misalignment’ in the education system (World Bank 2017). Interviews con-
ducted with local government officials at multiple levels in the system make
it clear that throughout the field administration, education officials lack the
3 While numbers of government primary schools and students stayed static between 2010 and
2013 (remaining at just under 38,000 schools and increasing from 9.9 to 10.5 million students),
‘kindergarten’ schools, which provide the main competition from the private sector, increased
from 4,418 to 14,100 over the same period, while student numbers almost doubled, from 535,000
to 981,000 (DPE 2011a, 2014a).
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resources and authority with which to implement and monitor education
reforms oriented towards improving teacher performance. Informal pressures
from local andnational actorsdivert bureaucratic attentionaway froma focuson
learning throughout the system. Informal relations influence systemic account-
ability failures from the directorate responsible for policy implementation down
to the upazila (sub-district) education office. Primary research conducted for this
studyon thedistrict andupazila levels of theeducation system, aswell aswith the
ancillary institutions tasked with delivering PEDP3 reforms, confirmed the
World Bank’s analysis of a system in which the allocation of resources and
incentives is a poor fit with reforms targeting quality and learning (World Bank
2013). Officially at the helm of sub-national education administration, district
primary education officers in practice lack the resources and authority for any
effective monitoring of policy implementation at the upazila, let alone school,
level. They frequently face informal pressures from political elites, mainly MPs,
and senior officials, including from other ministries, over the transfer, deploy-
ment, andmanagementof teachers. This is sodespite thegenerally strong,merit-
based system for teacher recruitment. At the upazila level, resource constraints,
insufficient staff, excessive workloads, and lack of motivation amongst upazila
education and assistant education officersweaken schoolmonitoring. The latter
are supposed to mentor primary school teachers on pedagogy, but mostly lack
the training and knowledge themselves, spend too little time in schools, or are
under-motivated by a lack of career development prospects.
Teacher-training reforms are supposed to be delivered via primary training
institutes (PTIs). Interviews and observations indicate that these generally lack
organizational skill, teaching proficiency, and capacity, as well as adequate
physical infrastructure. Group rivalries and litigation over recruitment ensure
that recruitment is neither meritocratic nor quality-focused. Instructors receive
little on-the-job training, pedagogical knowledge is particularly weak, and spe-
cialized subject trainers are not recruited.4 Provision in the training curriculum
for trainee teachers to spend time teaching in schools with supervision from PTI
instructors rarely happens. Not only do trainee teachers get little pedagogical,
subject-based, or practical training, but cheating in examinations is also rife.
Reforms at the School Level
A comparative analysis of four schools was used to trace the effects of the
political settlement and state capacity through to the implementation of learn-
ing reforms. Contrasting two pairs of comparatively high- and low-performing
4 The recruitment policy dictates that all candidates must have bachelors- or masters-in-
education degrees; this prevents recruitment of candidates with advanced degrees as specialized
subject instructors.
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institutions, one each in a lower-income rural (Narsingdi) and a higher-income
urban (Mymensingh town) community setting, allowed us to control as far as
possible for the influence of factors associated with politics and governance,
rather than socio-economic contexts and the background of students. Case
studies traced teacher-training and accountability reforms as implemented by
headteachers and SMCs, examining outcomes against how local communities,
education officials, and teachers themselves perceived the learning environ-
ment and student performance, and compared to key performance indicators
from each school.
The school-level analysis supported the analysis of the field administration.
In particular, it demonstrated that the competitive politicization that had
supported the expansion of the system had not strengthened state capacities
to deliver even the limited learning reforms adopted under PEDP3 directly
into classrooms. The reforms were not universally absent or everywhere
poorly implemented, but they were adopted with great discretion at the
school level. Learning reforms had been adopted and implemented to the
extent that the relationship between school authorities, the local elites
involved in school governance, and the wider community aligned behind
improved teacher and student performance. Where such informal relation-
ships of accountability were absent or weak, the reforms had had limited
effects on the teaching and learning in the community’s school.
The school-level research found that teachers’ subject knowledge and peda-
gogical skill varied significantly, even though teacher training iswidely available
and compulsory. In the ‘good’ schools, training was a regular matter, valued by
the more capable teachers. In the good rural school, teachers were praised by
school leaders for their successful efforts in explaining things to students, some-
times using pictures, interactive tools, and learner-centred activities; their suc-
cesses had drawn children to enrol from less good nearby schools. Peer learning
was encouraged, and teaching challenges discussed in weekly staff meetings. In
the good urban school, teachers were strict about homework and memorizing
lessons, but some were kind and affectionate, although children who failed to
attend regular classes or extra coaching were fined. In the ‘bad’ schools, the
situation was ad hoc, and teachers were criticized and mocked by their own
students for not knowing their subjects. In the bad urban school, teachers were
regularly present, but some were preoccupied with private tuition, including of
outside students. Students who passed generally paid for extra tuition.
The role of the headteacher in setting a good example and motivating good
teaching performance emerged clearly,5 a finding that resonates across the
country chapters. Headteachers in the good schools set clear goals and led
5 See FMRP (2007) and Hossain and Tavakoli (2008).
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by personal example, monitoring classroom performance, providing support
and advice, and taking action against poor teacher performance or attend-
ance. In the good rural school, the headteacher listened in to lessons to
provide feedback later, personally collected textbooks to ensure her students
got them on time, kept teacher attendance records, andmarked them absent if
they were late. The records had no real power (another list would go to the
central office from which salary bills are made), but they did check tendencies
to tardiness. In three of the schools, the headteacher revealed a vision and
plan for achieving it, at least some of which was consistent with public policy.
In the bad urban school, teachers were deployed and targets were reached,
but public policy played little role. In the bad rural school, the headteacher
had no discernible agenda and his demotivation infected teachers, pupils, and
the community. He was said to arrive late, fall asleep in class, outsource his
mathematics lessons in return for rights to conduct private tuition, and
his teachers lacked direction, supervision, and motivation.
While teacher salaries are relatively low in Bangladesh (Asadullah 2006;
World Bank 2013), teaching is a stable job with the status of public service.
Yet teaching has few career prospects or pathways, with few chances for salary
enhancement beyond the statutory increments. Private tuition was a factor in
teacher performance, because it ‘reduces the effort teachers put in in class’, as
one SMCmember explained. Private tuition was particularly weakly governed
in the worst schools, but managed with the aim of improving overall school
and examination performance in the better schools. Half of all teachers are
women, and unpaid care work also competes withmany teachers’ professional
responsibilities. Students noted women teachers were often absent or late
because of family matters. However, SMC and community members spoke
forgivingly of women teachers’ competing pressures, which suggests that a
patriarchal benevolence to protect women’s gender roles helps justify poor
teaching performance.
Accountability with respect to teacher performance, specifically the min-
imal expectation that a trained teacher will show up on time and deliver full
lessons to plan, requires that teacher performance can be examined and
sanctioned. In practice, formal requirements to check on teacher attendance
are delinked from teacher salaries, although teachers could in theory be
disciplined, or lose salary or jobs if they are late or erratic. But teachers were
only held accountable where they were being monitored by actors in a pos-
ition to observe and authorized to act, in particular SMC members working
with headteachers. When the SMC and headteacher shared a commitment to
raising standards, they created a rule regime that raised teacher motivation
and increased time-on-task, within the limits of the resources available.
The good schools were backed in these informal teacher discipline regimes
by the support of visiting education officials. Under the best circumstances,
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official visits were constructive, mutually satisfying professional exchanges.
All ranks of local education officials had recently visited all four schools, and
in the more accessible and better-performing schools, these were regular
and serious matters. But in the worse-performing schools, the inspection
was, at most, cursory.
Informal accountability pressures were more important. For the good
schools, teacher attendance mattered, because it determined overall results;
in both, the headteacher and the community wanted better results, and
monitored teachers and teaching as a result. Shaming and public humiliation
were common sanctions against teacher transgressions, and SMC members
were known to issue public reprimands. One irate parent in the dysfunctional
urban school said that after their abysmal showing in the scholarship exam,
he told teachers that ‘with madams like these, we should break their teeth’.6
The daily nature of schooling means the public sees teachers all the time, and
basic indicators of their performance—whether they show up, on time—are
public knowledge. Mothers of children in the good urban school waited at the
school throughout the short day, and complained of teacher lateness or slow
starts, and of excessive ‘official work’ taking up teachers’ time, observing
and commenting on classroom practices. The headteacher asked mothers
to report latecomer teachers to her. Parental scrutiny kept the head moni-
toring the teachers, and the teachers alert. Yet whether the desire to earn the
respect of the wider community actually motivates teachers to turn up and
teach depends on other factors. The teacher might be looking to transfer, or
have a private tuition practice in town, and have no need to maintain a good
local reputation. For established local teachers, reputationmatters because of
status, and is useful branding for those with the time, energy, and market for
private tuition.
Like all realms of public life, teacher motivation was influenced by party
politics. Local and even national political actors had shown interest in the
performance of the four schools studied here. SMC membership yields social
and political capital, and education projects create opportunities to distribute
contracts or other advantages. Schools can also be sites of local democratic
competition over performance, with different parties competing to show their
rule is superior by improving schools. Local parties influenced each of the
schools’ governance. In the bad rural school, local powerholders from within
the ruling party controlled the school for personal interests, and excluded the
opposition from school management. People there were scared to speak up,
despite the school’s declining performance, possibly for fear of reprisals from
local party loyalists. This suggests the opposite dynamic to that observed in
6 It is not unusual for extremely poor performance by heads and teachers to be punished using
‘unruly’ means, such as public protests, threats of or actual violence (Hossain 2010a).
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Ghana, where political dominance at district level enabled more constructive
and developmental relationships to emerge. In the bad urban school, political
conflict between different parties had paralysed governance, as the SMC
chairmanship was unresolved. In the good urban school, politics intervened
less in school governance. But in the good rural school, a local political
settlement meant the SMC chair was from the ruling party and the secretary
from the opposition, a settlement that harnessed the benefits of political
competition for the performance of a local public service.
Conclusion
Bangladesh’s successful early expansion of mass education was driven by an
elite consensus on the need for basic human development as the basis for
national development, and the expansionary pressures of competitive party
politics. Teachersheld significantholdingpowerwithin thepolitical settlement,
as a large andorganizedpublic sector group—apowerdemonstrated in the costly
and unplanned recent improvements in pay and conditions of hundreds of
thousandsof registerednon-governmental school teachers. Teacher associations
have blocked or impeded consideration of reforms that would demand more
accountability and higher performance. National political competition over
education provision has not, to date, increased the political salience of the
learning crisis in Bangladesh, nor have business or state actors shown any
interest in lobbying for or supporting such reforms, partly because their educa-
tional needs are satisfied by even low-quality schooling. However, at the local
level, political competition can shape school performance. In some instances,
local competition between party-affiliated local elites creates positive incentives
for SMCs to institute systems for improving teacher performance and student
attendance. In others, however, political competition focuses on rent-seeking
and securing jobs for party loyalists, paralysing efforts to improve learning.
Efforts to improve learning under the PEDP3 were shaped in part by the
legacies of past policies, including those of the previous government, and in
particular by the momentum for expansion and its impacts on teacher
accountability and performance. This includes the feminization of the labour
force in the expansionary drive, and the implications of gender disadvantage,
including women’s responsibilities for unpaid care work for matters such as
teacher capacity, performance management, and time-on-task. PEDP3
involved a closer focus on quality and learning than previous development
plans, and most notably strengthened the scope for central (although not
local) monitoring of performance, through a new system of learning assess-
ments (monitoring Bengali and mathematics performance amongst students
in grades 3 and 5), in addition to official school censuses and Annual Sector
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Performance Reviews. These efforts to strengthen central monitoring are con-
sistent with the kinds of far-sighted policies we would expect of developmen-
tal elites without significant competitive pressures to deflect. They may reflect
the growing concentration of power in the Awami League government, in
power from 2009 to 2018 (to date), and the importance of development
performance as a means of legitimating its authority andmaintaining positive
transnational relations.
While the quality of education does feature on political and policy agendas,
teachers’ collective holding powermeans that reforms targeting their perform-
ance have favoured positive incentives, doing little to hold them accountable
for what they do in the classroom. Some reforms do reach schools, particularly
where they involve more training or support to teachers. But it is only in
some types of ‘good’ school that the reforms are harnessed to improve learning
to any significant degree. The findings and analysis are consistent with the
domain diagnosis that policy is weakly transmitted from the centre, so that
inter-school differences explain most variations in student performance. There
is effective school-level managerial control over the primary resource in educa-
tion provision, namely, teacher time. But for a good school to exercise this core
managerial function depends on cooperation between its headteacher and the
community, and on an alignment of goals and visions for the school.
So, Bangladesh features an education system which, while formally highly
centralized, is in practice fairly decentralized and discretionary in whether
and how it implements reforms. And because SMC membership is amongst
the spoils of local politics, there are competitive pressures on schools to
adopt—and adapt—reforms. Local political competition can induce raised
standards and overall improved schools where the oversight is generally
benign. In others, political competition involving party affiliations destroys
and distracts from efforts to improve learning. Overall, effective teacher man-
agement is likely to arise where the institutional fit between the school and the
community enables a disciplinary regime focused around the management of
time, the primary resource in the system. In this regime, students and teachers
are driven to make the most of the resources available, with the clear aim of
learningmore and doing better. Community and school need to coordinate to
achieve this disciplinary regime, and it helps if they are supported by the
external administration. But there is little substantive support from district
levels, and a variable amount from upazila-level officials. There is little external
support for this effort to govern teachers, and no functioning system of formal
accountability to enforce it.
The political will to improve learning remains concentrated within the
central state’s development project, from which its education ministries and
agencies, in sectoral partnerships with aid agencies and projects, aim to deliver
results. It is here, in the results-focused space of international aid and human
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development, that Bangladesh has been successful in the past, and seeks to
demonstrate now the ‘Bangladesh model’ of development (GED 2015). To
the extent that this matters to a core developmental elite that comprises
politicians, bureaucrats, and aid and civil society actors, there is now some
urgency around the problem of education quality. To date, this seems to be
reflected most notably in the National Student Assessment, a monitoring
exercise which was sustained throughout the lifetime of the PEDP3 despite
persistent—and embarrassing—official evidence that learning remains at an
abysmally low level. These costly innovations to monitor sectoral perform-
ance and learning outcomes have strong potential for improving performance
accountability at different levels of the system.
A likely source of imminent change will be social and economic develop-
ment itself. A richer and more educated population, and perhaps eventually
larger andmore globally integrated firms which require higher-quality human
capital, will demand better education—but may not look for it in public
schools. Private tuition is so common as to already constitute a partial privat-
ization of the system, and is estimated to make an important contribution to
learning outcomes. The recent rapid growth in primary enrolment in private
schools may have the potential to raise standards and encourage public
schools to improve in competition with the private sector. But shifts of
effective teaching to the private sector are unequalizing, and may not raise
standards further. And as middle-class groups at present benefit dispropor-
tionately from their ability to pay for private learning, gaining credentials and
exam passes that ease them into good professional jobs, they lack any strong
incentive to support reforms targeting teacher performance in public schools.7
Amongst those who do remain in the public school system, socio-economic
change should also affect how schools are governed and managed towards
raising standards. More educated parents will be better able in theory to
monitor schools and teachers, and to support children’s schoolwork and
non-cognitive learning. This should lead to further improvements in the
institutional fit between schools and communities, andmore effective teacher
management regimes using informal accountability across more schools.
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5
The Downsides of Dominance




Two decades after a devastating civil war and the 1994 genocide, Rwanda’s
government has charted an audacious social and economic development
project to transform the country into a market-driven, modernized society.
Formal education has featured prominently in this project. Thanks in part to a
fee-free basic education policy entitling children to 12 years of public educa-
tion, enrolment in primary and secondary schools surged in the 2000s. But,
while student numbers rose quickly, recent evidence has shown that little was
being learned in these schools: a majority of primary students failed to meet
reading and arithmetic standards (EDC 2016, 2017; Friedlander, Gasana, and
Goldenberg 2014; USAID 2014), and dropout, repetition, completion, and
transition rates stagnated or worsened over this period (MINEDUC 2015).
Perhaps no country better exemplifies a ‘dominant developmental’ political
settlement than Rwanda. This implies a strong commitment to deliver devel-
opment to its citizens. The political elite and political power are aligned with a
single principle in the form of the ruling party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF), with its leader and the country’s President, Paul Kagame. Dominant
party regimes like Rwanda are known for governing through a high degree of
control and top-down discipline. Dominant regimes have strong, shared, and
centralized approaches to state building, and a political system relatively free
of both rent extraction and genuine political competition.
The stability of a regime such as that in Rwanda allows the state to engage in
longer-term planning (Hickey, Sen, and Bukenya 2015), with limited political
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space for meaningful pushback or alternative projects to arise. These condi-
tions favour rapid transformation over more incremental approaches to policy
development and implementation. In Rwanda, strategies for development
under the RPF have focused on lifting the country out of poverty with atten-
tion to the factors believed to have precipitated conflict—namely, ethnic
divisionism, resource scarcity, and limited opportunities for social mobility.
The government is mandated, in other words, to deliver development inclu-
sively, to all Rwandans.
Given the ruling party’s commitment to delivering development, why has it
not introduced reforms that have improved educational standards? This chap-
ter explores the interaction between Rwanda’s political settlement and the
education policy domain, to shed light on its unexpected inability to improve
learning. This failure is surprising because the Rwandan political elite has
demonstrated both capacity and willingness to undertake and implement
reforms that it has deemed necessary to deliver development in other sectors.
As Chapters 1 and 2 in this volume have summarized, the evidence suggests
that both dominant and more competitive political systems have incentives
to expand education provision; by contrast, getting the often more politically
difficult reforms needed to improve teaching and learning outcomes appear to
attract little political support, whether from citizens and politicians, business,
or employers, and can be blocked by powerful organized teacher interests.
Rwanda under the RPF appears to have been insulated against the kinds of
political pressures that might block unpopular teacher-related reforms, and it
has demonstrated state capacity to deliver when needed. So why have such
reforms been a low priority on the education policy agenda? And how have
quality-focused reforms been implemented?
To answer these questions, we drew from existing literature and policy
reports, and 65 semi-structured interviews carried out over six months with
members of government, civil society, development partners, local education
officers, teachers and headteachers, school-based mentors, and members of
parent–teacher committees. Local-level interviews were conducted around
four schools, two each in an urban and rural district, selected on the basis
that one in each district was relatively high- or low-performing. These were
selected in order to help us understand how Rwanda’s political settlement and
the policy domain interacted to influence learning outcomes at the local level.
Further details on methods are available elsewhere (Williams 2016a).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the following section,
we locate the education systemwithin the broader political settlement.We then
focus on reform efforts that the government has undertaken in recent years.
Finally, we investigate how frontline education stakeholders have experienced
and responded to these reforms at the local level. The chapter concludes with
a brief discussion of how the particular dominant developmentalism in the
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Rwandan political settlement has interacted with the education policy domain
to keep learning reforms low on the policy agenda.
The Political Settlement and the Education Policy Domain
Since taking power, the RPF-led government has introduced a series of reforms
aimed at social and economic transformation, with the goal of becoming a
middle-income country by the year 2020 (MINECOFIN 2000). The govern-
ment’s development strategy aims were premised on distancing the country
from a past marked by ethnic division, conflicts over scarce natural resources,
social inequalities, and limited opportunities for social mobility. Education
features prominently within these broader aims (MINEDUC 2003, 2010).
Elite commitment and state capacity in Rwanda centres on delivering devel-
opment to its citizens. This point is outlined in government documents
(Senate 2014) and was supported in our interviews with officials at every
level of government. Officials explained that their personal commitments
are guided by national development plans, rather than the prospect of indi-
vidual gain. Their sentiment underscores one of the characteristics of the
dominant developmental political settlement: that if the government moves
‘fast enough’, it can bring about the changes needed to distance itself from the
past, while charting a sustainable and peaceful future for all Rwandans (Booth
and Golooba-Mutebi 2012, 391).
There was a general agreement that during the time period in which our
study was carried out (2015), the inner circle of power in the education sector
consisted of the President of the Republic, the Cabinet, the Ministry of Edu-
cation (MINEDUC), Ministry of Finance (MINECOFIN), the Ministry of Local
Government (MINALOC), and the UK’s Department for International Devel-
opment (DFID). In the outer circle was the Rwandan Education Board (REB),
Parliament, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
and a consortium of NGOs called the Rwandan Education NGO Coordination
Platform. The Office of the President was understood to play a critical function
in establishing the priorities of the education sector. Ministers report directly
to the President, who has the power to replace them without notice. The
President can make key decisions that impact the priorities of the education
sector, such as the expansion of the basic education system from nine to
twelve years (Williams 2017). In practice, this initiative went through the
formal institutional channels to become national policy, but the decision
originated with the President. The Cabinet is the key decision-making entity.
Cabinet members are appointed by the President and comprise different
ministers. By law, no more than half of Cabinet members can be from the
ruling party, that is, the RPF. Within the Cabinet, the Minister of Education
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holds overall responsibility for MINEDUC. However, each of MINEDUC’s
three ministers of state are also Cabinet members. They report directly to the
President. MINALOC plays a crucial role through the country’s decentralized
system of governance. Within the education sector, it is responsible for the
implementation of policy and the administration of schools. District- and
sector-level education officers are technically members of MINALOC, even
though their primary duties are in education. MINECOFIN also has a deter-
mining role in education priorities through its responsibilities for budget
implementation, including ensuring the education sector and budget har-
monize with the country’s broader development aims, as outlined in the
country’s broader economic development and poverty reduction strategies
(MINECOFIN 2013). MINECOFIN does not have a direct role in establishing
priorities for the sector, but it funds the line items of the sector’s budget. The
final decision on priority targets rests with MINALOC, who can re-prioritize
after receiving MINEDUC’s ideas. DFID is also an influential actor within
the education sector. DFID and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
are the co-chairs of the Education Sector Working Group. DFID funds a large
proportion of the education sector budget, disbursing over £100 million
between 2011 and 2015 with the aim of ‘increased equitable access to quality
education and improved learning outcomes’ (British Council 2015, 6). Most
of these funds are disbursed through direct education sector budget support.
In 2015, DFID contributed £65 million, including £44m to sector budget
support, £9 million for a Results-Based Aid programme linked to learning
outcomes and primary school completion, and £12 million for a project
called Innovations for Education, which funded 26 pilot projects developed
by NGOs, universities, and civil society organizations aimed at improving
education quality and learning.
Sector priorities are also established at the government’s annual leadership
retreat. Each year, high-level government officials meet to produce a series of
resolutions. Resolutions often include items relevant to the education sector.
For example, Honeyman (2015, 26) noted that the 2014 retreat led to a specific
resolution concerning quality, which called for the establishment of ‘a moni-
toring and evaluation system for tracking educational quality, and putting
into place an education quality strategic plan with a baseline and desired
targets’. The introduction of school feeding was another example of a reso-
lution adopted at the retreat, and one that highlights their ad hoc nature.
Schools were expected to start providing food for students, but as the policy
had not been part of the budget for the 2014–15 fiscal year, schools had to pass
on the cost of school feeding to students.
Understanding the significance of decision-making processes in and beyond
the education sector is important for thinking about how policies are estab-
lished and implemented. As we shall see in the next section, policy decisions
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may well align with the government’s broader developmental ambitions. At
the same time, the fact that these decisions often occur outside the strategic
planning processes presents challenges for producing a coherent and focused
system. The domains of power approach offers guidance for thinking about
how these challenges affect policies that affect the quality of education.
Education Reform and Quality
The domains of power shaped policy priorities and outcomes. The govern-
ment was oriented towards delivering development, but with a strong focus
on tangible and visible outputs that could be offered as evidence to its citizens
and outsiders of its commitment to inclusive development. National and local
officials, including local education officers, sign performance contracts or
imihigo, officially intended to enable a more active voice in decision-making
processes, but which in practice ensure accountability primarily continues to
flow upwards (Chemouni 2014). District and sector performance contracts
include indicators concerning education quality, but focus on indicators that
are measurable and comparable, such as the construction of classrooms or the
building of latrines (Honeyman 2015). Performance outcomes that were more
difficult to measure and improve, such as learning outcomes, were assigned
lower priority. In this section, we focus on two interrelated areas of education
policy and reforms that have had a big impact on education quality: language
reform and teacher training. The language policy was introduced outside of
strategic planning processes, and how this decision was implemented has had
important effects for the ways in which teacher training has been carried out.
The Switch from French to English: Causes and Effects
Up until 2008, the language of instruction was French, owing to the country’s
Franco-Belgian colonial roots (King 2013). However, in 2009, the language
was switched from French to English. We draw on interview data and the
existing literature to explore the possible motivations and incentives for the
language change, and its effects on efforts to raise the standard of learning.
One explanation offered for the 2008 switch to English traces this to the
social and political demographic of the ruling party, and the legacy of the
genocide (Samuelson 2013; Williams 2016b). The predominantly anglophone
Tutsi political elite sought to distance itself and the country from its franco-
phone roots and sever its ties to France, owing to its controversial role in the
genocide. Many of the core members of the RPF themselves grew up in
Uganda and studied English (Prunier 1995). The 2008 switch to English was
thus consistent with an elite with predominantly anglophone backgrounds.
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A second explanation for the switch to English is economic: that is, a
strategy to facilitate regional integration, and a point of entry into the global
market economy. The switch to English coincided with the country’s entry
into the British Commonwealth. Rwanda also recently joined the predom-
inantly anglophone East African community. Thus, the language switch
helped to foster strategic alliances and promote trade with its neighbours.
As one policy expert we interviewed put it, the country’s ‘cultural alliances’
and economic ambitions are aligned with the anglophone world. ‘You don’t
go to China and speak French. Or Germany or Pakistan’, the expert said.
While no definitive account of the political motivations behind the language
change may be possible, it is possible to explore the consequences for learn-
ing outcomes.
It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the language change presented a
shock to primary education, to which the system was unprepared to respond.
This can be better understood by reviewing education planning documents
developed around that time. The language shift was announced in 2008. Yet,
the 2008–12 Education Sector Strategic Plan—the document used to guide the
priorities (and budget) of the sector—offers no indication of the language
change. The switch was made so quickly that it has left the quality of the
education system in a perpetual state of catch-up. Stakeholders ranging from
teachers to senior members of MINEDUC explained how the language shift
had made it difficult to maintain or improve quality. ‘It was a matter of
choice,’ a senior MINEDUC official said of the policy. ‘You go for access and
you will compromise quality. When you then add English as a challenge, the
problem of quality became a lot worse.’
The change has been an immense challenge for teachers in government
schools. A study of over 600 primary and secondary school teachers found
that almost half of all teachers had a competency of English considered to be
either at ‘elementary’ or ‘intermediate’ stages (British Council 2015), and
these figures were an improvement over the baseline study carried out two
years previously (Simpson 2013). It is clear that the proportion of teachers
using English at such a basic level presents challenges for the effective delivery
of the curriculum (Abbott, Sapsford, and Rwirahira 2015).
Since the language change was introduced, the Ministry of Education and
development partners have implemented many different responses. Most
notably, the Rwanda Education Board (the implementation arm of MINE-
DUC) introduced a School-Based Mentorship (SBM) programme in 2012.
The idea was to hire up to 1,000 English-speaking teachers from neighbouring
anglophone countries to assist Rwandan teachers to improve their ability to
carry out their own lessons in English. The SBM programme also included a
pedagogy component, but interviewees noted that, in practice, it concen-
trated on improving English only. Their rationale was that pedagogy did not
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matter if teachers could not speak the language of instruction. The programme
produced mixed results (Wilson 2013).
The switch to English may have made sense given the country’s broader
economic ambitions and the nature of its political settlement. On the other
hand, the implementation of the policy seems to have plunged all actors in
the education policy domain into a state of crisis, in which teachers instruct
their students in a language they have little knowledge of themselves,
while students struggle to learn because they have so little knowledge of
the language.
Training of Primary School Teachers
During the period in which the fieldwork took place, teacher training was in a
period of transition. In 2007, the Ministry of Education introduced the
Teacher Development and Management Policy (MINEDUC 2007). The policy
outlined the core priorities for how teacher training was to be done. The
Teacher Service Commission, an entity within MINEDUC at the time, was
responsible for overseeing the implementation of the teacher-training policy.
But the key challenge to this teacher-training policy was timing. That it was
published in 2007 meant it made no note of, or provision for, the switch to
English announced the following year. In other words, almost as soon as the
policy was introduced, it was inadequate to the challenges facing teachers.
During the data gathering for our project, government-led in-service teacher
training was also in a state of transition. The 2007 policy was still on the
books, but was now largely irrelevant. A new Teacher Development and
Management Policy had been developed, but had not yet been finalized.
During this time, in-service training was still happening, but it was mostly
offered by NGOs, rather than as part of an integrated system of continuous
professional development.
This brings us to an important point concerning resource allocation and
education quality. A hallmark of the government’s development strategy was
its decentralization policy (MINALOC 2001). Some scholars have argued that
the policy has had the effect of extending the state’s reach (Chemouni 2014).
However, the stated intention of the policy was to empower local government
and communities to use resources to meet locally identified needs. When it
comes to education, the decentralization policy meant that funds were trans-
ferred directly to schools, so that parents and teachers could decide what was
needed to improve their school (Transparency International 2013). Up until
2012, about 10 to 15 per cent of the funds transferred to schools were ear-
marked for schools to send their teachers for training.
The English language policy changed this. When the SBM programme was
introduced, the decentralized funds that had been earmarked for in-service
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training were recentralized (i.e. REB withheld these funds) to finance it. This
meant that virtually all government-financed in-service teacher training
became English language training, a point which was confirmed by senior
education sector officials, school administrators, and development partners.
Interviews with government and non-government stakeholders clearly
highlighted a commitment towards improving education. National and
local education officials said that a key need of the sector was more training
for teachers to be effective. But therein was the challenge. It was difficult to
implement in-service training when policy changes were introduced that
occurred outside of MINEDUC’s strategic planning processes. The language
change immediately channelled NGO and government attention onto this
issue. Available funds for teacher training were used for English training.
Frontline School Management and Performance
In this section, we explore how the domains of power converged to shape
policy implementation and education quality in communities, through a
comparative case study of one rural Southern Province district and one
urban district in Kigali. Within each district, high- and low-performing
schools were selected, in order to ‘reveal major system weaknesses that
become targets of opportunity for programme or system improvement’
(Patton 1990, 177). Within each district, we collaborated with local education
officials to identify the highest and lowest-performing schools, drawing on
results from the 2014 Primary 6 national examination as an imperfect proxy
for performance.
Urban District
In general, urban schools tend to perform better than rural on various learning
metrics (USAID 2014). Urban households are generally wealthier and can
make financial contributions to the running of the schools. The allure of
urban areas enables schools to attract more qualified teachers, in part because
of a higher top-up in salary, and because more economic opportunities are
available for teachers. The urban student experience is different as well, char-
acterized by shorter commutes and fewer daily responsibilities than rural
children (NISR 2012). At the same time, the cost of living is more expensive
in a place like Kigali. It was under these conditions that we investigated how
schooling was experienced in the urban district.
At the district office, the offices of themayor and vicemayor for social affairs
had display cabinets of trophies, signifying their achievements in relation to
the countrywide performance contracts. When asked how his district had
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been so successful over the years, the mayor attributed the gains to hard work
and innovation. At the same time, the area was also a wealthy centre of
commerce compared with other areas. Unlike its rural counterparts, it did
not need to rely exclusively on the central government funds to pay its
expenses, because it was able to generate revenue through its tax base. As
the district mayor explained, ‘Revenues come through taxes. We manage
those taxes and revenues to pay our staff. This district has pressure to tax
businesses so that it can get funds to pay its staff from the district to the cell
level.’ With the extra revenue, the district has been able to hire more district
education staff members to provide oversight of, and support to, schools. This
was not an option in the rural district.
According to local officials, school attendance in the urban district was a
non-issue. ‘I can say we have achieved education for all,’ said a District
Education Officer (DEO). The priority now, the official explained, was to
improve quality, primarily through mobilizing the parent–teacher associ-
ations (PTAs) to participate in school development, build classrooms, and
lower the student-to-teacher ratio. These commitments mirrored national-
level education priorities.
District officials and education officers reported that they did not have a
problem attracting qualified teachers. Urban schools were a desirable location
for teachers. Their base salary was low, but they could get additional work on
weekends and holidays, or continue their own professional development and
training at nearby universities if they wished. There were other financial
incentives for teachers working in urban primary government schools com-
pared with their rural counterparts. In particular, families were expected to
make PTA contributions to their children’s school. A PTA contribution is an
amount of money agreed upon by the parent–teacher committee (PTC) that
parents are expected to pay for each of their children. Technically, the PTA
contribution is not a fee and thus should not be the basis for exclusion from
school (Williams, Abbott, andMupenzi 2015). On the other hand, urban areas
are wealthier, PTA contributions were higher, and teachers depended on the
contribution. PTA contributions for primary school in the urban district were
around 3,000 RWF (US$5) per child per term.
Another element of the district-level success in education was the number
of private schools in the district. This presents something of a paradox in itself:
the urban district was one of the highest-performing districts in the country,
but the top nineteen performing primary schools within its jurisdiction were
private. Many key informants acknowledged that government primary
schools across the country—even in this particular urban district—have a
reputation for poor quality. However, government secondary schools tend
to be higher quality than their private counterparts, and are considered more
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prestigious, reflecting the fact that many originated in the colonial era (King
2013). The trend, then, was for better-off families to send their children to a
private primary school, so that they could receive better training, particularly
in English. Private primary school students who did well on their national
examinations then had the opportunity to re-enter government education to
attend a well-regarded government boarding school for their secondary studies.
When asked about teacher training, the DEO said it was less of an urgent issue
than for their rural counterparts. There was little mention of in-service training.
According to local officials, the training that was happening was organized
directly through REB, and mostly through the SBM programme.
HIGH-PERFORMING SCHOOL IN THE URBAN DISTRICT
The high-performing primary school in the urban district was technically a
government-aided school. That is, the Catholic Church owned the property
and built some of the original infrastructure. However, the schoolwas otherwise
government run, with administration and oversight handled by the district.
In separate meetings, both the headteacher and PTC members reported a
productive collaboration. The PTC included members who themselves had
been formally educated. Parents said this allowed them to draw from their
experience to speak knowledgeably about school operations and offer their
contributions to the decision-making and administration of the school, permit-
ting accountability relations to work both ways. The PTC and headteacher
worked together to manage the finances of the school. Though schooling is
officially free, and children were reportedly not excluded for an inability to pay,
the PTA contribution was considered by headteachers as an essential top-up to
the otherwise low teacher salaries. According to the headteacher, the school did
not have a mentor through the SBM programme, but it was not clear why.
Perhaps because they were a top-performing school, a mentor was a less urgent
need compared with other schools. In any case, the headteacher did not see the
absence of a mentor as having any bearing on quality at the school.
Rwanda’s double shifting policy meant that primary students attended
either in the morning or the afternoon. However, officials at this primary
school said that they kept Primary 6 students in school for both shifts, with
the aim of a final push to improve students’ national examination scores. This
was not a national directive, nor was it official policy, but the school admin-
istrators saw it as a way to keep examination scores high. But as strongly as this
particular primary school performed, nineteen private primary schools in this
urban district ranked higher in the year-end national examinations. ‘People
say that we performed well on the exams,’ said the headteacher. ‘But we do
not perform well like private schools.’
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LOW-PERFORMING SCHOOL IN THE URBAN DISTRICT
The lowest-performing government primary school in the urban district was
characterized by thorough dysfunction. In separate meetings, the PTC and
the headteacher described one another as uncommitted and poorly func-
tioning. The school was in a fairly well-off area, but the student population
mainly comprised poor families. In recent years, as Kigali has expanded in
size, the surrounding area has changed from suburban and poor to urban and
well-off. Its proximity to Kigali made the area more desirable for wealthier
families, and land prices increased. Teachers and school administrators sug-
gested that less well-off families living in the area sold their land to wealthier
ones moving in. Better-off families opted to send their children to private
schools, rather than the government primary school. Lower enrolment rates
meant the school received a lower total capitation grant through which to
operate the school. The concern expressed by the headteacher and PTC
was that the flight of better-off families also removed well-educated parents,
who could have positively impacted school operations through participation
in the PTC.
There was discord between the local school management through the
PTC and the head- teacher. The headteacher blamed the parents for failing
to be committed to their children’s education. Members of the PTC, in turn,
said they cooperated with the headteacher, but that there was not a sense of
shared decision-making when it came to the administration of the school. In
the PTC group discussion for this project, five parents and two teachers agreed
to participate in our group discussion, but only one parent and two teachers
ended up attending—perhaps a symptom of broader disharmony at the
school, or of weaker engagement in school activities.
Individuals also noted that, while children at the school came from poor
families, the boom in construction meant that temporary forms of employ-
ment had become available. Richer families needed manual labour. School
administrators expressed concern that the availability of work had the
potential to motivate students to work rather than study, or to discontinue
their studies altogether. This could help to explain low examination
performance.
Rural District
The rural district we worked with in the Southern Province was amongst the
poorest in the country (NISR 2011). Like all districts in the country, and as
emerged in interviews with district-level staff, its district-level goals were
aligned with broader development strategies of the country. As the DEO put
it, ‘The priority of this district is national priorities’. According to local
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officials, district-specific needs were also established through consultation
with stakeholders at the local levels.
District officials linked education priorities to the improvement of access
and provision of infrastructure as their primary targets. About one-third of
schools in the area were connected to electricity (MINEDUC 2015). District
and sector officials pointed to the importance of improving educational qual-
ity, operationalized through performance contracts. Like most performance
contracts we reviewed, the key focus was on achieving measurable and object-
ive targets, such as the construction of classrooms. District, sector-, and
school-level officials understood the training of teachers as a centralized affair,
responsibilities for which lay with REB or the handful of NGOs operating in
the area. The consensus was that teacher training happens through the SBM
programme, which, as we saw above, primarily focused on improving English.
Households in the district principally relied on agricultural production for
their livelihoods. Most were poor. Whereas PTA contributions in the urban
district were expected, PTA contributions could not be enforced in the rural
district. As the DEO said, ‘When you talk about money everything [i.e. prior-
ities and goals] can unravel . . . [expectation of PTA contributions] only hap-
pens in urban areas’. In effect, this meant there were fewer financial
constraints for children from poor families. But the lack of an enforced PTA
contribution—sometimes referred to as a ‘teacher motivation’—could also
limit the ability of schools to recruit and retain qualified teachers.
District officials pointed out that the recruitment and retention of qualified
teachers remained an ongoing challenge. Teachers from outside the district
were reluctant to migrate to a remote area for a low-paid teaching position.
Interviewees said that teachers in urban areas could supplement their salary
through additional work, along with PTA contributions that they could count
on. For teachers in this district, economic opportunities were limited. ‘That is
why we have that problem of recruiting qualified teachers,’ said the
DEO. ‘After a few days, they just leave.’ Other district officials also noted this
problem and said they had worked to address it. In 2011, a teacher-training
college (TTC) was built in the area, and its first cohort of primary school
teachers graduated in 2014. According to the district mayor, the rationale for
building a local TTC was to improve the ability to train and hire teachers from
the area, with the hopes of improving retention rates.
Another challenge was the recent introduction of ‘district education units’,
a team of staff members to be in charge of primary education, secondary
education, pre-primary, technical and vocational education and training
(TVET), and school construction, respectively. However, funding for the
units was intended to come out of district budgets and local revenue. While
the urban district had the funds to fully staff all five posts of their education
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unit, the rural district had the capacity to fill just one post (in addition to the
DEO) to date. As the DEO explained in a meeting at the district office:
We are supposed to be four education staff in this office but we are only two staff—
me and my colleague [who works on primary education, pre-primary, and liter-
acy]. There is someone else who is supposed to be in charge of secondary schools
and TVET. There is someone who is supposed to be an engineer in charge of
classroom construction. The district was told ‘Here is that new organogram.
Employ them from the financial capacity that you have’. [ . . . ] [But] if the district
doesn’t have salaries for those staff, it cannot employ them.
In effect, we may interpret this strategy as meaning that poorer districts
receive poorer education and supervision than wealthier, urban districts.
While this appears to be the case at the moment, both local and national
education officials we met with noted that the establishment of district edu-
cation units was a new endeavour, one which would take some time to fully
fund and institutionalize.
HIGH-PERFORMING SCHOOL IN THE RURAL DISTRICT
The top-performing school in the rural district presented a paradox. The
school was located in an extremely remote part of the district. The quickest
way to reach the sector office and primary school was by motorcycle, and
involved a journey of over two hours from the district office—itself a 90-
minute drive from the nearest paved road—at a round-trip cost of about
10,000 RWF (US$15), that is, roughly one-quarter of a primary teacher’s
monthly salary. The executive secretary of the sector remarked that the forest,
along with the bad road, served as an unfortunate barrier, and that few NGOs
had operations in the area. Sector officials said that the area was too rural and
too isolated to reach. Why then did the primary school outperform some
other schools located in closer proximity to key infrastructure, such as decent
roads, marketplaces, and the district office—amenities that could presumably
attract more qualified teachers?
That the school was secluded appeared to have had a buffering effect on
teachers. Teachers had few other non-farm options to make money aside from
teaching; transport was too time-intensive and expensive to travel elsewhere
on weekends for further study, and so teachers focused on teaching, supple-
menting their own income with extra tutorials on weekends and during
holidays for children from households that could afford it. Another key to
the school’s success was the reportedly strong collaboration between the PTC
and the headteacher. They worked together to decide how capitation funds
should be used to improve the school. When students did well in examin-
ations, the PTCmembers organized an event to recognize the achievements of
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teachers and students. The headteacher spent a lot of time supervising
teachers at school, in part because the sector and district offices were too far
to travel to.
The school also organized events aimed at making their education relevant
to the local context. Students were trained in cultivation, noted the head-
teacher, generating a new source of revenue for the school. The school also
owned several cows, whose milk went to students who arrived at school
hungry or undernourished. This is an example of the school exercising its
autonomy to establish creative measures to improve the welfare of students.
While the school did comparatively well, a number of challenges were
reported. For example, the PTC comprised committed members, but many
were uneducated themselves. According to school officials, parents were often
unable to give helpful ideas in meetings with teachers, and so sat in silence,
while the headteacher and teachers made decisions at meetings.
LOW-PERFORMING SCHOOL IN THE RURAL DISTRICT
The lowest-performing primary school in the district was located near some
main roads and markets. The commitment of the headteacher at the school
appeared different to that of the high-performing school. The headteacher
seemed rushed and eager to finish the interview because he had a private
matter to attend to in another town. The Sector Education Officer and execu-
tive secretary of the sector also lived in Kigali and Butare, respectively. One of
the key obstacles to effectiveness in the school was the interaction between
the PTC and the headteacher. PTCmembers indicated they were not involved
in the decision-making process through which the capitation grant money
was spent, and that the headteacher did not want to involve them in the
decision-making. The way finances were being used was unclear, and they did
not know howmuchmoney the school was receiving. Members did not imply
thatmisuse of funds was occurring, but suggested that the headteacher did not
communicate with the PTC because he was not clear about how to best use the
allocated resources. They said that if the school hired an accountant, it might
help the school to operate more effectively.
PTCmembers and the headteacher also pointed towhat they felt was a lack of
commitment on the part of parents. They said that parents allowed their chil-
dren to come to school without notebooks, and that some failed to follow up if
their childmissed a class. But teacher commitmentwas also questioned. Accord-
ing to the PTC, teachers did not always attend their in-service training, and
could be foundwalkingdown the roador at a barwhen they shouldhavebeenat
school or in training. The PTC stated that this lack of commitment on the part of
teachers may have influenced the commitment of families and their children.
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Discussion and Conclusions
Rwanda’s political elite have staked their claim to viability on a longer-term
investment in the development of the country, one which is relatively free
from the problems of rent-seeking common to other types of political settle-
ments (Levy andWalton 2013). Rwanda’s developmental anddominant leader
framework plays a central role in establishing its focus on governance and
accountability. Yet the analysis here identifies some potential downsides to
top-down, executive-led policymaking within the education policy domain.
Education priorities were clearly political as well as developmental. Policy
decisions were often not grounded in the realities of the education system
and its local stakeholders. Some of the key policy decisions that impacted on
quality, for example, the language policy, occurred outside the sector’s stra-
tegic planning processes. That efforts to address educationquality have been so
limited in Rwanda is a surprise, given that a dominant developmentalist
framework suggests a harmonization of priorities to achieve inclusive devel-
opment and maintain power. What explains the failure to introduce effective
learning reforms, for instance, in relation to teacher training?
Rwanda’s political settlement has enabled the government to advance ideas
and introduce transformative policies because the interests and incentives of
the elite are aligned with developmental gains, rather than shorter-term rent-
seeking behaviour (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012). However, in the
absence of significant pushback, this transformation did not always reflect
the realities facing the country and the majority of its citizens (Scott 1998).
Understanding these conditions may help to explain some of the challenges
facing the education sector, particularly with regards to quality. As other
chapters in this volume show, inmore competitive systems, states may struggle
to agree upon and implement major reforms and thus eventually negotiate a
gradual approach. Rwanda’s consensus-building approach opened itself up to
the opposite problem: the strong political will of the country’s principal and
elite, coupled with a lack of real opposition or pushback, enabled it to introduce
transformative educational policies in line with its developmental ambitions,
but which may be at odds with the present-day realities of classroom learning.
Understanding Rwanda’s political settlement helps us to analyse the role of
individuals, institutions, and incentives that are at the core of the domains of
power. The dominant developmentalist framework suggests that the country’s
elite has staked its claim to viability on its attempt to deliver development as
quickly as possible. Accountability was high, and tolerance for corruption and
underperformance low. Individuals failing to perform in accordance with the
government’s expectations were likely to be replaced. The government intro-
duced new policies that were aligned with its developmental aims, but that did
not always reflect the actual situation facing the education sector. These
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discontinuities prevented the education system frommaturing and improving
over time. The introduction of English did not occur within the strategic
architecture of the education sector. If it had done, sector officials, schools,
and development partners could have worked to ensure that the rollout of the
new language was done in a way that could have better anticipated the
profound changes that would need to happen. However, policies were intro-
duced at such a pace and in such a way that stakeholders in the education
sector were left operating in catch-up mode.
In terms of hierarchical forms of accountability and oversight, Levy and
Walton (2013) suggest thatmulti-stakeholder reformsmay only provide limited
additional value where principal–agent issues are largely solved. However, dis-
trict and school local-level work showed that centralized, top-down aspects of
educationqualitywere notworkingwell,whereas somemorebottom-up aspects
were doing better (e.g. PTCs), especially where undertaken in concert with
headteachers. Again, this may reflect the lack of political priority given to the
quality of schooling by the RPF. School-level governance matters, but so too do
matters of poverty andgeography. This is particularly the casewithheadteachers
and also with PTCs. The quality of the latter appeared to be strongly shaped by
the socio-economic background of the households involved. The fact that
better-off families opted to send their children to private primary schools before
transferring to government schools for secondary education did not strengthen
PTCs and is symptomatic of the low quality of government primary schools.
Remoteness provided unexpected benefits, in terms of reducing the opportun-
ities for teaching staff to be distracted by other opportunities.
Levy andWalton also suggest that theremay be something about the nature
of formal education that may make improvements to quality particularly
challenging. In Rwanda, as elsewhere, many elites tend to be committed to
expansionary education programmes (Levy and Walton 2013). School infra-
structure is fairly easy to build, and it is popular (Hossain and Moore 2001).
Examining the domains of power in Rwanda, we find that ‘quality’ needed to
fit within the government’s development ambitions and incentives. It needed
to be easily measurable and comparable across sectors and districts. It also
needed to be publicly visible to Rwandans and the development community
that the government was fulfilling its promises to deliver development to all
Rwandans. In many ways, this approach makes sense. Construction of class-
rooms was material proof that the government’s commitment to develop-
ment was legitimate. But, at the same time, the quality of teaching and
learning within those classrooms remained poor.
One of the most vivid examples of how the dominant coalition contributed
to deleterious learning outcomes was in-service teacher training. The decen-
tralization policy was designed to give greater autonomy to local government
and schools. Yet, teacher training was an exception. During the study, the
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/2/2019, SPi
Downsides of Dominance in Rwanda
101
approach to in-service training could be best characterized as a (re)centralized
affair amidst a deconcentrated education sector. Community-level research
confirmed that any in-service training that teachers received occurred almost
exclusively through SBM—a programme that focuses on English. The central-
ized programme relieved local education officers from having to plan and
organize training. Yet, the case could also be made that the teacher training
meant a recentralization of a sense of duty to ensure that teachers were
employing effective pedagogical practices in the classroom.
The present study also builds on existing studies of the education system in
Rwanda, such as on the untoward effects of PTA contributions. PTCs agree
upon an amount that all parents are expected to pay for their children to
attend the school. In the urban district, students paid 3000 RWF per term to
supplement teacher salaries. In poorer areas, however, schools did not ask for
PTA allowances, because families could not afford them. It is reasonable to
assume that PTA contributions and school location are factors that attract
better-qualified teachers to wealthier areas. This may offer one explanation
as to why urban government schools tend to have better learning outcomes
than anywhere else in the country, even when controlling for other socio-
economic factors (USAID 2014).
The nature of the political settlement–policy domain interaction in Rwanda
has permitted the government to introduce many reforms to the education
sector. Many of these reforms have been positive, particularly with regards to
access. New classrooms and schools represented some of the most visible and
popular commitments of the elite’s promise to deliver development to ordin-
ary Rwandans. But it was evident that this sense of urgency and elite commit-
ment has yet to carry over to adopting reforms to improve learning (Williams
2018). Policy reforms focused on learning have not resulted in a coherent
and sustained strategy. Until the ruling party sees poor quality education as a
threat to its hold on power, thereby producing a sense of urgency leading to a
sustained and effective strategy, the situation is unlikely to improve for the
foreseeable future.
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Political Transformation and Education
Sector Performance in South Africa
Brian Levy, Robert Cameron, Ursula Hoadley, and Vinothan Naidoo
Introduction
With the political miracle of South Africa’s first democratic election in April
1994, the country seemed transformed, almost overnight, from an exclusion-
ary polity serving the interests only of a small minority, to an inclusionary
state committed to providing a better life for all. This transformation makes
South Africa an ideal setting for exploring how a political settlement influ-
ences policymaking and implementation in the education sector.
Notwithstanding the 1994 ‘miracle’, the legacy of apartheid left the country
saddled with amongst the highest levels of inequality in the world.1 The
longer-term sustainability of democracy depended on moving the economy
in a more inclusive direction—and this, in turn, depended on transforming
basic education from a system geared to the reproduction of subservience
amongst the majority of the country’s population, to one that builds skills,
citizenship, and enhanced economic prospects for entrants into the labour
market from historically poor communities.
As a middle-income country, South Africa had available relatively abundant
fiscal resources to channel into education. It also had in place the knowledge,
institutions, and track record of a relatively high-performing public education
system—albeit one that, historically, was heavily skewed in favour of only a
minority of its people. And the country’s bureaucracy seemingly had the
capability to use the available money effectively to address the challenge of
1 Levy, Hirsch, and Woolard (2015) contrast South Africa’s pattern of inequality with those of
four other middle-income countries (Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey).
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providing a quality education for all. But, for all of these strengths, achieve-
ments in educational quality have proven elusive. Why?
This chapter synthesizes the results of amulti-level (national, provincial, and
school) andmulti-methods research project on how political and institutional
constraints have influenced education policymaking and implementation in
South Africa, and how the constraints might be alleviated. The methodology
of the South Africa research programme is closely aligned with the ‘domains
of power’ framework laid out by Hickey and Hossain in Chapter 2 of this
book, extending the approach to sub-national levels. The detailed South
Africa research findings are available in a companion volume to this one
(Levy et al. 2018a).
Figure 6.1 illustrates the logic of the multi-level research design. The central
idea is that policy and implementation outcomes are shaped at each level by
the interplay between the actors/groups seeking to influence the outcome,
and the institutions (‘rules of the game’) which shape how the actors interact
with one another. Action at each level is nested within a set of incentives and
constraints shaped in part by the higher level; and each level shapes, in part,
the incentives and constraints which prevail at lower levels. In this chapter we
explore some of the links between politics and institutions, and some aspects
of South Africa’s national-level policymaking; we go on to analyse how the
divergent political and institutional legacies of the Western Cape and Eastern
Cape provinces shaped the capabilities of their education bureaucracies; and
explore the independent role of the school level in shaping educational
outcomes. First we set the stage, with an overview of how South Africa’s
educational outcomes have evolved over the past quarter-century.
SCHOOL PERFORMANCE
SCHOOL-LEVEL DE JURE DE FACTO GOV ARRANGEMENTS
PROVINCIAL LEVEL EDUCATION BUREAUCRACY
PROVINCIAL POLITICAL CONTEXT
NATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT
Figure 6.1 The governance of education in South Africa—a multi-level framework
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Education Outcomes: South Africa’s Quality Challenge
Unsurprisingly, apartheid South Africa was characterized by extreme racial
disparities in access to, and expenditure on, education; in 1969, spending per
white child was 20 times the amount per black child, and access was also
hugely unequal. By the mid-2000s, as Crouch and Hoadley (2018) detail,
financing and access had been transformed. Between 1990 and 2005, the
share of public spending going to the richest 20 per cent of children fell from
28 per cent to 13 per cent, and the share going to the poorest 20 per cent rose
from 19 per cent to 25 per cent. In 1990, the average per child expenditure in
the Western Cape (the province with the highest proportion of non-African
children) was 80 per cent above the national average; by 2005, the disparity
had fallen to below 10 per cent. By themid-2000s, there was universal access to
primary education, and access to secondary education was on a par with other
middle-income countries, and rising.When it came to outcomes, however, the
apartheid legacy proved to be more resistant to change.
Table 6.1 uses the results of the multi-country Trends in International
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), and the Progress in International
Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), to contrast South Africa’s educational out-
comes across its socio-economic distribution with those of some other coun-
tries. As the table shows:
 At all points along thedistributional spectrum, SouthAfrica’s results arewell
below those of high-income and global high performers, such as Australia
and Singapore; they also are below those of the more directly comparable
middle-income countries of Chile and Turkey, although above low-income
Egypt and (depending on the year used for comparison) Ghana.
 Strikingly, South Africa’s results at the top of the distribution largely
follow the above overall pattern, contrary to the usual perception that
public schools catering to South African elites are equivalent in quality to
those of high-income countries.
 As of 2015–16, the inequality of outcomes between schools serving the
upper and lower ends of South Africa’s socio-economic distribution con-
tinues to be stark (although it appears to have declined over time)—but,
strikingly, turns out to be comparable to that of Turkey and Egypt.
 There is some evidence, especially when TIMSS data for 2003 are also con-
sidered,2 of improvements in the South African outcomes, especially at the
lower ends of the distribution. However, it is important to underscore that
results arewell below those of themiddle-income country comparators.
2 But note that South Africa’s 2003 TIMSS data (and all data for other countries) are for 8th grade;
the 2011 and 2015 tests were administered to 9th graders.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/2/2019, SPi
Transformation, Performance: South Africa
107
Table 6.2 uses the results of the 2007 Southern African Consortium on Moni-
toring Education Quality (SACMEQ) tests, to contrast South Africa’s outcomes
with those of Kenya. As the table shows, Kenya has better performance at all
three points along the distributional spectrum, notwithstanding the fact that
its per capita income (and per child spending on education) is one-fifth that of
South Africa’s. The table also provides provincial-level scores for the Western
and Eastern Cape, the two provinces on which later sections in this chapter
Table 6.1 Distribution of educational outcomes—within and across countries
Country/year Test scores at multiple percentiles of the score distribution, TIMSS













TIMSS (mathematics and science, generally 8th grade)
Singapore 2003 455 556 614 662 723 0.44
Australia 2003 368 450 506 561 634 0.53
South Africa 2015 242 311 364 426 529 0.79
(9th grade)
South Africa 2011 229 295 343 398 516 0.84
(9th grade)
South Africa 2003 117 191 248 316 484 1.48
(8th grade)
Chile 2015 297 372 427 482 560 0.62
Turkey 2015 289 385 454 531 634 0.76
Ghana 2003 130 213 274 337 430 1.09
PIRLS (reading, 4th grade)
Singapore 432 528 570 633 695 0.38
South Africa 147 246 311 390 498 0.70
Chile 356 442 489 550 614 0.42
Egypt 112 246 319 420 520 0.78
Notes: (i) For 2011 and 2015, South Africa administered TIMSS to 9th graders.
(ii) Inequality ratio is defined as (score at 95th percentile minus score at 5th percentile)/score at 50th.
Source: Crouch and Hoadley (2018).
Table 6.2 Some educational outcomes in Southern and Eastern Africa, 2007
50th percentile (median) 25th percentile 75th percentile
South Africa 483 424 548
Kenya 548 509 610
Kenya (Nairobi) 585 535 662
Western Cape 560 496 636
Gauteng 548 483 610
Eastern Cape 454 408 509
Note: Achievement in grade 6 mathematics and home language by province, 2007.
Source: SACMEQ data files (2007); Republic of South Africa (RSA), Department for Basic Education (2010).
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focus (Gauteng is included as a comparator). The Western Cape was the
best-performing SACMEQ province, and the Eastern Cape the worst. But, at
the lower ends of the distributional spectrum, even the Western Cape scores
below Kenya. Some possible reasons for the Kenya–Western Cape disparity are
explored later.
The National Level: Political Settlements and Policymaking
National-level political decision-making in the 1990s shaped the subsequent
development of South Africa’s education sector in two distinct ways. As part of
the process of forging a political settlement, some overarching parameters
framed how the sector would operate going forward. Subsequently, political
drivers emanating from the agreed political settlement significantly influ-
enced the process and content of national-level policy decisions.
Following the typology outlined in Chapter 2 of this book (and a related
framework laid out in Levy 2014), the political settlement that has prevailed in
South Africa since the end of apartheid rule can be characterized in terms of
the configuration of political power by the relative dominance of the ruling
African National Congress (ANC), which won almost 63 per cent of the
national vote in the first democratic elections in 1994; and in institutional
terms by a history of state building over the course of the twentieth century
that bequeathed the elected ANC relatively strong institutions, which oper-
ated (at least to some extent) along impersonal lines. As we discuss later, the
ANC is constituted by a broad range of actors, and characterized by a good deal
of internal dissent and negotiation around policy agendas, but since 1994 it
has been electorally dominant nationally. Likewise, although the leadership
of President Zuma (2009–18) raised serious concerns with regards to the issue
of ‘elite capture’, the country’s institutions have proven to be largely resilient,
restraining efforts to undermine rules-based governance. However, given the
country’s size, its racialized history of state formation, and the fragmentation
of governance institutions during the apartheid years, it makes sense to con-
sider whether different types of sub-national political settlements exist. We
explore this issue in subsequent sections through a comparative analysis of
the different political and institutional conditions that prevail in the Western
and Eastern Capes, respectively. This section focuses on the national level.
One further common (if somewhat oversimplified, but adequate for present
purposes)wayof describing SouthAfrica’s political settlement is as anagreement
between two nationalisms—Afrikaner nationalism and African nationalism.3
3 Mbeki (2009) and Macdonald (2006) are amongst the commentators who interpret the
settlement through a ‘rival nationalisms’ lens. Large-scale organized business (disproportionately
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Throughout the political transition, how South Africa’s education sector was to
be transformed was a central concern of South Africa’s leaders, negotiated in
parallel with the broader political settlement. It is no coincidence that the South
African Schools Act (SASA)was promulgated in 1996, the sameyear inwhich the
country’s final constitution was formally approved.
For black South Africans, an immediate concern was equalization of access,
and a redress of the stark financing inequities; for white South Africans, a
central concern was agreement on a system of governance that could sustain
the quality of the public4 schools, which historically had served the white
minority.
The governance arrangements for education incorporated within SASAwere
responsive to the concerns of the main protagonists who negotiated the
political settlement. The apartheid era education system comprised 19 separ-
ate education departments, divided along racial, political, and geographic
lines. An immediate and broadly agreed-upon task was to transform this
morass into a unified, non-racial system. But this needed to be done in a
way that could respond to the country’s political complexity. In part for this
political reason, SASA made provision for substantial delegation of the educa-
tion system:
 Responsibility for policymaking, for resourcing the system, and for setting
the overall regulatory framework was retained at the national level.
 Responsibility for implementation, including direct oversight of schools,
was delegated to the country’s nine provinces, which differed substan-
tially from one another, both politically and institutionally.
 Responsibilities at school level (including the recruitment of the school
principal and senior teachers) were assigned to school governing bodies
(SGBs), in which parents were required to be in the majority.
With the overarching parameters of the system in place, attention turned to
policy. National-level policies were shaped by a collision between the idealis-
tic visions of South Africa’s new, ANC-aligned education sector technocrats,
and the political complexities of the ANC’s governing ‘alliance’. The techno-
crats had scanned education sectors worldwide to identify ‘best practices’; the
anglophone) also played a key role in facilitating negotiations. Powerful ethnic factions (the
Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging; the Freedom Front; the Inkatha Freedom Party) came close to
derailing the settlement. The ANC itself was something of an umbrella; its negotiations team
included influential leaders of the South African Communist Party, the Congress of South
African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the United Democratic Front, a galvanizing umbrella
organization for non-violent civic resistance within South Africa. For detailed histories of how
South Africa’s political settlement was achieved, see Mandela (1994); Sparks (1996); Marais (1998);
Welsh (2009). For a structural perspective, see Seekings and Nattrass (2005).
4 In South Africa, public education dominates, both historically and to the present day; as of
2015, over 95 per cent of school-going children were enrolled in the public system.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/2/2019, SPi
Politics and Education in Developing Countries
110
result was a far-reaching agenda of sectoral reforms, described in detail by
Crouch and Hoadley (2018). While much was achieved, the gap between
initial visions and what actually played out on the ground sometimes turned
out to be wide. The reasons had much to do with political dynamics within
the ANC.
With its long history (dating back to 1912) as a broad-based, nationalist
political movement, the ANC was in practice an umbrella organization, strad-
dling a wide variety of interests. Upon assuming the reins of power in 1994, it
confronted the challenge of mediating amongst diverse stakeholders:
 As a mass political movement, with a long history of political struggle
against oppression, the ANC had a deeply rooted commitment to address
South Africa’s profound challenges of poverty, and of racial and class
inequality.
 It formally incorporated as members of the ‘ruling alliance’ both the
South African Communist Party and COSATU.
 Since the earliest days of its founding, it had also voiced the aspiration of
African (and other black) ‘petty bourgeois’ and other groups seeking
economic empowerment.5
These varied interests have co-existed uneasily with one another. Over the
past two decades, the result has been something of a race between consolida-
tion of a high-performing ‘developmental state’ at one end of the spectrum of
possible outcomes and, at the other, an accelerating slide into more personal-
ized and patronage-oriented approaches to governance.
In the first two decades of democracy, the ANC’s labourmarket policies were
broadly favourable to the interests of its alliance partner, COSATU (Seekings
and Nattrass 2015). Between 1994 and 2007, real average wages of unionized
workers (both white-collar and blue-collar) rose, even as real wages of their
non-unionized counterparts fell. Over the period, the employment profile of
union members changed radically. As of 1994, unskilled and semi-skilled work-
ers accounted for 60 per cent of the members of COSATU-affiliated unions;
by 2008, their share of COSATU membership had fallen to 22 per cent. Corres-
pondingly, the share in COSATU membership of skilled and professional
employees had risen to 59 per cent of the total; these employees were predom-
inantly in the public sector, with the South African Democratic Teachers Union
(SADTU) now one of COSATU’s largest affiliated unions.
The (narrowly conceived) interests of SADTU’s unionized workforce had a
powerful impact in shaping employee relations within the education sector.
5 For an in-depth review of the history of elite, neo-patrimonial influences in the ANC, see Lodge
(2014).
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As Cameron and Naidoo (2018) detail, technocrats within the education
sector repeatedly tried to introduce new tools for performance management,
as one way of addressing the quality challenges. However, these tools collided
with the narrowly conceived interests of SADTU’s members. The result was
that the ambitious initial proposals were heavily watered down.
Cameron and Naidoo describe in depth the evolution of a 2007 proposal to
introduce occupation-specific, performance-related pay. The effort was initi-
ated in the wake of an almost month-long strike by over 700,000 public
employees over pay and other conditions of service. The intention was to
enhance the attractiveness of a teaching career and expand salary progression,
to reward good performance, and to introduce incentives for experienced and
capable teachers to remain in the classroom.An initial proposalwas introduced
at the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC), set up as part of the com-
plex corporatist arrangements for managing labour relations as part of South
Africa’s new political dispensation. The proposals included:
 a career path in which pay increases were not automatic, but based on
performance, qualifications, scope of work, and experience;
 provision for a specialist career path for teachers who wanted to remain
in the classroom, and an accelerated career progression based on
performance;
 inclusion of learner performance as a basis for assessing the performance
of educators;
 performance agreements for principals and deputy principals; and
 a pay progression based on performance (1 per cent increase for satisfac-
tory; 3 per cent for good; and 6 per cent for outstanding), with external
moderation of assessments of ‘good’ and ‘outstanding’.
To sweeten the deal, the initiative also proposed a broad salary increase to all
teachers, and an increase in the starting salary of newly qualified teachers.
SADTU strongly opposed the proposals.
An agreement was finally reached after almost two years of contentious nego-
tiation, punctuated by work stoppages protesting the proposed arrangements—
but only after a closed-door intervention by the ANC’s top political leadership,
outside of the formal negotiation process. In the final agreement, most of the
performance-related elements were stripped out. Instead of a pay progression
based on performance, educators were given an across-the-board increase of
3 per cent, plus an additional increase for teachers at the lowest end of the
qualifications scale. Evidently, the ambitions of technocrats to strengthen the
performance orientation of the education system were no match for the strong
constituency interests that had to be mediated politically within the ANC’s
ruling alliance.
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The Provincial Level: Divergent Contexts, Divergent
Bureaucratic Capabilities
South Africa’s provinces are where responsibility lies for the operation of
the education sector—for employing teachers, providing essential school
infrastructure, spending the resources allocated for public education, and
for managing the system more broadly. This section summarizes and
synthesizes analyses of education sector management in two provinces—
the Western Cape (Cameron and Levy 2018) and the Eastern Cape (Kota
et al. 2018).
In 2013, South Africa’s Department of Policy Monitoring and Evaluation,
located in the office of the Presidency, released the results of a Management
Performance Assessment Tool (MPAT) conducted in over 100 national and
provincial government departments. As Table 6.3 shows, as of 2012–13, the
Western Cape Education Department (WCED) was rated as the best managed
of the country’s nine provinces (Gauteng was rated second). The Eastern Cape
Department of Education (ECDoE) was rated the weakest (with the Northern
Cape rated second weakest).
Consistent with the analytical framework illustrated in Figure 6.1, this sec-
tion explains the performance differences in terms of the contextual differ-
ences with regards to the interplay of politics and institutions within each
province. Applying at a sub-national level the typology laid out in Chapter 2
of this volume, the Western Cape and Eastern Cape turn out to be paradig-
matic provincial-level examples of two distinct patterns.
TheWesternCape emerges as a classic example of a ‘competitive’ political order,
governed largely by ‘impersonal’ rules of the game.
Table 6.3 MPAT assessments of South Africa’s education departments
(selected provinces 2012–13; distribution of scores, by level for assessed key
performance areas)6
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Western Cape 0 21 34 45
Gauteng 14 21 31 34
National average, all provinces 24 31 31 15
Northern Cape 28 41 28 3
Eastern Cape 59 17 17 7
Source: South Africa, The Presidency 2012.
6 For each key performance area, the MPAT rates performance according to four levels: Level
1—non-compliance with legal/regulatory requirements; Level 2—partial compliance with legal/
regulatory requirements; Level 3—full compliance with legal/regulatory requirement; Level 4—full
compliance, and doing this smartly.
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The Eastern Cape, by contrast, emerges as a paradigmatic example of a person-
alized, clientelist, and fragmented political order, operating under the umbrella
of a de facto dominant political party.
Table 6.4 groups some contextual differences between the two provinces into
three categories—socio-economic, political, and institutional. The discussion
that follows explores how these variables influence bureaucratic behaviour and
performance, distinguishing between demand-side and supply-side influences.7
Demand-side Pressures for Performance
By demand-side pressures, wemean themechanisms throughwhich exogenous
socio-economic and political variables influence the effectiveness of citizens’
demands on bureaucrats and politicians for decent public services. A first mech-
anism comprises the well-recognized8 relationship between social class and
effective demand, with middle-class citizens generally better positioned than
their low-income counterparts to exercise voice effectively in response to poor
quality services (and mismanagement and corruption, more broadly).
Economically, the Western Cape was (and remains) amongst the wealthiest
of South Africa’s nine provinces; as of 1996, its per capita income was
50 per cent higher than for the country as a whole. The Eastern Cape, by
contrast, was the poorest province in the country; its per capita income
hovers at around 50–60 per cent of the national average. These differences
in average income between the two provinces translate into far-reaching
differences in class composition.9
Table 6.4 Two divergent contexts in South Africa






– elites dispersed across
multiple political parties,














Source: Levy et al. (2018b).
7 This discussion is taken directly from Levy, Cameron, and Naidoo (2018b).
8 For some analyses of the role of a rising middle class in pressing for greater public sector
accountability, see Lipset (1959), Moore (1966), Huntington (1968), Acemoglu and Robinson,
(2006), Fukuyama (2014).
9 These differences in social class composition would, of course, be magnified (or diminished) if
the provinces also differed in their (intra-province) patterns of relative inequality. But the limited
available evidence on provincial-level Gini coefficients suggests that these differences are
relatively small.
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Table 6.5 reports some findings from Schotte, Zizzamia, and Leibbrandt’s
(2017) disaggregation of South Africa’s income distribution into five distinct
social classes; 49 per cent of South Africa’s total population is classified as
‘chronically poor’.10 In the Eastern Cape, the share of the population which is
‘chronically poor’ rises to 70 per cent. In the Western Cape, it is 25 per cent.
The ‘modal’ social class in theWestern Cape is the middle class (35 per cent of
the total population), with the ‘vulnerable’ and ‘transient poor’ accounting for
a further 35 per cent. Insofar as there is a positive correlation between eco-
nomic status and voice, then solely on the basis of these differences in class
composition, non-elite citizens in the Western Cape generally are likely to be
better positioned to pressure for better public services than are their Eastern
Cape counterparts.
A second demand-side mechanism works via the electoral process. Here the
key proposition is that citizens will be better positioned to exert demand-side
pressure for services in settings where elections are competitive than in those
where politicians can take the support (or acquiescence) of citizens for
granted, independent of how well they govern and in a context where polit-
ical institutions operate more along impersonal than personalized norms.11
For reasons which are rooted in part in demography, and in part in history, the
differences between the two provinces in electoral competitiveness have
been stark.
Table 6.5 Distribution of social classes in South Africa, 2014
South Africa (all)% Western Cape% Eastern Cape%
Elite 4 5 2
‘Middle’ class 20 35 13
Vulnerable 14 15 10
Transient poor 13 20 5
Chronic poor 49 25 70
TOTAL 100% 100% 100%
Note: The distribution is based on an empirical analysis of four waves of panel data collected between
2008 and 2014 by South Africa’s National Income Dynamics Study.
Source: Schotte et al. (2017).
10 The high proportion of the population who are ‘chronically poor’ is not an artefact of where
the benchmark is set. For one thing, over half of the income of this group comes from social grants
(pensions, child support, and disability), set at less than $100 per month. For another, South
Africa’s ‘chronically poor’ are notably poor when benchmarked against other middle-income
countries. As Levy et al. (2015) detail, in the year 2000, the poorest 40 per cent of South Africans
accounted for only 5.5 per cent of expenditure, a starkly lower share than for the comparator
countries (all of which have similar per capita incomes)—Brazil (8.1 per cent), Mexico (11.4
per cent), Turkey (15.1 per cent), and Thailand (17.1 per cent). As of 2010, the South African
share had risen to 6.9 per cent, still below the comparators.
11 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Khemani (2016) in chapter 5 reviews the literature on the
impact of democratic political engagement on development outcomes.
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In the Eastern Cape, 86 per cent of the 1996 population of 6.1 million was
black African, almost all Xhosa-speaking. (For South Africa as a whole, the
1996 black African share of the total was 77 per cent.) In theWestern Cape, by
contrast, the largest ethnic subgroup of the population was (in the South
African lexicon) ‘coloured’. In 1996, this group comprised 54 per cent of the
4.1 million people in the province; black Africans comprised only 21 per cent.
By 2011, population in the Western Cape had risen to 5.8 million (with the
increase driven in significant part by migration from the Eastern Cape), with
the black African and ‘coloured’ shares now comprising 33 per cent and
49 per cent, respectively.
The Western Cape’s relatively high ethnic diversity provided a platform
for closely contested elections. To be sure, the province had been a major
locus of opposition to apartheid and, as elsewhere in the country, most ‘non-
white’ anti-apartheid activists identified strongly with the ANC. But the
distinctive ethnic characteristics of the Western Cape implied that, amongst
at least part of the population, loyalty to the ANC was not necessarily
unequivocal. Insofar as the ANC was perceived to frame the basis for its
allegiance in narrowly ‘African nationalist’ terms, rather than an inclusive
non-racialism, there was ample scope for shifting allegiances, and thus voting
patterns, away from the ANC and towards the opposition Democratic Alliance
(DA), and other political parties.12
The result was a highly competitive provincial politics, with multiple com-
peting political parties, and hotly contested elections. Over the course of the
first two decades of democracy, seven different political parties/coalitions
have controlled the province. In these contested elections, non-elite swing
voters (in the ‘middle’, ‘vulnerable’, and ‘transient poor’ classes) became
politically central. Indeed, contestation amongst rival political parties for the
allegiance of this demographic and economic middle has been heated.
In the Eastern Cape, by contrast, the ANC dominated electorally. In 1994
it won 84 per cent of the vote in the province; this percentage declined
subsequently, but as of 2015 had not fallen below 70 per cent. The electoral
dominance of the ANC can be explained in part by the interaction between
the province’s ethnic homogeneity and its distinctive historical legacy.
A disproportionate number of the leaders of the struggle for liberation from
apartheid—including Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki, Winnie
12 The DA elite comprised those in the upper tiers of business, the professions, and the
bureaucracy within the province. Cohesion did not come naturally amongst these elite sub-
groups. At the dawn of democracy, there was a clear split between those with historical
allegiance to the apartheid National Party, and those aligned with more liberal (but not
revolutionary) ‘white’ opposition parties. Over subsequent decades, these two factions largely
merged—and were joined by smaller, independent (non-ANC) parties, whose allegiance was
generally not ‘white’, and who historically had been very active in the struggle against apartheid.
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Madikizela Mandela, Chris Hani, and Walter Sisulu—were Xhosa-speaking
sons and daughters of the province. This proud history translated into strong
electoral loyalty to the ANC on the part of the numerically preponderant
Xhosa-speaking voters. The result was that for the first two decades of dem-
ocracy, electoral competition did not serve as a significant source of pressure
on the ANC to improve public services.
Politics, Institutional Inheritances, and the Supply of Services
We turn now to the two ‘supply-side’ causal mechanisms through which
politics and institutions influence bureaucratic behaviour: the role of in-
herited institutional legacies and patterns of intra-elite contestation within a
governing political party.
As Keefer and Khemani (2005) explore, in choosing how to seek the alle-
giance of non-elites, political leaders confront a fundamental choice. One
option is ‘programmatic’—leaders might try to win legitimacy by promising
a specific programme of public action, and then utilize the public bureaucracy
to deliver on these promises. Alternatively, they could seek to win support
through personalized patronage and clientelistic vertical networks that link
elite and ‘intermediate class’13 powerbrokers with local communities. A key
determinant of how political leaders choose between these twomechanisms is
whether their promises to provide broad-based services (rather than targeted
patronage) are perceived to be credible by voters. This is where inherited
institutional legacies come into play.
The Western Cape inherited a bureaucracy that could straightforwardly
respond to the relatively strong effective demand of citizens for services.
During the apartheid era, alongside the ‘white’ political and bureaucratic
structures, the apartheid government had established a parallel ‘parliament’
and bureaucracy, the (‘coloured’) House of Representatives (HoR). The ‘white’
civil service and the HoR bureaucracy together were responsible for the pro-
vision of services (including education services) to the large majority of the
Western Cape population.14 As numerous studies of organizational culture
have shown,15 both South Africa’s ‘white’ public service and the HoR bureau-
cracy were steeped in traditional public administration, albeit with an apart-
heid bent. This inherited legacy of a relatively capable bureaucracymeant that
13 The term is used in this way in Khan and Jomo’s (2000) analysis of rent networks in
South Asia.
14 Africans living in urban townships were under the control of the Department of Education
and Training (DET). In theWestern Cape, Africans were a minority and the number of DET schools
in the province was relatively small. There were also no Bantustans in the province. This meant
that the province had to deal with only a modestly sized ‘deadweight’ of the most dysfunctional,
control-oriented part of the apartheid state (Fiske and Ladd 2004).
15 McLennan and Fitzgerald (1992); Schwella (2000).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/2/2019, SPi
Transformation, Performance: South Africa
117
voters were likely to perceive politicians’ promises to provide public services as
credible, adding to the impetus for political competition to be oriented around
competing programmatic platforms, rather than patronage.
Indeed, as Cameron and Levy (2018) detail, throughout the democratic era,
the WCED has consistently had a relatively strong professional orientation
amongst both the administrative bureaucracy and teaching staff. Turnover
amongst the senior bureaucratic officials was low, insulating the bureaucracy
to a significant degree from the cycles of political change, including the rapid
turnover of the provincial-cabinet-level appointments of political heads
(i.e. the provincial ministers of education). The WCED had consistently
worked to implement the ongoing stream of results-oriented systems reform
initiatives which emanated from the national level, and has complemented
them with a variety of more home-grown initiatives to strengthen perform-
ance, all implemented especially vigorously under the DA administration,
which has governed the province since 2009. These include sophisticated
computerized tools for managing budgets, staffing, and procurement, school
improvement plans (SIPs) for each of the province’s 1,500 schools, online
tracking systems for monitoring the progress of individual learners through
the WCED system, and (on a quarterly basis), the progress of schools in
implementing their SIPs.
The institutional legacy of the Eastern Cape was very different from that of
its Western Cape counterpart. Two-thirds of the Eastern Cape’s total 2015
population of 6.9 million people reside in areas which formerly had been part
of either the Transkei or Ciskei ‘Bantustan’ polities created by the apartheid
government. Both the Transkei and Ciskei had nominally been independent
(recognized as such only by South Africa’s apartheid government). Both had
large-scale bureaucratic apparatuses, which were moulded together to com-
prise the major16 part of the post-apartheid provincial bureaucracy.
The two Bantustans had been organized along personalized, patronage
lines.17 These patronage patterns carried forward into the workings of the
Eastern Cape province via two distinct mechanisms. As per Keefer and
Khemani (2005), one mechanism worked through the credibility of political
promises: the weakness of the bureaucracy at the outset of the democratic
era meant that, even under the best of circumstances, persuading citizens
that promises to provide decent services would be credible would be an
uphill challenge. But the circumstances prevailing in the province were espe-
cially unpropitious. This brings us to the second supply-side influence on
16 Along with the two Bantustan bureaucracies, the third part of the Eastern Cape bureaucracy
comprised some portions of the apartheid era Cape provincial bureaucracy—though the head
office, and senior staff had been located in Cape Town, and most transferred into the Western
Cape’s bureaucracy.
17 Streek and Wickstead (1981).
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bureaucratic behaviour—the role of intra-elite contestation within a govern-
ing political party.
In the wake of the dissolution of the Transkei and Ciskei Bantustans, a large
majority of their political and bureaucratic elites (and also many ordinary
citizens) joined the ANC—not out of conviction, but out of convenience.
Further, the (non-Bantustan) Eastern Cape ANC was itself hardly an ideolog-
ically unified party. In its early years, the ANC (both within the Eastern Cape
and nationally) reflected the aspirations of a mission-educated aspirant
African middle class, which was increasingly being constrained by racially
discriminatory policies.18 In the decades prior to democracy, parts of the
party had become increasingly militant; both Govan Mbeki (Thabo Mbeki’s
father) and Chris Hani (chief of staff of the armed wing of the ANC in exile)
were stalwarts of the South African Communist Party. The result was that
the Eastern Cape ANC was less a disciplined, programmatically oriented pol-
itical organization than an overall umbrella, beneath which inter-elite con-
testation was endemic. This continuing contestation afforded the ANC’s
provincial leadership neither the authority nor the longer-term time-horizon
needed to translate electoral dominance into a commitment to better service
provision.19
In sum, the Eastern Cape was especially poorly positioned vis-à-vis each of
the causal mechanisms linking context to bureaucratic operation and per-
formance. The middle class was weak. Elections were uncompetitive. The
bureaucratic legacy was dismal. The wide diversity of ideologies and motiv-
ations resulted in ongoing internecine struggles within the Eastern Cape
ANC’s leadership. Patronage, not programmatic commitments to improve
services, became the default mechanism for maintaining the political alle-
giance of non-elites.
The result was an ECDoE bedevilled by divergent and competing regional
interests, organizational cultures, and patronage ties that consistently defied
centralized control. As Kota et al. (2018) detail, subsequent to 1994 the ECDoE
has experienced repeated leadership turnover, and a general flouting of cen-
tralized authority. Provincial ministers of education and their senior officials
belonged to divergent subgroups of the party, with some officials outranking
the ministers within the ANC, making vertical accountability difficult. The
obstacles to enforcing management control and sustaining leadership con-
tinuity in the ECDoE have contributed to chronic weaknesses in both finan-
cial and personnel management. In March 2011, the national government
intervened, and temporarily took over administration of the ECDoE. But this
18 Lodge (2014); Southall (2014).
19 In the terminology of Kelsall and vom Hau (2017), the Eastern Cape ANC was a multipolar,
rather than unipolar, political party.
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did not stem the crisis. Provincial politics proved too powerful. After a few
years, intervention was scaled back, having had only a limited impact.
Is Bureaucracy Destiny? Educational Outcomes
and School-level Governance
As the previous section has detailed, in the Western Cape political and insti-
tutional context (plus effective leadership) have come together in a way that
has resulted in a well-functioning education department. The same factors
have conspired to produce the opposite result vis-à-vis the ECDoE. But is
bureaucracy destiny?
To be sure, a well-functioning education bureaucracy makes it possible to
performwell many tasks that contribute to the quality of an education system.
The allocation of scarce public funds across the system; the assignment of
personnel to the places where they are most needed; building the capabilities
of teachers and other employees whowork within the system;monitoring and
managing the results achieved by staff; the construction and management of
infrastructure; and the provision of furniture, textbooks, and other teaching
materials—all are quintessentially bureaucratic tasks. But, as noted earlier, the
SASA also delegated substantial decision-making authority to SGBs. Might this
horizontal governance dimension independently influence outcomes in ways
which complicate the relationship between bureaucratic quality and educa-
tional outcomes?
Organizational theory suggests that the latter might be the case—that in
sectors such as education, where service provision is diffused across a large
number of frontline providers, delegation of authority potentially creates
opportunities for customization, for improving local-level motivation, and for
utilizing local-level information inways that improve performance.20 Theways
in which horizontal governance might plausibly add value would be different
in settings where bureaucracy is strong, from settings where it is weak:
 Where bureaucracy is strong (as in the Western Cape), can horizontal
governance complement hierarchy via its particular strengths at the
local level?
 Where bureaucracy is weak (as in the Eastern Cape), can horizontal
governance function as a potential substitute by also taking on, reasonably
effectively, some tasks which might otherwise have been done
bureaucratically?
20 Key contributions to the literature on the value added of frontline autonomy include Sah and
Stiglitz (1986), Aghion and Tirole (1997), Wilson (1989), Lipsky (2010), and Scott (1998).
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This section explores the above questions. It reviews some robust statistical
comparisons of the relationship between bureaucratic quality and educational
outcomes across multiple locales (including the Western Cape). It then pro-
vides an overview of findings from school-level case study analyses of how
micro-governance dynamics influenced performance in some Western and
Eastern Cape schools.
Assessing the Determinants of Educational Outcomes
As Table 6.2 signalled, the Western Cape achieved the highest scores amongst
South Africa’s provinces in the 2007 SACMEQ standardized test—but its scores
were generally similar to Kenya’s (a much poorer locale, with less than a fifth
of the per pupil public resources available for education), indeed somewhat
below Kenya at the lower end of the socio-economic distribution. Given the
evident robustness of the Western Cape bureaucracy, and the well-known
unevenness of Kenya’s public management systems, it is highly unlikely
that the performance gap can be explained by superior hierarchical manage-
ment on the part of Kenya.
Outcomes, of course, depend on multiple influences. Consequently, as part
of the overall research effort, the qualitative country-, provincial-, and school-
level analyses were complemented by a robust statistical study, conducted by
Wills, Shepherd, and Kotze (2018). Their econometric strategy was to isolate a
‘Western Cape effect’ on educational outcomes (in the form of the coefficient
of a dummy variable for the province) once other influences were controlled
for—home background, socio-economic status, teacher qualifications, other
teacher/classroom characteristics, plus a subset of governance indicators.21
With these controls, the coefficient of the Western Cape dummy variable
can be interpreted as being, in significant part, a ‘management effect’. Wills
et al. (2018) comprehensively describe the data, the researchmethods, and the
econometric findings. Table 6.6 reports a small subset of their results. As the
table shows, relative to both Gauteng and the Eastern Cape, thisWestern Cape
effect is significant and positive.
However, relative to Kenya,22 the Western Cape effect is negative—even
after controlling for a wide variety of influences. At the broadest level, this
residual effect could be attributed to governance. Viewed through the narrow
21 Each of these is a composite measure, built on very detailed student-, parent-, and school-
specific information collected in the SACMEQ survey. Wills et al. (2018) detail each of the
underlying data points, including average scores for each, in each of the locales they analyse.
22 The comparison is specifically with results for Kenya’s Nairobi and Central provinces. AsWills
et al. (2018) detail, these provinces are reasonably similar in their socio-economic status (SES)
demographic to the Western Cape. The statistical procedures break down when SES differences
across the populations are too large.
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prism of hierarchical governance, the Western Cape is relatively strong. Thus
the results could be interpreted as pointing to the possibility that it is in the
‘softer’ side of the governance of education—perhaps motivation on the part
of teachers and other stakeholders, perhaps the patterns of participatory,
horizontal governance—that Kenya has an advantage.23
A closer look at the results for the Eastern Cape offers an intriguing added
pointer as to the relevance of the softer side of governance. As Table 6.6 shows,
the inclusion of ‘parental contribution to school building and teachingmater-
ials’ as an explanatory variable has a large effect on the magnitude of the
‘Western Cape effect’ on educational outcomes. Why? In the SACMEQ data
series, 57 per cent of Eastern Cape parents (but only 13 per cent of Western
Cape parents) assist with school building—and 65 per cent (but only 18
per cent in the Western Cape) with school maintenance. Plausibly, parental
participation serves as a partial institutional substitute for weaknesses in the
Eastern Cape bureaucracy—with the true proportions of the costs imposed on
Eastern Cape children by weaknesses in the ECDoE only evident once the
parental role is accounted for.
Table 6.6 Grade 6 mathematics SACMEQ scores—the ‘Western Cape’ effect
(coefficient on Western Cape dummy variable)
1 2
Comparison country/region:
Kenya (Nairobi and Central) 0.373** 0.434**
Eastern Cape 0.488*** 0.890***
Gauteng 0.299*** 0.408***
Controls:
home background X X
socio-economic status X X
teacher test scores X X
teacher/classroom characteristics X X
parents contribute to school building and teaching
materials
X
Notes: Teacher and classroom characteristics include: teacher education, teacher age, teacher experi-
ence, weekly teaching time (hours), textbook availability, class size, pupil–teacher ratio, frequency and
discussion of homework, and frequency of classroom assessment. Standard errors clustered at the
school level are shown in parentheses.
***significance at 1 per cent level **significance at 5 per cent level *significance at 10 per cent level.
Source: Wills et al. (2018).
23 Levy et al. (2018a) appendix 10A explore the historical roots of Kenya’s ‘soft governance’
advantage. Here what can be noted is that a distinguishing feature of Kenya’s education system
comprises its strong roots in the country’s harambee (‘self-help’) movement in the wake of
independence.
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In sum, the econometric results suggest that bureaucracy need not be
destiny—that there are other dimensions of the governance of education
systems, which can be, as in the Eastern Cape, partial institutional substitutes
for relatively weak hierarchical bureaucratic capability, or (as seems likely in
Kenya) complements, adding to the overall efficacy of the system. The find-
ings of the school-level case studies offer added insight into these softer sides
of governance.
School-level Governance Dynamics
School-level governance research in the Western Cape (Hoadley et al. 2018)
and Eastern Cape (Levy and Shumane 2018) used process-tracing methodolo-
gies (George and Bennett 2005) to explore the causal mechanisms through
which interactions between school leadership and other stakeholders inside
and outside the school influenced educational outcomes. The research focused
on eight schools, four in each province, all in poor communities, and with
variations in performance, both across schools and over time. All eight schools
had gone through a change in principal over the relevant period, making for
the three distinct governance ‘episodes’ illustrated in Figure 6.2: an initial
period; a transitional period and associated process of selection of a new
principal; and a later period. This sub-section provides an overview of some
key findings.24
Table 6.7 summarizes some of the main findings from the case studies
vis-à-vis the influence on performance of hierarchical and horizontal gov-
ernance in each school. The table distinguishes between two facets of hierarch-
ical governance: hierarchical influence exerted by the relevant provincial
department, and leadership by the school principal. In none of the Eastern
Cape case studies was there any evidence that the ECDoE offered more than
verymodest help in fostering a performance orientation at the school level. The
Western Cape’sWCED, by contrast, played amore proactive role—but there are
some paradoxical findings, which are best considered jointly in the discussion
that follows of the role of the school principal.
Initial period Principal change Later period
Figure 6.2 Governance ‘episodes’ in South African schools
24 A fuller account of the school-level case studies can be found in Levy et al. (2018a).
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As the table also summarizes, there were substantial variations in the influ-
ence of horizontal governance. In some schools, for some periods of time, its
influence was positive. In others, a variety of school-level stakeholders were
complicit in the capture of school-level resources for more narrowly person-
alized purposes. The efficacy of horizontal governance turned out to be
strongly associated with the approach to leadership of the school principal,
with some striking interactions between the initial period (Figure 6.2) and
later period patterns.
The centrality of the school principal has been identified in global research
on school-level governance as an important proximate determinant of school
performance (Hallinger and Heck 1996; Leithwood, Patten, and Jantzi 2010).
The findings in the school-level case studies are consistent with this, but with
a crucial addition. As they underscore, the principal does not function in
isolation, but is embedded in a dense network of horizontal interactions
with teachers, with the SGB, with parents, and with the community more
broadly. Over time, these relationships—and how the principal nurtures them
(or fails to nurture them)—are key underlying determinants of school-level
educational outcomes. The interactions between leadership and governance
in the initial period (Figure 6.2) had a strong influence both on school
Table 6.7 Governance and performance in the case study schools in South Africa
Eastern Cape Western Cape
I: INFLUENCE OF HIERARCHICAL GOVERNANCE
Role of provincial
bureaucracy
 Protects dysfunctional status quo in
two schools.
WCED buttresses authority of
charismatic principals in initial period in
two schools, but performance declined
when the principals left.
 Offers modest support for school
principals seeking turnaround in
later period in two schools.
Role of school-
level leaders
How authority is exercised by school leaders consistently has a strong influence on
governance and performance in all periods in all schools.
Highly respected principal drives
relatively strong performance in early
initial period in one school.
Charismatic principals drive strong
performance orientation in initial
period in two schools.
II: INFLUENCE OF HORIZONTAL GOVERNANCE









 Ongoing capture in one school.  Ongoing capture in one school.
 Capture during earlier period in two
schools.
 Capture in latter period in one
school.
 Conflictual principal succession
disrupts performance in one school.
Source: Levy (2018).
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performance, and on the governance dynamics in the subsequent period.
Three distinct patterns of ‘initial period’ leadership were evident.
A first pattern, evident in the initial period in three schools, comprised
strong top-down leadership by a charismatic, committed, results-oriented
principal. This leadership style yielded good results in the initial period, but
with performance in all three schools subsequently declining—with the
declines pointing to the limitations of this ‘heroic’ style of leadership.
Although in the short term, the determined efforts of a strong principal can
yield success, at some point the time comes for succession. If succession turns
out badly (as happened in the two Western Cape schools), or if the principal
loses authority for some other reason (as happened in the Eastern Cape
example), then this successful performance is likely to be reversed. Charismatic
personalized leadership without institution-building risks leaving behind an
institutional vacuum, conflict, and a collapse of school performance.
In a second contrasting pattern, evident in four schools, governance was
more participatory—with the clearest illustration coming from a school in the
Eastern Cape. The institutional culture of the school, established by its found-
ing principal, was one where all stakeholders—teachers, the SGB, the
extended community—felt included; even with the ECDoE, which was care-
fully kept at arm’s length, relationships remained cordial. This pattern of
collaborative governance was underpinned by impersonal rules, collectively
developed, collectively owned, and largely self-imposed. The school’s inclu-
sive culture supported a smooth process of principal succession. The successor
principal, an internal candidate from within the teaching staff, had been
mentored by the previous principal, enjoyed the support of the SGB, and,
once appointed, continued along the path that had been established. Indeed,
this was the only one of the eight case study schools that consistently sus-
tained a relatively25 strong performance.
Another variant of participatory governance was more bottom-up. One of
the Eastern Cape case study schools had long been characterized by sustained,
neglectful, and predatory leadership on the part of an often-absent principal.
The number of pupils had fallen from close to 1,000 in the early 1990s to a low
of 341 in 2011. After over a decade of ongoing dysfunction, a group of parents
and some SGB members met, and jointly reached the view that the principal
needed to be replaced. At the group’s urging, the SGB took their decision to
the ECDoE district office. After failing to win support from the bureaucracy,
the parent community staged a protest, preventing the principal from
25 Both the trend in numbers of students, and area feedback (and visual observation during
fieldwork) identify the school as a relatively strong performer locally. But given the vast disparities
between average performance in the Eastern and Western Cape, there is no basis for extrapolating
this relative success into absolutely strong performance in relation to schools in low-income areas
in both provinces.
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accessing the school, and forcing the appointment of a replacement, with
whom they worked closely to turn around the school. By 2015, four years after
the intervention by parents, the number of pupils in the school had risen to
547, up by 70 per cent from the trough.
The third broad governance pattern was one of weak/captured leadership.
In two cases (one in each province), this dysfunctional leadership was
linked directly to the predatory preferences of ‘strong’ principals, who
inculcated a culture of self-seeking and inattention to learning throughout
their schools. In two other schools (both in the Eastern Cape), leadership
was relatively weak; in one of the two, there was a low-level equilibrium of
capture, with the principal, teachers, and the SGB working in cahoots with
one another; in the other, the stakeholders were mired in endemic conflict.
A noteworthy implication of this last governance pattern is that there is
no necessary one-to-one relationship between a particular configuration of
school-level governance, and success or failure. Andrews, Pritchett, and
Woolcock (2012) make a related point in underscoring that seeming compli-
ance with external conceptions of ‘good governance’ can be a reflection of
‘isomorphic mimicry’—of an effort to win validation from external actors,
even as the way in which the relevant rules of the game are applied—and may
in fact reproduce a low-level equilibrium.
What shapes the outcome for a specific school at a specific point in time is
less the form of governance than the dynamics amongst stakeholders, specif-
ically the relative balance between developmental and predatory influences.
These stakeholder dynamics are not pre-ordained by either the broader local
context or the strength of the education bureaucracy. They turn out to be
contingent and cumulative, with individual agency by stakeholders playing a
significant role. This raises the possibility that proactive interventions could
potentially tilt the balance of threat-trumping interactions in some fraction of
schools away from predatory and towards more developmental actors, with a
positive impact on educational outcomes.
Before concluding our discussion of the school-level case studies, one final
empirical finding is worthy of note. Going into the research, the expectation
was that the largest teachers’ union, SADTU, would play a significant role in
shaping school-level dynamics, using its power to influence appointments,
and to assert control more generally. We also expected to see evidence of
political parties using the power of appointment for patronage purposes.
While we did find a few instances of these problems, in general we found
that, in both provinces, hyper-local school-level dynamics were decisive, and
that, generally, these were only loosely linked to these broader forces. Though
surprising, this finding is consistent with the observation of a seasoned
scholar/practitioner of South African education, Nick Taylor (quoted in Jansen
2015) that:
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When I entered the National Education Evaluation Unit in South Africa’s Depart-
ment of Basic Education, I thought SADTU was a huge problem . . .But the more
I got into the data . . . I began to realize that there is a bigger problem. The biggest
problem is the poor management in many parts of the system. Where manage-
ment is weak, unions do what they do . . .
Conclusion
As this chapter has shown, politics and institutions have had a substantial
influence on education sector policymaking and implementation in South
Africa, and thus on the country’s educational outcomes. The pathways
through which these influences have been felt are multiple and circuitous.
Only for the broadest, foundational policies (e.g. universal access; intergov-
ernmental delegation of authority) is it plausible to map causality directly
from South Africa’s early 1990s political settlement. Rather, the South Africa
research suggests that contextually grounded explanations require a careful
exploration of the distinctive features of the relevant policy domain (e.g.
commitment to performance management), the relevant sector (e.g. educa-
tion, where service provision is diffused across a large number of frontline
providers), and the relevant locale (e.g. the Western and Eastern Cape prov-
inces, and individual schools, each with distinctive dynamics).
For all of the evident complexity, the conclusion need not be the nihilistic
one that every setting is unique, and thus that there is little to be learned in
one context that is useful for policymaking and implementation in another.
To illustrate, this concluding section suggests how the research findingsmight
contribute to the long-standing debate amongst education sector scholars and
practitioners as to what should be the right balance between hierarchical and
horizontal approaches to the governance and accountability of the sector.
A central question explored by the research concerned the determinants of
the capability of bureaucratic hierarchies. The results suggest that such cap-
ability is embedded in a complex system, comprising a variety of interdepend-
ent economic, demographic, political, and institutional variables/drivers.
These interdependencies can result in a variety of distinct equilibria for bur-
eaucracies, which can be difficult to change. In the Western Cape, the drivers
were aligned in a way that sustained relatively strong bureaucratic capability.
By contrast, in the Eastern Cape, the drivers were configured in a way that, in
the absence of far-reaching broader political and institutional reforms, made
the likelihood of bureaucratic improvement remote.
For horizontal governance, the SASA granted significant responsibility to
SGBs. But its contribution potentially varies significantly between settings
where hierarchy is strong, and settings where it is weak. In settings such as
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the Western Cape, where hierarchy is strong, the relevant questions concern
the role of horizontal governance as a complement—providing support for
tasks where there are inherent limitations to the efficacy of hierarchy. Con-
versely, in settings such as the Eastern Cape where hierarchy is weak, might
horizontal governance plausibly be (at least in part) an institutional substi-
tute—with local-, school- and community-level actors taking on, reasonably
effectively, some tasks which might otherwise have been carried out bureau-
cratically? Both roles were evident in the school-level case studies; but so was
capture, with the outcome dependent on the relative weight of developmental
and predatory influences.
Insofar as stronger horizontal governance can indeed improve educational
outcomes (either as complement or as substitute) how can it be strengthened?
There is strikingly little to be learned on this score from within South Africa.
Despite the central role given to SGBs in the 1996 South African Schools Act,
there have been few efforts aimed at strengthening their performance. But
there have been systematic evaluations in other developing countries of the
impact of efforts to improve horizontal governance.
Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos (2011) offer rich detail on dozens of carefully
evaluated horizontal reforms, including reforms to improve school-based
management, to enhance information transparency, and to make teachers
more accountable for performance. They find considerable variations in impact;
some interventions turn out to make a significant positive difference, others
have been ineffective. The school-level case studies summarized in this chapter
suggest that the success of such efforts depends not so much on ‘capacity
building’ (which is technically straightforward) or on the specific accountability
mechanisms introduced (World Bank 2003), but on power: whether interven-
tion is able to tilt the balance between developmental and predatory school-
level forces in favour of the former.
Indeed, the research findings laid out in this chapter suggest that, in the
final analysis, stakeholder dynamics (that is, politics and power) are key to
governance reform of both the hierarchical and horizontal variety. For hier-
archical governance, incremental reforms to improve public management
may perhaps make some modest difference, but far-reaching improvements
in bureaucratic performance will be dependent on difficult-to-achieve sup-
portive political circumstances. For horizontal reforms, the Eastern Cape
school-level case studies suggest that, insofar as stakeholder dynamics at
school level are hyper-local, there may be scope for interventions (either by
government or by non-governmental organizations) that tilt the balance in at
least some schools in a developmental direction.
Those seeking a ‘magic bullet’—one right way to turn schools around—will
doubtless be frustrated by the conclusion that there are multiple possible
governance entry points for improving educational outcomes, and that the
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efficacy of any of them depends as much on politics and power as on the
technocratic expertise of reformers. But there is an alternative interpretation,
namely that uncovering institutional diversity and its political drivers
expands opportunity, clarifying what might work across different settings,
and thereby adding to possibilities for improving educational outcomes, even
in contexts where governance is difficult.
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7
The Political Economy of Primary Education
Reform in Cambodia
Tim Kelsall, Sothy Khieng, Chuong Chantha, and Tieng Tek Muy
Introduction
In August 2014, Cambodian students up and down the country sat for their
grade 12 national exit exams. Unlike in previous years, elaboratemeasures had
been taken to ensure that exam questions were not leaked by education
officials, students were frisked for mobile phones, calculators, or other cheat-
ing aids by thousands of volunteers, and, in some cases, exam halls and papers
were protected by armed Anti-Corruption Unit guards.1 One student summed
up the situation with the statement, ‘It’s damn strict this year’ (Brehm 2014)
(NE2,2 TTCA). When the exams were graded, it transpired that of the 75,000
students who sat them, a mere 26 per cent had passed—a striking contrast to
the 87 per cent that had passed the previous year (Ponniah and Heng 2014).3
Dismal though they were, these results came as little surprise to experts on
Cambodia’s education, since they reflect a system which, while successful in
building infrastructure and getting large numbers of children into school, has
been less adept at delivering educational quality.
The exam reforms were the brainchild of Dr Hang Chuon Naron, a new
Education Minister with the mandate to shake up the sector and deliver
1 In fact, there was also a clampdown on cheating in 2002, which also saw a dramatic decline in
the pass rate. However, subsequent years saw a return to cheating as normal (Brehm 2014).
2 Interviews are referenced throughout this chapter according to the following codes: EA:
Expatriate advisor; FG: Focus group; NGO: Non-governmental organization; IS: International
scholar; NE: National expert; NM: National Ministry of Education Youth and Sport official;
TTCA: Teacher Training College Province A.
3 Following protests from higher education institutions, failing students were given a second
chance to sit exams in October. However, regulations were again strictly enforced, and the failure
rate was 82.06 per cent (Barron 2014a).
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tangible results prior to the birth of the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community in 2015, and to what were expected
to be hard-fought general elections in 2018. He explained them as both a tool
for diagnosing the ills of the sector, and as one part of a wide-ranging reform
agenda (Barron 2014b). In this chapter, we delve into the politics of the
reforms, applying a ‘political settlements’ and domains of power approach
to explain, retrospectively, how Cambodia’s political settlement has condi-
tioned the emergence of an education system that focuses on quantity rather
than quality, and, prospectively, to help us assess the prospects for reform.
We describe the contemporary Cambodian political settlement as weakly
dominant and personalized (see also Chapter 2), though with some pockets of
rule-governed behaviour. This provides a set of opportunities and constraints for
education reformers. Weak dominance provides some potential to impose top-
down reform on the sector and to persist with this over a relatively long time-
horizon. However, personalization implies that bureaucratic sophistication will
be low, and that changes in rules and regulations may be weakly adhered to.
However, ifwe are tounderstand the trajectory of reform indetail, wemust delve
into the internal politics of the policy domain, its organizational culture, ideas,
and interests, and assess the potential for the emergence of coalitions that can
create pockets of effectiveness dedicated to improving quality.
The chapter is based on a review of secondary literature and official docu-
ments, one focus group with national NGOs and expatriate advisors, and
twenty-five national-level interviews.4 It begins by describing the politics of
primary education up to 2013, incorporating a discussion of the commitment
to quality, or lack thereof, and the political settlement and policy domain
dynamics that underlie this. It then proceeds to the present period, examin-
ing, amongst other things, concerns around teacher quality and the govern-
ment’s new Teacher Policy Action Plan. It suggests that the odds are stacked
against Cambodia successfully implementing far-reaching quality-enhancing
reforms in the relatively short timeframe it has set itself; however, with
persistent political will, and civil society and donor support, the chances of
success over the longer term are better.
The Politics of Education Policy in Cambodia
Cambodia has had two basic types of political settlement since independence
and several political regimes, each of which has provided a distinct flavour to
its education policy. Whether dominant or competitive, however, all of these
4 Fieldwork took place in 2014 and 2015, with the findings updated for the current period by
means of a document review.
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regimes and each of these settlements have been based on a personalized elite
bargain with rather low bureaucratic capacity and complexity. Each has been
interested in rapidly expanding access to education, and rather less interested
in, or at least less able to promote, educational quality. Due to a combination
of external and internal pressures, that is now beginning to change—but the
predominantly personalized nature of Cambodia’s political settlement means
that reform champions still face an uphill struggle.
Sihanouk Dominant (1953–70)
The story starts in 1953, when Cambodia gained independence from France
under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Driven by a vainglorious
desire to mimic the greatness of Angkor, together with an attempt to earn
popular legitimacy with a peasantry that associated education with an escape
from rural poverty, Sihanouk quickly embarked on a massive expansion in
educational provision. There were rapid moves to introduce universal primary
education, universal secondary education, and a higher education system that
was the envy of other states in the region (Ayres 2000). Sihanouk consistently
interfered with the policies of the ministry, overriding its technocratic
approach in favour of grand political gestures (Ayres 2000). The result was
that ‘schools were poorly constructed, teachers hastily trained, too many
students were crammed into classrooms, and teaching facilities and materials
were inadequate’ (Ayres 2000, 63).
The failure of Sihanouk’s educational and economic policies fuelled oppos-
ition to his regime, and in 1970 he was overthrown in a coup. For the next five
years, civil war raged, and Cambodia cannot really be said to have had a
‘political settlement’ at all. In 1975, the Maoist Khmer Rouge overthrew the
regime and imposed a new order under the name of Democratic Kampuchea.
Khmer Rouge Dominant (1975–9)
The Khmer Rouge, reacting in part to the excesses of Sihanoukism, had an
entirely different educational vision. According to Pol Pot, its leader, ‘there are
no schools, faculties, or universities in the traditional sense . . .because we
want to do away with all vestiges of the past’ (Ayres 2000, 104). Teachers
were forced to flee the country or were killed, school buildings were used as
cattle sheds or go-downs, while whatever education that took place—much of
it teaching revolutionary slogans through song and dance (Sloper 1999)—was
entrusted to untrained ‘base people’ (Ayres 2000).5
5 ‘Base people’ were defined by the Khmer Rouge as those who joined the ‘Revolution’, viz. the
fight against the Republic, prior to 1975.
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Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party Dominant (1979–89)
By the time the Vietnamese-backed Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary
Party (KPRP) overthrew the Khmer Rouge in 1979, the education system was
practically non-existent (NM5). The KPRP vigorously rebuilt it, but, once
again, quality was not the main concern. According to Ayres, ‘education was
seen as a primary tool for state building and establishing legitimacy’ (Ayres
2000, 135), and, in the eyes of Vietnamese advisors, that meant building a
nation of ‘new socialist workmen’, by placing as many students as possible in
schools as quickly as possible (Ayres 2000, 128). A key obstacle when it came
to improving educational quality remained the nation’s teaching corps, who
were ‘very poorly trained and poorly remunerated’ (Ayres 2000, 143); teacher-
training colleges were desperately short of materials, while many teachers at
provincial teacher-training colleges were unfit to be teachers themselves
(Ayres 2000, 143).
Moreover, these efforts were proceeding in a context of state building on a
shoestring. When it came to power, the KPRP was bereft of Western support,
and highly vulnerable to revanchist assaults from the Khmer Rouge and other
rebel forces. The most urgent need was to establish a network of supporters,
who would act as a bulwark against ongoing insurgency. Consequently, there
was a drive to recruit functionaries to the new state. But with the formal
economy in ruins, and formal revenue-raising powers weak, the new political
settlement was built on the understanding that, in addition to their meagre
salaries, new recruits could use their positions to extract rents. By controlling
access to the most lucrative of these, while turning a blind eye to petty rent-
scraping, the leadership was able to build a patronage-based state (Gottesman
2004). As in most patronage systems, loyalty was more important than
competence—a trend compounded, no doubt, by the fact that many former,
competent officials had either fled or been murdered by the Khmer Rouge.
Consequently, most ministries were staffed by poorly qualified, underpaid
staff, who understandably expended as much energymoonlighting or extract-
ing rents as they did pursuing official government policies, establishing a
legacy that Cambodia has yet to fully escape.
Competitive Power Sharing (1991–8)
In 1989, the Vietnamese withdrew from Cambodia, opening the door to a
peace accord in 1991, multi-party elections in 1993, a power-sharing govern-
ment, and increased involvement in the education sector by international
donors (Sloper 1999). Initially, donors’ experience was a frustrating one.
National administrators had no idea of how to construct plans or budgets,
and, according to one observer, ‘it was common to see educationministry staff
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playing boules in the ministry yard, gossiping at their desks and departing
early for lack of any clear idea of what to do in the office’ (McNamara 2013, 24).
Capacity, nevertheless, was gradually built, and the sector attracted substantial
donor funds (McNamara 1999; Sloper 1999). It was less successful in attracting
government money, languishing at around 10 per cent of total spending.
And, while most donor attention went into trying to improve quality, the
government focused its own resources on infrastructural expansion
(McNamara 1999, 100–01).
The background to this was that the KPRP, renamed theCambodian People’s
Party (CPP), now found itself in competition with a deadly enemy—the royal-
ist party, Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant Neutre Pacifique et
Coopératif (FUNCINPEC)—for control of the state, in which they both held
offices, courtesy of the UN-brokered power-sharing arrangement. The size of
the civil service ballooned, as each party attempted to appoint its own loyalists
(McNamara 1999; Roberts 2001). A large portion of the resources reaching
education went to populist measures, such as increasing teacher salaries and
school infrastructure. Reports from the field mention ‘attractive new buildings
without equipment or competent teaching staff ’ (McNamara 1999, 101), a not
uncommon feature of competitive clientelist regimes.
CPP Dominant, 1998–2013
After vanquishing FUNCINPEC in abloody contest in 1997, andfinally defeating
theKhmer Rouge in1998, PrimeMinisterHunSenwasfinally able to consolidate
his political settlement (see Figure 7.1). It is based on a dominant coalition,
comprising local tycoons (often awarded the honorific oknha), foreign investors,
militarymen, selected technocrats, and international donors. Under its informal
terms, technocrats and foreign investors have created the conditions for jobs
and growth; business cronies and themilitary havemade rents from concessions
and contracts; and international donors have provided technical advice and
supported the budget, particularly in the social sectors.
This settlement, it should be noted, is an evolution, not a displacement of,
the state-building process initiated in the 1980s, the main difference being
that Western and multilateral donors have grown in importance relative to
the Vietnamese, and liberal democracy (despite de facto CPP dominance) has
replaced state socialism as the official ideology. It is still based on a predom-
inantly personalistic bargain between members of the elite and lower-level
cadres, though with some pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness, especially in
the economic ministries. The compliance of subordinate groups—and elect-
oral victories—is secured through a mixture of ideology (the CPP takes credit
for defeating the Khmer Rouge), patronage (a portion of the dominant coali-
tion’s rents is channelled to the masses in the form of roads, schools, etc.),
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programmatic policy (as with some of the donor-supported initiatives in
education and health) and coercion (dissenters rapidly incur the wrath of
the security forces) (Craig and Pak 2011; Hughes and Conway 2003; Hughes
and Un 2011; Kelsall and Heng 2014; Kelsall and Heng 2016; Pak 2011; Un
2005). But the patronage-based nature of the state has not been radically
overhauled.
In the introduction to this chapter we described the settlement as ‘weakly
dominant’. Evidence for this is that, despite the CPP’s consistent ability to win
elections and the undoubted pre-eminence of Hun Sen within his own party,
the Prime Minister has always taken great care to balance CPP factions. Until
recently it has been rare for ministers or other high-ranking officials to be
sacked, or even reshuffled, and in areas such as land-grabbing and forest
exploitation, the Prime Minister seems to tolerate behaviour that he recog-
nizes is not ideal. The Prime Minister, himself a former Khmer Rouge com-
mander, was politically schooled in an era when the Khmer Rouge fatally
weakened itself in intra-party factional struggle and paranoid purges, and his
unwillingness to discipline other high-ranking members of the elite stems
perhaps from this.
The CPP-dominated settlement coincided with a period of increasing align-
ment between the party’s desire for popular legitimacy, and donor efforts to
expand education access under the Education for All initiative and the Mil-
lennium Development Goals. As such, the revenue situation in education











































Figure 7.1 Cambodia’s political settlement, 1998–2013
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under the government’s Priority Action Plan (reaching a high of 19 per cent of
budgeted recurrent expenditure in 2006 [Benveniste, Marshall, and Araujo
2008, 4, 60]).6 Between 2000 and 2014, the number of primary schools
increased from 5,468 to 6,993, and the number of teachers from 45,152 to
55,958 (MoEYS 2014; UNESCO 2010).7 The amount of training received by
teachers increased steadily over the years, as did teacher salaries (although
teacher salaries fell as a proportion of total education spending) (Benveniste
et al. 2008, 67). Capacity-building efforts in the ministry continued, such
that by 2009, the country’s Education Strategic Plan was, for the first time,
said to be genuinely ‘nationally owned’ (McNamara 2013). There were also
numerous schemes to improve educational quality, for example the Education
Quality Improvement Project, student-centred learning, cluster schools, the
Child Friendly School Approach, and life skills curriculum development
(Benveniste et al. 2008; Reimer 2012).
These schemes failed, however, to make a big impact on overall learning
outcomes. For example, the 2010 Early Grade Reading Assessment of grades
1–6 found that 33 per cent of children could not read, and that 47 per cent of
those who could had difficulty comprehending what they had read. A recent
impact evaluation found that grade 9 schoolchildren performed no better in
maths and vocabulary than children who were not in school (cited in Tandon
and Fukao 2015, 1). The aforementioned grade 12 exam results show that
problems continue throughout the system, and, indeed, many investors in
Cambodia complain of a poorly educated workforce seriously deficient in
generic employment skills (Barron 2014b; Madhur 2014).
One possible explanation is that quality-focused initiatives have received
little political commitment. Ayres, writing in 2000, claimed that the Prime
Minister was, apparently, ‘unconcerned about the finer details of educational
quality and relevance’ (Ayres 2000, 190), while a long-term observer writes,
‘National leader initiatives . . . are driven by political motives, uninformed by
the technical considerations underlying the effectiveness of the institutions of
a modern state’ (McNamara 1999, 101).
Disentangling the degree to which this can be attributed to Cambodia’s
political settlement type, and the extent to which it is more to do with sui
generis features of Cambodian history, is not an easy matter. One could argue
that the CPP’s dominance should have provided the political leadership with
the space to plan a more rational education policy, in which the demands of
access and quality were better balanced; and that its failure to do so is thus a
6 The actual spend may have been lower (IS1).
7 Note that owing to ‘a surge in demand’, the expansion in secondary education, which started
from a very low base, has been even more rapid than that for primary education (Benveniste et al.
2008).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/2/2019, SPi
Politics and Education in Developing Countries
138
result of misguided ideas about education, or personal failings on the part of
its leaders. At the same time, the CPP has only ever been weakly dominant,
constrained by relatively strong factions within its own party, and fearful of a
resurgent opposition, meaning that the desire to cater to popular aspirations
around access is understandable. Moreover, the predominantly personalized
nature of the settlement would have made implementing a learning agenda
challenging, even in the presence of a political desire to do so. The government
consequently put more energy into outcomes that were easily achievable and
earned the most political capital (NM5). In this, it was aided and abetted by
donors, for whom expanding access was at least as important as improving
quality, at least in the first decade of the twenty-first century.8
Improving school infrastructure and access arguably paid political divi-
dends in the short term. On the campaign trail, Hun Sen was known to fly
around the country by helicopter, describing the CPP as a ‘superpower’when it
came to building schools (Ayres 2000, 180). In addition to donor money, many
were built with political contributions from well-connected businessmen, and
bore the Prime Minister’s name.9 Between 1998 and 2013, the CPP recorded
three successive election victories, the last one, in 2008, comfortable. But in the
longer term, the disproportionate emphasis on access to education has created
problems, by contributing to social changes that threaten to undermine CPP
dominance. In 2013, the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party ran
the CPP extremely close in national general elections. Sustained protests and
demonstrations followed, in which the opposition claimed that the CPP had
rigged the election and called for Hun Sen to resign. Worryingly for the
ruling party, it appeared particularly unpopular amongst young people—an
increasingly large and influential section of the electorate—many of whom
had graduated through the education system, but had been unable to find
the kinds of jobs to which they aspired (Cambodia Daily 2013).
Impending ASEAN economic integration has amplified educational con-
cerns. As of the end of 2015, ASEAN nationals were theoretically able to take
jobs in Cambodia, with Cambodians able to take jobs elsewhere. Given Cam-
bodia’s lagging educational status, the former appears much more likely than
the latter, especially when it comes to well-paid, professional jobs. Further
tightening of an already straitened labour market for Cambodian graduates is
8 Un (2012) argues that, although educational attainment in Cambodia remains poor, it has
nevertheless marginally improved, despite massively expanded access. This distinguishes it from
some other expanded access countries, for example Uganda. Un explains this by reference to
Cambodia’s greater centralization and more effective control of rent-seeking. Our take on this
would be that although Cambodia and Uganda are both weakly dominant settlements, Uganda’s is
weaker.
9 As of February 2017, 3,932 schools had been supported by the Prime Minister and his wife
(MoEYS 2013, 16).
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bound to have negative consequences for the ruling party. Concerns about
educational quality have also been voiced by employers and business associ-
ations (Kotoski 2015; Global Times 2013). The response has been an increased
interest in adopting ASEAN educational norms, for instance a 12 + 4 teacher-
training system, as we will see (FG1, NM1, NM5, EA10).
In September 2013, the Prime Minister announced a cabinet reshuffle,
prominent in which was the appointment of Dr Hang Chuon Naron to the
education portfolio. Naron is a well-respected scholar, economist, technocrat,
and trusted advisor to Hun Sen. Previously he had worked at the Ministry of
Economy and Finance, and at the Supreme National Economic Council, the
government’s economic thinktank. His appointment to the education port-
folio was interpreted as a sign that the Prime Minister recognized that a new
approach to the sector was needed (FG1, NGO3, NM1). It can also be seen as
part of a wider attempt to shift the political settlement away from its patron-
age roots and towards more programmatic, higher-quality, public goods pro-
vision (a move that is apparent in the domain of health as well as education,
see Kelsall and Heng 2016), which at least some high-ranking CPP stalwarts
now consider necessary.
The Politics of Cambodia’s Education Domain, 1998–2013
A more granular understanding of the political economy of educational out-
comes in the period 1998–2013 can be gained by examining the policy domain
of education itself, as illustrated in Figure 7.2.10 Themain ‘policymaking actors’
are coloured in white, with the main ‘implementing actors’ in grey.
In the inner circle of power are the Minister (a post held during this period
by Tol Lah, Kol Pheng, and Im Sethy), and themost powerful Secretary of State
(whom we will call SOS A). SOS A began his professional life in the teacher-
training department, where he still retains his strongest power base, working
his way up the hierarchy over time. Observers attributed his rise to being in the
right place at the right time when the Education for All and Child Friendly
Schools policies were introduced, demonstrating his competence to develop-
ment partners, and subsequently being chosen by theMinister to handle donor
relations. He has since amassed an enormous portfolio of responsibilities and
undoubtedly has the largest patronage base in the Ministry (EA6, EA7). Also
10 The diagram is the result of a ‘political settlements mapping’ exercise, carried out amongst
education NGOs, development partners, and CDRI (Cambodia Development Research Institute)
researchers, held at the CDRI in January 2015. The mapping exercise used a tool adapted by
Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) from Parks and Cole (2010).
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present are the Education for All coordinators (whoworked closely with SOS A),
the technical departments (with primary implementing responsibility), and the
sub-technical working groups.
In the outer circle of power are the Prime Minister the late Deputy Prime
Minister other ministries for whom education policies have implications, in
particular theMinistry of Economy and Finance (MEF), more junior secretaries
of state, provincial governors, and provincial departments of education, devel-
opment partners—the most important of whom, such as UNICEF, UNESCO,
JICA, Sida, and theWorld Bank, sit on the Education Sector Working Group—
and NGOs, the most influential being, perhaps, the umbrella group, NGO
Education Partnership. Teacher associations, both pro- and anti-CPP, exist,
but they are forbidden to strike and are not particularly influential (CITA 2012;
see also CITA 2013; Pereira 2014).
Between them, members of the dominant coalition fund, regulate, and try
to improve the public education facilities that supply education services




























































































































Figure 7.2 Politics of Cambodia’s education domain, as of 2013
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community-centred school boards. The dominant coalition also regulates
private-sector facilities, some of which are owned by members of the coalition
and other Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport (MoEYS) staff. Public
teachers also moonlight in private facilities or, more usually, teach informal
private lessons on their own. Teachers have also been known to pay a per-
centage of their salaries, plus fees, to provincial education officials, who either
facilitate or forestall their transfer from/to remote areas (Un 2012). Another
major source of rents is Cambodia’s publishing and printing house, which has
a monopoly on textbook production (World Bank 2011).
In terms of the nature of the ‘elite bargain’, or ‘common understanding’
about how power is organized and exercised, MoEYS, as with much of the rest
of the Cambodian civil service, is a hybrid. For many Cambodian actors,
including politicians, education officials, teachers, and parents, education is
about instilling discipline and building good character. The emphasis,
with deep roots in Cambodian history, is on young people as largely passive,
obedient recipients of hierarchically transmitted knowledge. Whether or
not this is appropriate to an agricultural society transitioning to a low-grade,
semi-authoritarian industrial society, it is very much at odds with dominant
trends in global education discourse, which are about creating active citizens
for a democratic knowledge economy. At the same time, there is a desire to
make use of global models, because of the benefits they are believed to bring
(Reimer 2012).
Administration is also of a mixed type. Although efforts have been made
over the past twenty years to increase professionalism, some of which have
undoubtedly borne fruit (McNamara 2013), much of the Ministry still runs on
personalized, clientelistic, rather than legal-rational lines. At the local level,
meanwhile, many senior officials are said to have paid hefty bribes to obtain
their positions, and are thus dependent on illicit revenue streams from prac-
tices such as exam cheating and re-stationing teachers from remote areas, to
recoup their investments (Un 2012, 110–47) (EA1, NE6, NGO3).
Development partners do try to make a difference to this scenario, with
various projects to build capacity around either general or specific program-
matic goals. However, the typical capacity-building intervention involves a set
of lofty ambitions operationalized through a series of workshops or trainings,
often held at attractive venues outside the capital. MoEYS officials often
welcome these initiatives with open arms, since they bring resources into
the ministry, fuel patronage networks, and can, to some extent, be skimmed.
And while it would be unfair to say such trainings are useless, they usually fall
well short of their aims, since most trainees fail to apply what they have been
taught to their daily duties (EA2, EA4, NGO7). A 2002 study, for example,
could find no relation between in-service training and classroom outcomes,
describing most programmes as, ‘short, irrelevant, irregular and conducted in
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a cascade system’ (Chhinh and Tabata 2002).11 Neither donors nor the gov-
ernment have shown much commitment to ensuring more effective forms of
knowledge transfer.
Put differently, the ethos of the ministry, to quote one informant, ‘is activ-
ities rather than outcomes based’ (EA2).Many development partners recognize
this but have, by and large, failed to find more successful ways of working.12
Matters are not helped by donor fragmentation (only partially alleviated by
coordinating bodies such as the Education Sector Working Group), and the
tendency of most development agency staff to work on programmes and
contracts that are only two to three years long (EA1, EA2, EA4). A report from
the turn of the millennium commented that lack of coordination between
donors created confusion in schools (Care International 1999).
Child Friendly Schools
Many of these trends are exemplified by the Child Friendly Schools (CFS)
approach, which is an international initiative, promoted primarily by UNICEF,
as a ‘pathway to educational quality’. InCambodia, CFSwas piloted byUNICEF,
Sida, SC-Norway and local partners in several provinces in the early 2000s.
Based on these pilots’ apparent success, it became national policy in 2007,
with enthusiastic support from MoEYS and the World Bank. Amongst its
objectives, CFS promotes child-friendly schools, effective learning, and the
participation of children, families, and communities (Reimer 2012).
Evidence suggests, however, that inculcating a genuinely child-friendly
approach has been challenging. For example, teachers have sometimes been
found to have child-friendly lesson plans, which they can teach in the pres-
ence of inspectors, but which they rarely use for normal classes. Group work is
used frequently, but mainly as a means of giving the teacher a rest. Teachers
realize that corporal punishment is banned, though they still sometimes use
it, while others resort to shaming practices instead. Gender equality is
acknowledged as an ideal, but there is little attempt to challenge traditional
gender roles, or to ensure that girls stay in school (Reimer 2012). While it
has been adopted at a policy level, its key tenets—alien to dominant currents
in Cambodian culture and education—have not been internalized at a practiec
level, despite the expenditure of significant resources and technical support.
11 Cited in McNamara (2013).
12 An apparently successful capacity-building initiative around the Education for All initiative
is detailed in Benveniste et al. (2008).
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Its reasons for adoption, then, bear many of the hallmarks of what has
elsewhere been called, ‘isomorphic mimicry’ (Andrews 2013):
First, there is widespread recognition that the Cambodian public education system
is of low quality and something must be done—no local options have presented
themselves, so an international model is adopted. Second, CFS comes with signifi-
cant funding resources and technical advice. Third, Cambodians are very con-
scious of wanting to appear competent on the regional and global stage and do not
want to be regarded as ‘backward’ and ‘not modern’. (Reimer 2012, 422)
A high-ranking Cambodian official admitted to us that the policy has been
most successful in improving school environments (‘Easy to do; easy to see’),
less so in promoting effective learning (‘Easy to say; very hard to do!’) (NM5).
In 2008, a statistical study found that the effects of CFS were inconclusive,
with the overall ‘flavour’ suggesting that CFS ‘has not had an impact on
student learning’ (Reimer 2012, 311).
Teacher Quality in Cambodia
At the root of many of Cambodia’s educational problems is the poor quality of
teaching, which has long been a subject of concern. As we saw earlier, teacher
salaries have increased throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Nevertheless, in 2008 a
major report from the World Bank found that teachers were still underpaid
(Benveniste et al. 2008, 40). Although the quality of teaching had improved
over the years, thanks to increases in the entry requirements for teachers, the
length of time spent in teacher training, and programmes to encourage ‘life
skills’ and ‘Child Friendly’ pedagogy, classroom observations suggested that
most teaching remained ‘frontal’ and focused on ‘rote learning’: ‘overall, the
picture that emerges is a teacher-centred classroom where students basically
receive information and prompting but are not themselves active partners in
the learning’ (Benveniste et al. 2008, 72, 75). Further, many teachers, especially
older ones, lacked ‘pedagogical content knowledge’, with the result that they
were unable correctly to diagnose and respond to student errors (Benveniste
et al. 2008, 77). These findings suggested that, whatever improvements recent
decades had seen, problems with pre-service and in-service training remained.
Monitoring of teacher performance also left much to be desired, being organ-
ized around, ‘a bureaucratic (external), low stakes accountability mechanism’
(Benveniste et al. 2008, 82). Further, few incentives were offered for teachers to
improve the quality of their teaching, since they faced a highly compressed
salary structure, and the bonuses and performance-related incentives that did
exist seemed not to be linked in any systematic way to performance in the
classroom (Benveniste et al. 2008, 98). In response, the authors of the report
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urged the adoption of a ‘Teacher Standards Framework’, incorporating a range
of teacher competencies tied to behaviours linked to student learning, which
could be observed and evaluated (Benveniste et al. 2008, 100).
Since the 2008 report was written, base salaries continued to rise at the rate
of 15–20 per cent a year (Pereira 2014), and the teaching workforce continued
to expand. However, many of the problems identified in 2008 proved persist-
ent. A 2015 World Bank study found that, on average, teachers earned only
60 per cent of what other professionals earned, and that a typical teacher,
married, with a two-person family, found themself below the poverty line.
The profession continued to fail to attract themost talented students, with the
majority of teacher trainees having scored C, D, or E on their grade 12 exams,
and private tutoring was still rampant (Tandon and Fukao 2015). Other
research found teachers were unable or unwilling to teach the full curriculum
during normal school hours, thereby driving students to take extra lessons
(Un 2012). Typically, poorer students cannot afford these, and do less well in
exams as a result (Brehm and Silova 2014).
Teacher training continued to require a significant overhaul (Tandon
and Fukao 2015). Monitoring also remained an issue. Schools were supposed
to be monitored by officials at district and provincial level, but evidence
suggested that such officials, although they sometimes visited schools,
rarely observed what was going on in the classroom. Teachers were also
eligible for a number of performance-related bonuses, but respondents felt
that these were small, and unrelated to good teaching practice (Tandon and
Fukao 2015).
Interestingly, the Teacher Standards that were recommended by the 2008
report, piloted, and adopted as national policy in 2010, were in many cases
ignored. Many teacher trainers, teachers, and principals had not heard of
them, and many of those that had did not use them. Consequently, they
were rarely incorporated into lesson plans, or used as a basis for monitoring
and evaluation (Tandon and Fukao 2015). Although at one stage they had the
enthusiastic backing of both donors and SOS A, it seems that ultimately they
were not given sufficient political backing or resources to prioritize their
introduction in TTCs and schools.
As we have seen, the quality agenda within the education policy domain
received new impetus with the appointment of a new Minister in 2013. On
coming to office, Dr Naron made a number of changes signifying the serious-
ness of the reform effort. Into the inner circle of power he brought a new actor,
the newly created Education Research Council (ERC). The ERC comprises, on
one side, educational specialists from the university and civil society, and on
the other, ministerial staff, especially secretaries of state. The aim, apparently,
is to inject fresh ideas into the Ministry, create a capacity for evidence-based
research, and to provide a national counterbalance to the influence of
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development partners (NE1, NE2, EA3, NGO4). TheMinister also brought into
the Ministry a number of trusted aides with whom he had previously worked
in finance, who immediately began to introduce reforms such as results-based
budgeting (NE2, EA3, NM1).13 He alsomade school visits, in which he listened
to teachers’ ideas and complaints, as well as establishing a Facebook page on
which the public could air their views (FG1). Informants stressed that, unlike
the previous minister, the new minister was genuinely curious about the state
of affairs in education (FG1). By September of 2014 he had produced an eight-
point reform agenda, prioritizing:
1. The reform of personnel, meaning the qualifications of teachers and their
salaries; 2. Public financial reform at the ministry; 3. The issue of education
quality; 4. A think tank to assist the ministry in policy recommendation and
feedback; 5. Higher education reform; 6. Examination reform;14 7. Giving young
people skills; and 8. Reform of physical education and sport. (Barron 2014b)
The Teacher Policy Action Plan
The new minister’s main response to the problem of teaching quality is the
Teacher Policy Action Plan (TPAP). Cambodia has had an official Teacher
Policy since 2013 (MoEYS 2013), but shortly after taking office, Dr Naron
decided that the Ministry needed a ‘Plan’. After intense discussions, consult-
ations with donors, revisions, and a national workshop chaired by the Minis-
ter, the TPAP (2015–20) was approved and published in January 2015 (Teacher
Training Department 2015).
The Plan is based on the understanding that teacher quality is the most
crucial ingredient in educational outcomes, and the most pressing problem
facing the education sector is attracting high quality candidates to the teach-
ing profession: ‘Success in recruitment and training of teachers is the key to
fundamentally reforming the teacher-training system and ensuring that the
status and roles of the teaching profession rise significantly’ (Teacher Training
Department 2015, 3). It aims to establish a new vision for the teaching
profession, improve educational quality at all school levels, reform teaching
education institutions, raise the status of teachers, change teaching and learn-
ing practices, and lay the foundation for even deeper reforms post-2020.
To this end, it outlines nine strategies, thirty-four sub-strategies, and over
100 tasks or activities. They include: strengthening teacher education and
13 Apparently MoEYS was previously notoriously bad at constructing budgets, and partly for this
reason MEF had reduced its share of spending over the years (EA3).
14 The Minister has spoken of the exam reforms as a diagnostic tool for the education sector,
from which the main takeaways were the need to focus on maths and science, retraining teachers,
and strengthening the inspection system (Barron 2014b).
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recruitment by improving the financial and social benefits of teaching, auto-
matically admitting top-grade students into teacher-training colleges, and
implementing a new set of Teacher Education Provider Standards; strength-
ening professional development by upgrading teacher qualifications via a
Bachelor of Arts fast-track into the profession, while institutionalizing a sys-
tem of in-school training; updating teacher-training systems by creating a
Bachelor of Education 12+4 curriculum; and improving the school environ-
ment by revising textbooks, strengthening the accountability of teaching
staff, and, once again, properly implementing the Teacher Professional Stand-
ards (Teacher Training Department 2015).
Yet in mid-2015, when most research for this chapter was conducted,
progress on TPAP implementation was uneven. Dr Naron was widely acknow-
ledged to have injected a new sense of dynamism and urgency into the
ministry, and initiatives such as exam reform, for which the Anti-Corruption
Unit was brought into the inner circle, had created a stir (FG1, NE1, EA2,
NM1). It was not clear, however, that he had the critical mass of support to
achieve his more ambitious aims. Upon taking office, there was said to be a
tussle between the Minister and SOS A, although signs were that the former
had subsequently gained the unswerving support of the latter. Most inform-
ants, meanwhile, felt that the Minister did not really have the support of the
technical departments, though he was trying to change this by seeding them
with his own supporters (FG1, NE1, NE2, NM2, EA3). And while some inform-
ants opined that the new ERC was working well, others claimed that the
privileged financial position of the academics on the Council was creating
resentment amongst MoEYS staff (NM2). Dr Naron was also said to be under
criticism from the Cabinet for paying toomuch attention to foreigners (EA10).
Certain national- and provincial-level officials, meanwhile, had their inter-
ests undermined by the exam and pay reforms, and it was unclear how
supportive they would be of more far-reaching measures. To give one
example, the ex-Minister, who allegedly had substantial vested interests in,
amongst other things, textbook procurement, was said to be trying to poison
staff against the reforms (EA7). Consequently, more than one informant said
that Dr Naron may either become an icon of reform in Cambodia, or ‘fall flat
on his face’ (EA1, EA2).
As of the end of 2016, there were signs that the Minister had consolidated
his political position. A myriad of activities was being undertaken with the
learning agenda in mind, including strengthening a Quality Assurance Dep-
artment, creating a National Assessment Framework, providing additional
training for monitoring and inspection, and beginning to administer standard-
ized tests. Nevertheless, most of these initiatives were taking place on a
small scale and were not yet translating into improved learning in the class-
room (MoEYS 2016, 2017). A mid-term review of the Education Strategic Plan
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expected that rigorous implementation of the TPAP would strongly improve
this situation (MoEYS 2016, 5). In 2017, the Ministry secured a large increase in
its budget (Sokhean 2017), and teacher salaries were again raised—necessary but
not sufficient conditions for improving the quality of learning. At the time of
completing this chapter (March 2018), however, we were unable to access hard
evidence on either the extent of TPAP implementation or classroom perform-
ance, although at least some education specialists had a positive impression of
progress.
Be that as it may, it remains the case that the TPAP is an extremely ambi-
tious undertaking that would be challenging to implement, even with a
highly capable, coordinated bureaucracy. As we have seen, MoEYS, for histor-
ical reasons, falls some way short of this ideal. In light of this, perhaps the
main thing the Cambodian leadership has on its side is time. Weathering the
political storm of 2013, the CPP has, more recently, aggressively repressed and
disorganized the political opposition, cementing its dominance as it heads
into the 2018 election. Although some of its tactics in this respect have been
unsavoury, they do reduce the electoral incentives to concentrate on visible
infrastructure over learning reforms. Indeed, during the course of research,
one of Dr Naron’s close aides opined, in an aside, that reforming education in
Cambodia would take at least twenty years.
Conclusion
The power domains framework predicts that in dominant, personalized pol-
itical settlements, leadership coalitions sometimes emerge with an interest in
promoting developmental outcomes, and—providing the policy domain is
suitably aligned—their strong hierarchical institutions allow them to make
rapid progress in this regard. Since independence, Cambodia has experienced
a succession of political settlements of varying degrees of dominance, with
leaders able to make a big difference to the education sector, though not in the
interests of educational quality. Until recently, the constituencies concerned
about quality—international donors, and a small number of ministry techno-
crats in the education policy domain—have been neither strong nor single-
minded enough to make the agenda count. Instead, other educational ideas
and interests, around national greatness, socialist refashioning, post-conflict
state-making, and popular legitimacy, usually flowing down from the top
leadership or up from a predominantly rural population, have driven widen-
ing access. In the early years of the millennium, the access agenda was also at
the forefront of donor concerns, creating an alignment of political interest
and donor funding that drove a particularly rapid expansion in schooling,
with learning a secondary, if not irrelevant, consideration.
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That is now beginning to change. The CPP political settlement has always
been premised in part on earning legitimacy through ongoing economic
growth, and there is a realization amongst elements in the leadership that
better quality education is necessary to this. In addition, a community of
interest that includes employers’ associations, underemployed youth, inter-
national donors, and education NGOs are directly or indirectly applying
pressure on the government, contributing to the appointment of a new
Education Minister and a sweeping programme of reform, with quality at the
centre. Here, the CPP’s renewed dominance of a hugely uneven electoral
playing field may prove to be an asset, since reformers are freed from the
need to respond to short-term electoral pressures. At the same time, it needs
to be remembered that the Cambodian political settlement is essentially a
stitching together of a group of disparate elements under the CPP umbrella,
united by little more than a shared interest in physical survival and rent-
seeking. Power within the state itself, including the education bureaucracy,
is somewhat dispersed. To succeed, Dr Naron needs not just to change the
culture of the Cambodian classroom, but to win a political struggle against
vested interests which prioritize personal ties, patronage, and rent capture
over competence and performance. In this respect, the continued support
of the Prime Minister and the Finance Ministry will be essential. Given
MoEYS’ internal weaknesses, Dr Naron’s hand could also be strengthened
by donors and civil society, providing horizontal support and bottom-up
pressure for his reforms. That said, care must also be taken to provide
solutions that are adapted to local circumstances and realistic in the con-
text, as opposed to best-practice approaches appropriate to a very different
type of state.
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The Political Economy of Education
Quality Initiatives in Uganda
Anne Mette Kjær and Nansozi K. Muwanga
Introduction
Uganda’s success in broadening access to education is well documented
(Ssewamalaa et al. 2011; UNESCO 2015). The introduction of universal pri-
mary education (UPE) in 1997 was widely welcomed by parents, especially the
poor in rural areas, where the majority could not afford private schools or the
charges levied in public schools by parent–teacher associations (PTAs) that
had become the de facto school managers. The sharp rise in primary school
enrolment, from an estimated 3.1 million in 1996 to 8.4 million by 2013, put
Uganda on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) targets.
However, these widening access achievements under UPE have been under-
mined by low literacy and numeracy levels and high dropout rates. There has
been growing frustration with the dismal quality indicators amongst a cross-
section of education stakeholders, including politicians, education practi-
tioners, researchers, and the public. This has, in recent times, been echoed
by the President, who has expressed frustration with the high dropout rates.
Despite the consensus that the quality of primary education is poor, and
despite several policy initiatives to try to address the issue, there has to date
been little progress in raising education standards in Uganda. This chapter offers
an analysis of why thismay be the case. The analysis is rooted in an understand-
ing of how Uganda’s political settlement has interacted with the education
policy domain to shape the adoption, and variable implementation, of initia-
tives to improve the quality of education in government primary schools.
We rely on a careful reading of existing data and information on the
education sector in Uganda, as well as on fifty-one key informant interviews.
At the national level, we interviewed members of Parliament, Ministry of
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Education (MoE) officials, education NGO staff, education researchers, and
teachers’ union representatives. At the district level, we interviewed district
officials, local councillors, headteachers, teachers, and NGO staff in the districts
ofMayuge andMukono—chosen because one scores poorly onquality learning,
while the other performs comparatively well. In each district, we chose a com-
paratively high- and low-performing school, based on a mix of local actors’
assessments and the combined objective scores on the primary leaving exams,
in order to identify whether school-level governance made a difference in
otherwise matching contexts. Although it may be that the factors shown to
explain performance across such different districts and schools can also explain
performance more widely across the system, proving this would of course
require the application of our approach to a wider sample.
This chapter finds that Uganda’s dominant political settlement has features
of competitive clientelism, which means that there are only weak policy
coalitions to push for quality reforms within the education sector. The policy
of fee-free primary education in effect prevents schools from practising cost-
sharing with local communities, not least as it is tied to a populist promise
made by a President who has become increasingly vulnerable to competitive
pressures. In practice, this means that schools that manage to perform well
within this system tend to be those that successfully raise incomes due to their
position within local patronage networks, including through strong head-
teacher relations with local elites and politicians. The weakly dominant nature
of the ruling political coalition means that quality reforms remain off the
agenda, while only schools with strong local relationships can overcome the
financial constraints of fee-free UPE policies to raise learning outcomes.
The Problem of Education Quality in Uganda
The Ugandan government introduced UPE in 1997, resulting in a dramatic
increase in enrolment rates, from about 65 per cent in the early 1990s to over
90 per cent a few years later. Literacy rates rose to 56 per cent and 73 per cent
in 1991 and 2010, respectively, as more children were enrolled, but not as
much as predicted by the rise in enrolment (World Bank 2015). The Uganda
National Household Survey found that literacy rates actually declined, from
71 per cent in 2010 to 68 per cent in 2013 (UBOS 2014). A series of assessments
revealed that improvements in access had not been accompanied by an
improvement in the quality of education, despite increased budgetary alloca-
tions to the sector (Guloba, Magidu, and Wokadala 2010; Hubbard 2007;
Makaaru et al. 2015; UWEZO 2012). The pupil–teacher ratio increased after
the introduction of UPE, and has declined only slightly since.
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Furthermore, the proportion of children passing the primary leaving exams
is low. The government’s policy of automatic promotion, which allows chil-
dren to go on to the next grade without passing tests, is partly responsible for
the decline in standards. For example, UWEZO Uganda,1 an East African
Education NGOwhich carries out regular assessments on the status of primary
education in the country, estimates that only three out of ten children in
Primary 3 to Primary 7 were able to read and understand a Primary-2-level
story (UWEZO 2012, 13). It is clear from Table 8.1 that while Uganda, Kenya,
and Tanzania all struggle with quality education, learning outcomes are poorest
in Uganda. For example, numeracy and English pass rates in Uganda are at
38 per cent for ten to sixteen year olds, compared with 45 and 70 per cent in
Tanzania and Kenya, respectively.
The Political Settlement and the Education Policy Domain
In order to understand why the performance of the Uganda education sector
has this striking gap between access and outcomes, even when compared with
countries with similar budget constraint challenges and poverty levels, we
adopt a political settlement approach. This analysis helps us to understand
why the expansion of education is more politically attractive than policies to
improve its quality, and the factors that impede the uptake and implementa-
tion of learning reforms.
Table 8.1 Uganda education performance compared with Tanzania and Kenya
Uganda Tanzania Kenya
Gross enrolment rates, primary, male and female, 2009 (UNESCO) 130 90 105
Pass rates numeracy and English combined (ages 10–16), 2012
(UWEZO)
38 45 70
Primary completion rate, 2009 (UNESCO) 53 58 85
Percentage of grade 6 pupils reaching level 5 difficulty in reading,
2009 (UNESCO)
16 25 22
Percentage of grade 6 pupils reaching above level 4 (basic reading
ability), 2007 (UNESCO)
55 90 80
Sources: UWEZO, East Africa and UNESCO data at: http://epdc.org/sites/default/files/documents/eastafrica.pdf
(accessed 16 April 2018).
1 Uwezo means ‘capability’ in Kiswahili. UWEZO was originally a five-year initiative, which has
been consolidated into an organization that aims to improve competencies in literacy and
numeracy amongst children aged six to sixteen years old in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. It
does so by taking an innovative approach to using educational assessments for social change in
ways that are citizen-driven and accountable to the public (www.uwezo.net, accessed 23
February 2018).
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All Ugandan post-independent rulers have had to struggle with how to
construct a stable ruling coalition, given the many ethno-regional, religious,
and socio-economic cleavages in the country. The current National Resistance
Movement (NRM) government of President Museveni has largely achieved
and maintained this difficult balance since taking power in 1986, at least in
terms of preserving stability and promoting poverty reduction. Uganda’s
political settlement under the NRM can be characterized as dominant, in the
sense that President Museveni and his ruling party maintain a strong hold on
political power, and dominate the policymaking process. In power since
waging a bush war against the Obote regime in the aftermath of the 1980
elections, the NRM built on an alliance between south-western and central
Buganda factions, primarily from the previous kingdoms of Ankole and
Buganda (Goodfellow and Lindemann 2013).
President Museveni and the NRMwon elections under a no-party system in
1996 and 2001. In 2006, constitutional presidential term limits were lifted,
allowing the President to contest and win the elections under a multi-party
system in 2006, but with opposition candidates winning a higher share of the
vote than in the past. In the 2011 election, the NRMwon again, this time with
an increased electoral margin, explained in part by an increase of support in
the North, where peace had been restored after 2006. In the 2016 elections,
the President once again won, but with a lower margin (60 per cent for
Museveni; 35 per cent for the main opposition candidate, Besigye) (Kjær and
Therkildsen 2013; Golaz and Medard 2014; Kiggundu 2016). NRM support
remains stronger amongst the rural and poorer majority population than
amongst wealthier, educated, and urban voters (Kiiza 2014).
Winning elections by a big majority has been an important concern to the
regime, because a narrowmargin wouldmake the opposition a credible threat,
and could induce lower-level factions to leave the coalition to join the oppos-
ition. The 2011 and 2016 elections showed the opposition as weak and
disorganized compared with the ruling party, which is both better-organized
and better-resourced (Golaz and Medard 2014; Kiiza 2014). The ruling NRM
elite has taken several measures to weaken the opposition, including the
regular arrest and harassment of the main opposition candidate. Elections
have also strengthened lower-level groups of the ruling coalition, such as
local army units, local council chairpersons, and local NRM chairmen. The
role of lower-level political units is important in the mobilization of votes at
that level (Kjær and Therkildsen 2013), which, in the lead-up to the 2016
elections, could translate into the co-option of opposition supporters with
financial and other incentives.
Therefore, although the settlement is ‘dominant’, local factions have some
power, and the maintenance of the coalition means that policies that run
against powerful lower-level factions are unlikely to be implemented (Kjær
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2015). There is enough factional competition within and outside the coalition
to raise the cost of staying in power, a phenomenon Joel Barkan (2011) has
labelled ‘inflationary patronage’. Patronage is used to hold the coalition
together, and government programmes can be used to appease lower-level
interest groups. For example, the agricultural extension reform programme
was used not only to give advice to farmers, but also as a source of patronage
(Kjær 2015). Another important way in which these lower-level factions are
kept ‘in the fold’ is by being allowed to use their positions to derive advantages
and resources, so-called ‘decentralized rent-management’ (Khan 2010; Booth
2012). Decentralized rent management often takes place in settlements with
strong lower-level groups; these groups can then derive rents from their posi-
tions in lower-level governments, or in various line ministries, or the army. In
all, the ruling elite has been able to remain in power through a combination of
repression, co-optation strategies, including decentralized rent management,
and a broad appeal to the rural poor (Golooba-Mutebi andHickey 2013, 2016).
Prior to 1997, the school system in Uganda had not been reformed since the
near collapse of government functions in the 1970s and 1980s. Schools were
primarily run by parents through PTAs, and government had limited capacity
to provide direction (Muwanga 1999; Hubbard 2007; Makaaru et al. 2015).
Parental contributions went towards school maintenance, and included par-
tial support to teachers’ salaries. Although government tuition fees were low,
PTA dues meant that many poor parents were unable to enrol their children in
school. On taking power in 1986, the NRM promised to build a broad-based
system, built on inclusion and equality. Central to the rapid reforms, which
the NRM introduced in the public sector and the economy, was the need to
rebuild the education sector, to make it more accessible and equitable. The
Education Policy Review Commission, ‘Education for National Integration
and Development’ (Senteza-Kajubi 1989), and the government white paper
on education (Government of Uganda 1992) provided the basis for the intro-
duction of UPE in 1996. UPE fitted in well with the government’s egalitarian
and inclusive agenda. More importantly, however, it was a way of gaining
control over an important social service that people identified with progress
and social mobility. Providing free education meant reasserting centralized
control over education and thus curbing the perceived influence of PTAs,
largely controlled by more well-to-do parents, which had effectively appropri-
ated the delivery of education services.
In 1996, the NRM government pledged to provide UPE, abolishing school
fees and promising free education for four children in each family in 1997.
After 1997, there were significant increases in funding for implementing the
UPE programme, including with the support of new and important players in
the education system, such as aid donors, particularly the World Bank. The
number of schools and primary school teachers increased (Hubbard 2007;
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Kjær and Therkildsen 2013; Stasavage 2004), but budgetary allocations for
education expenditure have stagnated since 2002 (Hedger et al. 2010). The
implementation of UPE from 1997 onwards fitted into the NRM’s political
agenda, and with the poverty reduction strategies emphasized by develop-
ment partners and theMDGs in themaking. This ‘fit’ between the ruling NRM
elite, donors, and the rural poor formed a formidable policy coalition for
universal access to primary education—a coalition which has not to date
been evident in the support for quality improvement.
The political dividends of the UPE initiative were clear: any service improve-
ment, such as expanding access to education to those previously disadvantaged,
would be credited to the NRM government, thus increasing its popularity. The
introduction of UPE and the abolition of school fees also coincided with the
country’s first elections under the new constitution, and UPE became an
important government campaign pledge (Stasavage 2004; Kjær andTherkildsen
2013). Thus, the public funding that was pumped into the primary education
sector after 1996 was basically to improve access (such as payment of capitation
grants, building schools, or recruiting teachers), with little attention paid to the
quality of education (such as improving inspection and monitoring, curricular
activities, provision of materials, or training teachers). Although the country
was still operating under a no-party system, the President usedUPE as part of his
election pledge in the 1996 elections, making it part of his political agenda
(Muwanga 1999; Stasavage 2004). Implementing the UPE programme was
about making good on that election pledge that had struck a chord with voters.
The abolition of PTAs’ financial contributions in schools effectively signalled a
fundamental change in the power relations between the government, school
management, and parents; the NRM and President Museveni specifically could
take credit for broadening access and the inclusive delivery of education services
(Muwanga 1999). The focus on numbers, rather than quality, in education
continues to have political dividends, as we show in the next section, which
focuses on why reforms targeting education quality and learning have only
been implemented to a limited degree.
Education Policy Reforms Aimed at Improving Learning:
Implementation at National and Local Levels
The government has acknowledged that the quality of education is poor in
UPE schools. As early as 2003, an evaluation of the Teacher Development and
Management System (TDMS), set up in the mid-1990s to provide pre-service
and in-service training, revealed that the system and the 23 primary teacher
colleges were inadequately staffed and funded, which undermined their over-
all contribution to improving the quality of education (USAID 2003, 6).
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As the government’s financial allocations remained low, the education
sector largely relied on the support of development partners. The United
States Agency for International Development (USAID)-supported UNITY pro-
gramme, launched in 2006, focused on quality, with a large teacher-training
component that also sought to strengthen the TDMS (USAID 2008). Similarly,
the 2010 Quality Improvement in Primary Schools through Basic Require-
ments and Minimum Standards Implementation programme, supported by
UNICEF, sought to support the TDMS and the school inspectorate function.
Another initiative, supported byOxfam and the teachers’ union, is the Quality
Educators for All Programme, which focused on developing competence pro-
files for teachers in northern Uganda. These initiatives, however, have so far
not resulted in any significant improvements in the quality of primary edu-
cation or learning outcomes. Arguably since 2006, the political emphasis has
been on expanding the UPE programme into secondary education by univer-
salizing secondary education to absorb the large UPE intake, rather than on
improving the quality of primary education.
During the 2006 elections campaigns, the first multi-party elections under
the NRM government, Universal Secondary Education featured strongly in
President Museveni’s campaign (Werner 2011; Hedger et al. 2010.) However,
according to the teachers’ union, this has resulted in automatic class promo-
tion, which is largely responsible for students completing the seven-year cycle
without attaining the required literacy and numeracy competency levels
(UNATU 2013). In addition, since 2003, a larger proportion of donor funding
has gone to the Uganda Post Primary Education and Training Program, a
programme that also focused on secondary education and vocational training
(Hedger et al. 2010).
The political settlement framework draws attention to three features of the
policy domain that help explain why elite commitment to implementing
initiatives to enhance quality has been weak in Uganda. First, both formal
and informal governance arrangements allow for a system of decentralized
rent management that serves to appease lower-level factions. Second, the
policy legacy of UPE traps the NRM government in the rhetoric of free educa-
tion, in an appeal to rural constituencies; this impedes local fund-raising and
parental participation in school management, with adverse implications for
local accountability and school governance. Third, weak policy coalitions in
favour of learning at multiple levels translate into relatively weak pressure to
push through quality-enhancing reforms.
Decentralized Rent Management
The management and provision of basic education in Uganda is largely in the
hands of district administrations. At the district level, the chief administrative
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officer (CAO) is responsible for monitoring and ensuring full implementation
of all government programmes. The CAO is expected to contribute to the
development of education policies, setting up and supervising performance of
education departments, supervising the construction of schools, and mobil-
izing communities to send children to school. At the school level, the head-
teacher and the school management committee (SMC) are supposed to
support the UPE programme by mobilizing communities to send and keep
children in schools, and to monitor the work of teachers.
While the formal arrangements seem adequate, in reality, the monitoring
systems are weak, with several points of leakage. The public expenditure study
by Reinikka and Svensson (2004) showed that the publication of releases of
capitation grants for schools greatly decreased leakages, as did the transfer of
capitation grants into designated district accounts, although some of these
gains have been eroded over time (Hubbard 2007). In addition, the multipli-
cation of districts, itself a manifestation of efforts to decentralize rent manage-
ment, has served to undermine districts’ financial, monitoring, and inspection
capacities, opening up possibilities for abuses of the system (Green 2010).
Funds are allocated directly to schools from central government, and salaries
paid directly to teachers. However, it is estimated that there is considerable
leakage of resources at several levels. The leakage that occurs between central
government and schools is principally through the payment of ‘ghost
teachers’ and the misuse of UPE grants at the district level. Interviews with
headteachers’ association leaders indicated that local councillors and district
officials may, for instance, use their discretion to allocate teachers or grant
licences to set up private schools. Within schools, public spending on educa-
tion is ‘leaked’ or wasted through high rates of absenteeism by pupils, teachers,
and headteachers. Leakages and inefficiencies of this kind are predictable in a
political settlement characterized by decentralized rent management.
In addition to central transfers, a school facilitation grant at the district level
may be allocated if the district government has its own revenue sources.
According to the regulations, the district is responsible for allocating school
facilities grants. The technical team led by the CAO and the district planner
agrees on priority sites following analysis of schoolworkplans and reports from
monitoring and inspection visits (Makaaru et al. 2015). But in practical terms,
the capacity of local governments to carry out such functions has been weak-
ened by themultiplication of districts that are generally underfunded, and lack
the human resources to undertake the needed analyses for prioritization.
The increase in the number of districts2 has increased public administration
expenditures and presented a particular challenge for new local governments,
2 This trend is widely perceived to be driven by the need to gain and consolidate the NRM’s
electoral support (Green 2010).
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which typically lack staff, offices, and equipment to carry out basic functions
(Kjær and Katusiimeh 2012). As a result, the districts often lack the capacity to
carry out the required inspection and monitoring of schools. The district
councils’ technical planning committees and education sector committees
provide citizens and civil society organisations (CSOs) with an opportunity
to participate in education planning and budgeting at the local level. The
district education office appoints SMCs, which are also supposed to be repre-
sentative of different education stakeholders. The two local governments
researched for this study displayed a general lack of capacity, with school
monitoring and inspection functions particularly under-prioritized. In both
Mukono (the high-performing district) and Mayuge (a low-performing dis-
trict), the inspectorate was evidently underfunded, with insufficient staff,
and no means of transport to inspect the large number of schools under
their control.
One obstacle to stronger governance arrangements in this decentralized
rent management system is that the political centre has to date failed to
prioritize or mandate specific departments for quality reforms within the
MoE. While the Education Sector Investment Plan emphasizes the need to
improve the quality of education, it does not clearly spell out the aspects of
quality to be addressed, nor does it detail the measures needed, nor the source
of the funding to implement quality improvement programmes. According to
oneMinistry official, ‘What happens in terms of initiatives in quality is largely
accidental, and depends on whether there is a donor project’.3 The lack of a
clear and strong political priority around quality was highlighted by several
interviewees, who noted that the former Minister of education had been an
army officer and an NRM party loyalist, but nevertheless lacked the clout to
instigate and implement quality reforms, and was widely viewed as having
been uncooperative with key Ministry staff.4
Sector budget support has assisted the MoE to build its implementation
capacity. However, evaluation reports and interviews indicate that the minis-
try lacks a strong implementation agency capable of pushing through quality
reforms. Initiatives to improve monitoring and evaluation systems have the
potential to highlight the leakages and inefficiencies of decentralized rent
management, and thus to undermine the material basis for regime support
amongst political actors at lower levels of the system. In an evaluation of
sector support, Hedger et al. (2010, xi) observed that, although sectoral budget
support had succeeded in supporting the achievement of UPE targets, it had
3 Interview, MoE, January 2015.
4 Following the February 2016 elections, Rtd Col Jessica Alupo was replaced by Mrs Janet
Museveni as Minister of Education and Sports.
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been less successful in strengthening accountability for financial management
and service delivery at the district and local levels.
In sum, the political settlement has interacted with the policy domain to
ensure weak elite commitment to building capacity and authorizing quality
reforms in the MoE, in particular in the departments and functions associated
with improving learning outcomes.
The Policy Legacy of Fee-free Education
Substantial investments are required to improve the quality of education
through recruitment, training, monitoring, and assessing teaching and learn-
ing. One avenue for increased school funding—that of user fees and/or par-
ental contributions—is blocked, however, by the strong policy legacy of the
UPE drive, with its emphasis on fee-free education, which has been an import-
ant part of the government’s base political support and electoral advantage.
However, the lack of initiatives to address quality by central government
has meant that solutions have largely been left to the innovation of districts
and school administrators. In practice, many schools elicit contributions from
parents in order to attract teachers or provide other school services, such as
meals for students. District and school responses to the decline in quality of
education present an interesting departure from the UPE policy as it was
introduced and has been implemented for more than two decades. One
common view is that parents misunderstood their role under UPE, giving
rise to creative reinterpretation at the level of implementation. For example,
although government made it clear from the outset that SMCs were to assume
all functions previously carried out by parents in schools, many local school
administrators are reported to rely increasingly on parents to make financial
contributions to ensure that schools have sufficient resources to provide an
adequate education.
For the most part, the directive that parents should not be required to make
financial contributions in school is ignored, and local leaders activelymobilize
parents to contribute to supporting their local school. Furthermore, parents’
financial contributions can facilitate linkages with the local political leader-
ship to drive through the sorts of changes parents want in their schools. The
result is an unofficial cost-sharing policy that is not officially condoned, but
allowed to continue in practice. As one local political leader commented,
‘We’re encouraging the lower councils to come up with very good by-laws
and they’re coming upwith them. But at the same time, the [national] laws are
not looking into that.’5 These by-laws permit parents to contribute through
5 Interview, political leaders, Mayuge, May 2015.
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the provision of food, paying for teacher accommodation, the costs of extra
tutorials, or to supply boarding facilities.
While the NRM government tacitly condones such practices, during the last
elections it confirmed that it had no intention of reopening the issue of cost-
sharing. One education official reported that the MoE, together with the
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, had prepared a
white paper on quality education that included discussion of user fees, but this
never made it to cabinet out of fear that it would not have presidential
support. It is understood that the President has no intention of going back
on his pledge of fee-free education, which is seen as particularly important for
poorer parents, as that would signal the government’s inability to uphold its
promises. Support for the policy remains widespread, particularly in rural
areas. While it has become increasingly clear that UPE is not in practice free,
local leaders, such as party chairmen, who dominate the lower-level factions
of the ruling coalition, continue to promote public education as a free service.
This reflects the nature of a dominant ruling coalition that depends on
numerous local factions who are powerful because they can mobilize votes.
Weak Policy Coalitions to Push through Quality-focused Reforms
When the civil society group, Citizens’ Action on Quality Public Education,
took to the streets in 2012 to highlight the learning crisis in Ugandan schools,
it was out of a sense of frustration about the lack of effort to address the quality
of primary education. Its aim was to push MPs into taking a more active
interest in education quality. However, the Parliament’s education committee
has remained passive, apparently more interested in trips abroad to examine
schooling in other countries. An interviewee from the Parliament Watch civil
society group stated that ‘education has not preoccupied MPs a lot these past
few years’.6
The teachers’ union in Uganda, the Uganda National Teachers’ Union
(UNATU) has similarly tried to lead the push for quality education, but has
largely failed to push through any significant initiatives. According to inter-
viewees within the union and in school bodies, the union’s struggle for salary
increases was manipulated by the NRM government. On 10 July 2013, the
MoE issued a press statement threatening to sack teachers involved in the
quality education campaign and scheduled activities, and called upon the
security agencies to investigate the NGOs behind the campaign. UNATU
issued a counter press statement that the union was not part of the campaign,
and presented a petition to the deputy speaker of parliament that was tabled
6 Interview, NGO official, January 2015.
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in parliament with wide media coverage.7 The government responded with
intimidation, as well as promises to pay lump-sum salary increases into UNA-
TU’s savings and credit organization, rather than committing to general salary
increases. Some union members were alleged to have been co-opted by the
government, disrupting the union’s agenda and undermining its unity of
purpose.8 Overall, the lack of initiatives to raise the quality of primary educa-
tion reflects the weakness of the policy coalition to push for learning reforms.
Variation in School Performance
The generally poor performance of UPE schools masks interesting and signifi-
cant variations. The consensus amongst different district actors interviewed as
part of this research was that better learning outcomes required parents to
contribute to, and participate in, their children’s schooling, the introduction
of refresher courses for teachers, and strengthening of school inspectorates, in
addition to the introduction of patriotism training for teachers.9 In both the
districts studied, the local councils (LCs) were passing by-laws (or ordinances)
to allow schools to compel parents to contribute to schooling in different
ways. For example, in Mayuge, parents contributed substantial quantities of
maize, in addition to a financial contribution for processing it, a move
endorsed by the resident district commissioner (RDC), whose role is to oversee
the implementation of government policy.10 This suggests that the NRM
government silently supports these local policies to introduce an element of
cost-sharing, even if this is against official government policy.
An elected local council V (LCV)11 chairman explained how the council
campaigned and explained to parents why they should contribute: ‘Some of
us have interacted with the President informally, talking about this and rais-
ing these issues, but you know, sometimes for better or for worse, politics
comes on board.’12 The LCV chairman’s comments suggest that the President
is aware of the problem and the fact that these local policies are not publicly
renounced indicates that they are indirectly endorsed at the national level.
‘Politics’ here refers to electoral politics specifically, and to the President’s
concern topreserve the rural support base. Intervieweesnoted that theUgandan
government has described primary education as ‘free’ since the 1996 elections,
7 Forum for Education NGOs in Uganda News, 4 February 2013. https://fenuexample.
wordpress.com/2013/02/04/action-for-quality-public-education/ (accessed 16 April 2018).
8 Interviews, teachers and union members, January 2015.
9 Interviews conducted in January and May 2015 and June 2016.
10 Interview with RDC Mayuge, May 2015.
11 The local council V is the district level. Below, there are counties (LC4), sub-counties (LC3),
parishes (LC2) and villages (LV1).
12 Councillor, interviewed May 2015.
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and that this has been interpreted to mean that all aspects of schooling should
be free. All those interviewed were of the view that the government cannot
correct this view, for fear of losing popularity. Themessage that education is free
is then interpreted by local politicians, particularly at the LCIII (sub-county)
level, who are important political mobilizers during elections, to mean ‘every-
thing is free’—a message that is then conveyed to parents.
Parents in a focus group discussion (FGD) at a well-performing school
openly supported cost-sharing practices that were against official NRM
government policy. According to a disgruntled but highly engaged parent:
. . .we [parents/teachers] agree on something in the meeting, but because politi-
cians need the votes, they go to the parents and tell them the contrary to what
we agreed upon. They confuse the parents because they need votes in the next
election. . . .parents need to be helped to appreciate that children are not
Museveni’s—the children will fail, but Museveni will remain the President of
Uganda.13
The tacit condoning of parents’ contribution in practice created significant
variations in the performance of UPE schools, variations that reflect local
contextual factors.
In Mayuge district, we visited two government (UPE) schools, one well-
performing (School A) and one less well-performing (School B). In School A,
33 pupils had passed in the best category, Division 1, and none failed in 2014,
whereas School B had no pupils in Division 1, and 18 out of the 64 pupils
failed the primary leaving examination in 2014. Other visible differences
between the two schools included infrastructure development and innov-
ations: School A had many buildings, a matooke14 plantation, and a chicken
project, whereas School B had half-built buildings, and very few students.15
School A appeared well organized and managed. At the time of our visit,
UNATU had just announced a general strike over an unfulfilled government
promise to increase teachers’ salaries. The strike was not fully endorsed by all
teachers, as we found out during our visit to School A, where teaching was
going on. At the time of our visit, a couple of new parents had left a private
school to register their children in School A because they had heard about its
good performance. The school boasted several teachers’ houses, in addition to
large dry storage rooms where maize, beans, and other dry foods were kept.
13 FGD with parents in Mukono in 2015.
14 Matooke is the staple food and having a plantation makes the school self-sufficient.
15 Mayuge has a 50 per cent primary school dropout rate. In School B, however, the problem
relates to the mismatch between the interests of parents and the headteacher. As a result, many
parents who regard the school as academically inferior prefer to take their children elsewhere,
irrespective of the distance (interviews, district education official and district politician, June 2016).
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It was clear that School A had managed to ‘get the parents on board’.
Contrary to official government policy, they were taking a number of initia-
tives to raise parental contributions. Teachers at School A seemed engaged and
motivated, because their conditions were relatively good, due to parents’
contributions. Of course, contributions alone do not automatically convert
into improved quality in education, and there is a risk of corruption and
leakage of funds. However, at School A, there was transparency in the way
parents’ contributions were used. For example, the headteacher, the SMC, and
the teachers had together worked out a system whereby the collected pay-
ments for extra tutoring were allocated on a weekly basis to an appointed
teacher, who was responsible for administering the funds. This form of
accountability, we were told, ensures that funds are spent according to a set
plan agreed upon by the headteacher, teachers, SMC, and parents.
The teachers were also motivated by the fact that the school provided them
with breakfast and lunch, in addition to accommodation. There were weekly
checks to see if the teachers had carried out the necessary tests. But teachers
were adamant that their performance had nothing to do with regular control
by the director of studies or the headteacher. In response to our question of
whether there were penalties for teachers’ non-performance, one teacher
answered: ‘Teachers here know what to do. It’s just in our blood; we’re self-
driven.’16
At School A, the fact that the headmaster was answerable to the PTA and
SMC for school performance had, according to teachers, been amongst the
factors that made a significant difference to the quality of teaching and
learning in their school. Teachers were also held accountable for their per-
formance, including for being present in class with lesson plans that were
jointly prepared with the headteacher and some of the school directors.
Appraisal forms were used to give teachers feedback on their lesson plans
and performance. Teachers noted that the cooperation of both parents and
teachers in contributing to the purchase of books and paying towards teacher
allowances of between UGX 30,000 and UGX 60,000 to reward good teaching
had helped motivate teachers, leaving no room for indiscipline. The school’s
good performance had also created a good relationship between teachers
and parents.
The interview with the chairman of the SMC revealed what he saw as the
key to the school’s success, including their ability to mobilize parents to
contribute to the school. He noted that the interpretation of the UPE policy
as free education was the problem, because it implied that parents should
abdicate their responsibility for their children, including expecting the
16 FGD with teachers, May 2015.
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government to feed them. In his view, the government needed to acknow-
ledge that the policy was problematic and to reverse it, including by telling
parents that ‘they [parents] should feed them [their children in schools]’.
By contrast, in School B, there were no teachers present at the time of our
visit and it was our impression that their absence was not solely due to the
teachers’ strike. Only the headteacher was present, but we suspected she
only came because she had an appointment with us. Another teacher arrived
an hour later and did not seem clear on what she was supposed to do. The
school inspector’s report noted that the school was well-known for teacher
absenteeism. School infrastructure was poor, with only one school building
that was divided into three large classrooms, which were poorly maintained
and disorganized. The storage room used to store, amongst other things,
maize for pupils, was in the headteacher’s office; it smelt of mould and was
infested with rats. Parents had contributed bricks, with which the headteacher
had tried to build teachers’ houses, but the construction had not progressed
beyond the external walls. Parts of the foundation seemed to have been
eroded by rain, and grass was growing in the centre. Interviews with the
headteacher indicated that there was no clear or regular system for collecting
parents’ contributions and allocating these resources to various school needs.
One conclusion is that the difference between the schools reflects differ-
ences in the headteachers’ ability to mobilize local communities. However,
the better-performing school was also better situated in terms of links to the
local council and the DEO than the poorly performing school, which arguably
enables them to attract a better headteacher in the first place. The headteacher
of School A had been able to influence the DEO to post good teachers, for
instance. He had also used connections to make the council contribute to
constructing teachers’ quarters and boarding facilities. By contrast, in School
B, the headteacher had been trying to gain access to the local council through
letters about school needs, but these had gone unanswered.
The political connections of School A were not just limited to the head-
teacher. The treasurer at the school was a member of the SMC and the
foundation body, and was also a member of other local committees.17 Local
government officials confirmed that the school had managed to establish
close ties with the district, which had ensured that the headteacher was not
transferred, inspection was regular, and support for different initiatives was
forthcoming.18
The findings on cost-sharing and school management in Mayuge were
similar to those in the better-performing school in Mukono district, School C.
School C is a Church of Uganda-founded mixed boarding school, enrolling
17 Interviews, headteacher and the school treasurer, May 2015. 18 Interview, June 2016.
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860 pupils at the time of our visit. According to teachers, students were
learning well; the school was regularly inspected, and the headteacher actively
and closely monitored their performance, including through assessments
three times a term and through weekly meetings. The teachers were happy
with the school’s progress and overall performance compared with other
schools, both public and private.
During the FGDs with teachers in School C in Mukono, all the teachers
attributed their performance to a combined effort by parents, teachers, the
district, and the community. According to one teacher, ‘you find that when
you do something good, different people come in to assist. So by our children
performing very well, it [the school] has attracted the parents.’19
The importance of political connections was also evident inMukono, where
the well-performing school was considerably better connected politically than
the low-performing School D. School C had several members of Mukono local
council on its SMC.20 As the chair of the SMC in the well-performing school in
Mukono noted:
We have got some politicians on board, we brought them also on this committee
of ours. We have Mrs Ssozi, the LCV women district councillor, we also have the
LCIII, he’s also on board with us.
Q: You mean on the SMC?
A: Yes. Then the chairman of this area is also with us. So when we talk, it is a
combined voice.21
As in Mayuge, the better-performing School C also appeared to have good
relations with the foundation body, that is, the Church. Hence a group of
closely connected persons, such as the LCV, LC III, the Church members, the
headteacher, and SMC members made sure that the school’s efforts were
supported by the local government; the school also housed the local Catholic
diocese.
Mirroring the experience with the poorly performing School B in Mayuge,
Mukono’s School D was poor in terms of its primary leaving examination
results, teachers’ own assessments, and in relation to basic infrastructure, and
teaching and learning materials. Teachers lacked basic teaching materials, and
had inadequate accommodation; notably the headteacher of School D did not
use the house provided for him, preferring to commute daily from his home 15
kilometres away. Teachers lacked the necessary qualifications and motivation.
The previous headteacher (the incumbent had only been in post a year or two)
had frequently been absent and hadmade no effort to engagewith teachers and
parents. While the new headteacher had some personal contacts in the DEO,
she used these contacts to help cover up her absenteeism, rather than to
19 FGDMukono, May 2015. 20 Interviews, Mukono, 2015. 21 Interview, June 2015.
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pressurize the local council for resources or to enlist their help in mobilizing
parents and resources for the school.22 Interaction with parents was limited
and of poor quality. The overall poor performance of School D was attributed
by many interview respondents to the headteacher’s inability to garner the
support of different stakeholders. Her regular absence had alienated parents
and district officials, who had decided to engage a dynamic deputy to sensitize
parents to—and build consensus around—school and community roles and
responsibilities. So, while headteacher leadership qualities matter for school
quality, recruitment to the better-performing schools was also linked to the
SMC’s connections with the local council and the foundation body.
In both districts, the weaker schools were not well positioned in the local
elite networks and had little success in improving their schools. This suggests
that, in the absence of strong learning reform initiatives from the centre, a
strong SMC and a strong foundation body with close connections to the local
council is instrumental in recruiting a competent and visionary headteacher
capable of mobilizing parents to contribute and support school governance.
The emergence of such a local coalition around the school appeared not only
to be the result of the personal characteristics of the headteacher, but also an
outcome of a combination of factors, amongst which the place in the local
political economy networks was important. Interviews and consultations at
the national and district levels, andwithin schools, revealed the importance of
political consensus around education and cost-sharing. In the instances where
this political consensus was arrived at and worked to improve the quality of
education—through ordinances, themobilization of parents, and local leaders
(religious and community)—there is evidence that performance in schools
can improve to an extent, even without strong political or policy support for
learning reforms from within Uganda’s weakly dominant political settlement.
Conclusion
We have shown that in Uganda’s political settlement, which is dominant but
with many features of competitive clientelism, there are weak political incen-
tives to undertake reforms to enhance quality learning. A system of decentral-
ized rent management renders quality improvements arbitrary; the success of
such initiatives depends on the presence of aid donor-driven projects or, at the
local level, on the presence of resourceful and politically well-connected
schools and individuals. At the local level, the school administrations in the
high-performing schools were able to draw upon resourceful networks in
22 Interviews, June 2015, June 2016.
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order to mobilize local council funds, as well as funds raised from parents’
contributions, in order to improve on different aspects of schools that
together extended to improved school performance as a measure of quality.
The political leadership continues to believe that UPE, and specifically the
idea of ‘free’ education, is an important part of the electoral appeal of the
NRM for rural voters. While it has become increasingly clear that UPE is not
in practice fully free, local leaders—including sub-county chairmen, who
are predominantly NRM members and are important in terms of political
mobilization—continue to frame it as such. The government is aware that
cost-sharing by parents in schools is already practised, and that schools
that perform well rely on the support and input of parents, as well as their
political connections with local council governments. However, these
facts are not publicly acknowledged; as the lead-up to the February 2016
elections demonstrated, the NRM continues to campaign on access to ‘free’
education under UPE. Finally, the pressure to push through education
quality-enhancing reforms, whether from civil society, powerful interest
groups, or parliament, is too weak to overpower the incentives within Uganda’s
political settlement that currently distract ruling elites from addressing the
learning crisis head-on.
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9
Identifying the Political Drivers
of Quality Education
A Comparative Analysis
Sam Hickey, Naomi Hossain, and David Jackman
Introduction
This volume provides yet more evidence of the serious nature of the learning
crisis in developing countries. The country case studies presented here offer
accounts of systems that are failing at scale, where teachers lack the training to
teach, let alone themotivation to show up; students spend demoralizing years
in poorly equipped and overcrowded classrooms with little learning to show
for it; and where parents’ faith in the promise of education is shattered by the
poor quality of the services on offer. Behind this crisis on the frontline of
education service delivery, each country chapter documents a crisis of policy-
making and implementation. Few country governments are taking on the
challenge of even trying to raise educational standards with any conviction;
and education bureaucracies are ill-equipped or weakly incentivized to deliver
even those learning reforms that get through the policy process.
Yet the analysis here also shows that this crisis is neither inevitable nor
permanent, even in countries where universal primary education (UPE) is a
comparative novelty. Much more is now known about how learning out-
comes can be improved in developing countries, going beyond the necessary
investments in classrooms, textbooks, and teachers. Examined closely, it is
clear that a ‘misalignment’ between learning goals, policies, and practices
feature across education systems that are failing to enable children to learn,
even by their own standards (World Bank 2017). The amount of time that
well-trained teachers spend on task, the quality of school leadership, and the
strength and legitimacy of accountabilitymechanisms in ensuring higher levels
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/2/2019, SPi
of performance at multiple levels of the education domain have emerged as
particularly critical (UNESCO 2014; Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011).
There is also a growing consensus that politics largely determines whether
or not reforms aimed at improving learning outcomes are adopted and imple-
mented (Kingdon et al. 2014; Bruns and Schneider 2016). Yet there has to date
been little knowledge of the political conditions under which ruling elites
become committed to, and capable of delivering on, such reforms, and none
of the analytical tools that would help us understand this. Assumptions that a
mixture of electoral competition, decentralization, and stronger downward
accountability would do the trick, in part by countering the oft-cited malign
influence of teacher unions in blocking reforms that might damage their
interests, have rarely been grounded in comparative evidence of how the
politics of education reforms has played out in practice.
This book set out to examine the politics of the learning crisis within the
global South, in societies where learning outcomes have stagnated or wors-
ened, despite remarkable achievements in widening access since the 1990s.
The introductory and theoretical chapters at the start of this volume argued
that, although politics is increasingly recognized as an important explanation
of how education systems perform, there has to date been no robust frame-
work within which to examine the critical features of the politics of education.
Inspired by the small number of comparative political analyses of education in
developing countries (in particular, Grindle 2004; Kosack 2012), we became
convinced that any such framework would need to capture the multiple
incentives and ideas that shape elite behaviour. Crucially, this was a task
that entailed moving beyond a focus on formal institutions, to capture the
significance of informal power relations and practices; the ways in which
material aspects of a country’s political economy shape the capacity of differ-
ent groups to make demands; the particular forms of political agency (e.g.
leadership, coalitions) required to navigate these structural conditions at
multiple levels; and the role of governance arrangements and relationships
within the state, as well as between the state and citizens.
We responded to this need for an analytical framework through which to
investigate the politics of education, by developing what we term a ‘domains
of power approach’. This was then applied to understanding the conditions
under which elites commit to education reforms, and how these reforms
unfold in practice (see Chapter 2). This approach posits that elite commitment
to education is influenced by the interaction of two domains of power. The
first is the political settlement, which we conceptualize in terms of the balance
of power between contending social groups and how this interacts with
institutions. The second is the dynamics of the education policy domain,
which is partly embedded within and defined by the political settlement,
but which also has distinctive sectoral characteristics, such as the specific
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governance arrangements associated with education service delivery, and
the legacies of past policies, in particular those from earlier periods of rapid
expansion of schooling provision. We deployed this ‘domains of power’
approach through a comparative case study analysis of elite commitment to
promoting improved learning outcomes in six countries, each of which was
chosen to represent particular types of political settlement. Our country
research teams carefully traced the interaction between these two domains
of power from top to bottom, examining elite commitment to enacting and
implementing reforms through multiple levels of governance, from the
national level down to comparisons of high- and low-performing districts
and schools. The insights generated by this approach have, we believe, helped
to deepen our collective understanding of how politics shapes the learning
crisis in developing countries. In particular, our case study chapters have
demonstrated the following.
Elite Commitment to Education Reform is Shaped by the Political Settlement
Political settlements have a direct bearing on education policy and practice,
shaping the extent to which elites commit to adopting and implementing
reforms aimed at improving learning outcomes, and the nature that this
influence takes. This analysis has helped to problematize a current tendency
to assume that getting the formal political processes (electoral competition,
decentralization, ‘bottom-up’ mechanisms of accountability) right will be
enough to improve the quality of education in developing countries. We
accept that there are strong arguments for such institutional reforms. How-
ever, our analysis suggests that deeper forms of politics and power relations
tend to (mis)shape these institutional forms and undermine their potential
gains for social service delivery in general, and education in particular.
Informal Power and Politics are Critical
There are two reasons why less visible and formal forms of power and politics
are so important in explaining the persistence of the learning crisis. First, the
interaction between formal institutions of political competition and pre-
existing informal and often clientelistic forms of politics can—and frequently
does—generate incentives that undermine, rather than support, elite commit-
ment to development. Such tendencies are particularly apparent in the
domain of education, which offers the rents and legitimacy required to help
keep ruling coalitions in power, and which makes the domain of education
particularly prone to being politicized. Second, this interaction between pol-
itics and institutions is closely shaped by the balance of power between
contending social groups (di John and Putzel 2009).
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Diverse Actors Play Important Roles
For the most part, the coalitions of actors in favour of improved learning
outcomes (including business and middle-class parents) are less powerful
than those in favour of maintaining a focus on reforms that widen access,
but do little to address quality (including populist leaders and teachers’
unions). Our analysis also questions the extent to which teacher unions
should be the central focus of the political economy analysis of education in
developing countries (cf. Moe andWiborg 2017), in part because the evidence
that unions are a powerful obstacle to promoting learning seems to rest on a
specific handful of country cases. Instead, we find in our country cases that
teacher unions play positive as well as negative roles in advancing learning
reforms, and that focusing exclusively on unions risks overlooking the highly
significant roles played by other key players, particularly politicians, bureau-
crats, and other politically salient stakeholders, such as aid donors and
teachers associations, in shaping education reforms.
Levels of Political Competition Influence the Incentives
and Constraints to Reform
While political settlements play a significant role in shaping the level of elite
commitment to delivering higher-quality education, our aims have also been
to explore how different types of political settlement influence this in specific
ways. How power is distributed and maintained creates varying elite incen-
tives, opportunities, and constraints to reform, depending on whether and
how the education domain helps maintain political order and secure the
survival and legitimacy of ruling elites. We distinguished here between polit-
ical settlements characterized bymore or less political dominance or intra-elite
competition in terms of political power, and between those with institutions
organized along more or less personal or impersonal logics. Comparative
analysis of our cases, each of which represented different types of political
settlement, suggests that consistent dynamics can be discernedwhich indicate
that settlement types relate systematically to the capacity and commitment of
elites to improve educational outcomes.1
1 Note that we did not set out to explain different levels of learning outcome in our cases, but
rather to understand the extent of elite commitment to adopting reforms focused on raising
learning outcomes. Any generalizations we make from our comparative analysis here are to the
heuristic types of political settlement that our cases represent, rather than to developing countries
as a whole. Even here we acknowledge that any such generalizations are necessarily tentative, given
the relatively small number of cases we have looked at here, and the likelihood that there will be
variation within each political settlement type.
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Political Competition and Dominance Influence
Reforms in Complex Ways
These dynamics are multiple and complex: while political dominance is
associated with the effective delivery of educational access, and may enable
ruling elites to overcome resistance from powerful interest groups to drive
through reforms aimed at improved outcomes, the top-down accountabil-
ity mechanisms associated with dominant settlements struggle with more
‘transactional’ tasks of improving frontline educational quality (Pritchett
2013). Meanwhile, higher levels of competition can lead to short-termism
and a tendency to appease vested interests. Only where high levels of
bureaucratic capacity already existed did we find that high levels of political
competition helped to also motivate quality reforms (i.e. in South Africa’s
Western Cape), and even here the hierarchical governance structure
limited the advances made in delivering on this transactional policy
agenda. Further down the delivery chain, the absence of national-level
dominance can, when combined with decentralized governance arrange-
ments, enable more space for problem-solving innovations at lower levels.
However, the emergence of developmental coalitions capable of devising
such institutional fixes can be more difficult in local contexts, where
intense levels of competition amongst political elites lead them to politicize
local governance arrangements. This further underlines the importance of
undertaking a close analysis of the interactions between overlapping
domains of power and formal governance arrangements in the education
sector at multiple levels.
We Need to Acknowledge Idiosyncratic Factors
While settlement types thus tend towards particular dynamics in the educa-
tion domain, education quality reform and educational provision are also an
outcome of highly contextual and idiosyncratic factors that shape the domain
of education in different countries. These include policy legacies, the local
political economy, and the sociology of citizen–state relations. The main
drivers of education reform thus derive from a combination of variables and
actors from both the political settlement and the policy domain of education.
The following sections in this chapter integrate analysis across these two
domains to synthesize and further develop the key findings emerging from
the empirical country cases. The next section examines the significance of
political competition or dominance in enabling reform. This is followed by an
exploration of how micro and sub-national variations influence education
performance. The chapter concludes with an outline of the intellectual and
strategic agenda emerging from our analysis.
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Elite Cohesion, Drivers and Limits to Education Reform
Weak Coalitions for Quality Reform
Political elites across settlement types exhibit a high level of commitment to
mass basic education, which they appear to see as vital to the achievement of a
modern, productive, and governable population. The fact that there are high
levels of investment in education, and an accompanying tendency to reform
initiatives, suggests that across political settlement types a commitment to
mass education is important to the legitimacy of successive ruling coalitions.
Following Schmidt (2008), we would characterize this commitment as a ‘para-
digmatic’ idea: it is not just a general norm, but an organizing principle that
has been binding across political (and other) elites in these countries since
before independence.2 In key respects, elite ideas about education in these
case studies are consistent with Corrales’ (2006, 244) view that the ‘idea that
education is a public good, in the national interest of every state, is one of the
most significant paradigmatic shifts of the twentieth century’.
However, across all of our cases, the strength of the political and social
coalitions in support of expanding schooling provision is more powerful
than that of the coalitions in support of reforms to improve learning out-
comes. Coalitions for educational access involve powerful alliances between
populist leaders and their rural constituencies, teachers’ unions, and (histor-
ically, at least) international development agencies, whereas the actors that
could potentially form coalitions for learning—including business groups (to
the extent that business depends on a steady supply of labour with at least
basic educational attainments), teachers associations and middle-class par-
ents, have so far failed to coalesce. Donors have relatively recently turned
their attention to the quality agenda, but have so far failed to identify and
form alliances with influential domestic actors.
In these contexts, political entrepreneurs have yet to offset the collective
action problems faced by groups with an interest in raising the standards of
public education, in contrast to the coalitions that emerged in favour of
increased access in many developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s
(cf. Kosack 2012). The civil society-led groups that have tried to do so have
2 Literature on the post-colonial politics of education in developing countries highlights the
significance of the experience of colonial andWestern education for nationalist political elites and
ideas about education reform as part of the nationalist development project; see in particular
comparative analyses of Kenya’s Harambee education movement and Tanzania’s Education for
Self-reliance initiative (see, for instance, Cooksey et al. 1994; Buchmann 1999; Court 1976; Buchert
1994). See also Fuller and Rubinson (1992) on the motives and roles of political elites in expanding
mass basic education; Hossain and Moore (2002) on why contemporary developing country elites
favour mass education over public health; Tikly (2001) on education and post-colonial state-
building; and Benavot and Resnik (2006) on how international organizations such as UNESCO
established ideas about the education-economic ‘black box’ amongst post-colonial leaderships.
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largely failed to push issues of quality onto the political agenda, in part
through being either too co-opted (Uganda) or too excluded (Bangladesh)
from the ruling coalition. Business plays a critical role in each of our ruling
coalitions, but none of our countries seem to have reached a stage where
capitalists actively demand more skilled labour (as white capital eventually
did in South Africa), although there are early signs that this may be emerging
in Cambodia and Bangladesh, and some vocational agendas are emerging in
Rwanda which respond directly to the demands of the economy. As a result,
the policy coalitions that Grindle (2004) describes as central to driving
through reforms against similar obstacles in Latin America are not present in
our parts of Africa and South Asia.3 This suggests that new class configurations
may be a necessary precursor to demands for higher-quality governance in the
sector to emerge. Aside from the absence of structural transformation,4 a
significant obstacle here is that the educated middle-class groups most likely
to press for higher-quality provision and help ensure this (via school manage-
ment committees [SMCs], parent–teacher associations [PTAs]) are exiting the
public sector for private schools.
Reforms addressing the quality of education provision are thus difficult to
get on the agenda, and are often fragmented and poorly implemented, failing
to confront the entrenched interests and constituencies empowered by previ-
ous reforms aimed at widening access. While elite commitment to improving
education access is therefore strong, commitment to educational quality is
weak, and this can be at least partly explained by the opportunities and
constraints that different political settlement types bring to bear on political
elites and the education domain.
Rents and Competitive Pressures
A critical factor determining the relationship between the political settlement
and the education domain is the degree of elite cohesion, or the degree
of political dominance or competition within the political settlement. The
3 Of our six cases, Cambodia, Ghana, and South Africa depend substantially on exports, while
Bangladesh depends substantially on labour-intensive exports for its foreign currency earnings.
In the two Asian countries, in particular, there are objective reasons for educational quality
investments to matter, even if those are not as yet manifest in education policy debates. Actual
demand for skilled labour may help to explain why quality has at least gained a position on the
education policy debates in these countries, even if this has yet to be articulated as a political
‘demand’.
4 Structural transformation tends to lead not only to new class configurations and different
demands from capital, but also to the increased levels of domestic revenue required to invest in
education from tax receipts. For example, it may be that Kenya is doing better than Uganda and
Tanzania on literacy/completion rates, in part because it has a larger ‘middle-class’ and also more
domestic revenue to invest.
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education domain is likely to be an important source of rents, votes, and
legitimacy for any ruling coalition in a developing country. Exerting control
over it can be a means by which ruling coalitions seek to exercise or consoli-
date power. As a result, the dynamics seen in the domain, including its
organization, modes of delivery, and the potential for collaboration and
coalitions, can all be closely linked to how a particular political settlement is
maintained. The extent and way in which any given policy domain has this
political salience relates to the structure and nature of the ruling coalition, as
well as the ideological commitment of ruling elites to education. Our cases
indicate that the education domain is particularly prone to being politicized in
competitive clientelist settlements, and in those where ruling elites are only
weakly dominant, and which have a greater need to appease lower-level
factions or maintain a popular support base. This aligns with Levy’s (2014)
argument that competitive clientelist political settlements display a stronger
tendency for the public bureaucracy to be subjugated to the imperatives of
ruling coalitions, whichmay use key policy sectors to distribute rents, often in
partisan ways, and to maintain popular legitimacy.
This dynamic can be seen in diverse ways across our cases. In more com-
petitive political settlements, such as Ghana and Bangladesh, there was evi-
dence of the partisan allocation of jobs and other rents at different levels of the
education system. Access to free education was seen as important to main-
taining the rural electoral base, and to some extent the bloc support of
teachers’ unions. But even dominant settlements with elements of competi-
tion featured politicized and clientelistic practices, such as the appointment of
education sector personnel in Cambodia on the basis of personal connections
rather than professional competence, and of official positions being used as a
springboard for income-generating projects in the private sector. In Uganda,
the persistence of an officially ‘fee-free’ policy reflected ruling party fears that
the introduction of cost-sharing would undermine rural political support,
even though cost-sharing is believed to be necessary to raise the very low
educational standards there. A system of decentralized rent management was
also implicated in failures to install stronger accountability mechanisms
within the system: lower-level political factions tend to benefit from weak
governance on the education frontline, giving the national leadership little
incentive to change matters.
Competitive clientelism tends to incentivize reforms that offer tangible
benefits, while undermining efforts to implement the politically difficult
reforms associated with improved learning outcomes. Unlike the expansion
of school systems, efforts to raise quality are difficult to ‘see’ politically. In
more competitive political contexts, improving quality lacks the political
salience of the tangible goods of widening access or building schools. The
universalistic nature of the education sector also appears to lend itself to a
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particular form of populist policymaking in clientelistic political settlements,
where executive fiat overrides or ignores bureaucratic policy processes, leading
to short-termism and policy incoherence. As a result, high levels of political
pressure and influence over bureaucracies mean that administrative authority
is weak: attempts to impose top-down reforms within such settlements can
face opposition throughout the educational hierarchy, perhaps most critically
amongst the political elite. This dynamic can be reproduced at the local level
(as seen in the case of the poorer performing district within our Ghana study)
in ways that can fracture local-level interests and prevent collaborative part-
nerships from emerging.
At the national level, however, we also find some evidence that under
certain circumstances increased competitive pressures can persuade ruling
elites to adopt reforms aimed at improving quality. In Cambodia, the close-
run 2013 election and the strength of the opposition party, the Cambodian
National Rescue Party, indicated weak electoral support amongst the youth,
which seems to have bolstered the commitment of the government to educa-
tion reforms. This was reflected in the appointment of a Technocratic Minister
to drive quality reforms through. Electoral concerns can thus result in higher
or lower levels of commitment to learning reforms, depending on the political
salience of relevant constituencies. While in Cambodia, political competition
appears to have spurred some commitment to improving education quality in
part because of the political salience of urban youth, in Uganda, one of the
least urbanized countries in Africa, the President relies heavily on support
from the rural majority. There the political calculus has been that more
citizens are interested in a free school place than in the quality of learning.
Rather than appoint a Technocratic Minister to the post of EducationMinister
after the last election in 2016, the President deepened his personalized
approach to both the education domain and state institutions more generally
by appointing his wife as Minister, an experienced political campaigner but
with no sectoral experience or track record of delivery.
Political Dominance: Constraints and Opportunities
Our analyses of more dominant party political settlements reveal a complex
relationship between political dominance and a commitment to education
reform. Elite-level political dominance, as seen most clearly in Rwanda, can
reduce the tendency for systems of decentralized rent management to
impinge on the functioning of the bureaucracy, and enable effective and
efficient implementation of certain policies, notably those around improving
access. However, there are also signs that the top-down hierarchical system
of accountability that political dominance enables is a blunt tool with which
to undertake the more transactional task of securing accountability and
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/2/2019, SPi
Politics and Education in Developing Countries
180
performance on the frontline of education.5 In Rwanda, this reflects how the
education sector has come to form a key part of the government’s performance
legitimacy, relying onmeasurable indicators that do little to raise the quality of
services, andmay in practice drain the capacity of education sector actors. This
suggests that a functioning hierarchical, impersonal bureaucracy may work
very well in terms of establishing rational, technocratically sound, and even
politically viable policy, as well as in implementing that on the ground. But,
when it comes to quality, ‘educationmay be the kind of craft-based activity for
which hierarchy is not the appropriate response’ (Levy and Kelsall 2016, 12;
also Pritchett 2013), and which relies on ‘horizontal’ governance, and local-
ized mechanisms of accountability and authority to deliver high quality out-
comes (Levy and Kelsall 2016, 12; also Pritchett 2013).
Political dominance can have a questionable impact on education systems
and delivery if the policies imposed are themselves misaligned with the chan-
ging needs of the society in relation to the domain of education. The sudden
decision to switch the language of instruction from French to English in
Rwanda, for example, has resulted in incoherent forms of educational delivery,
as the decision behind the switch was disconnected from the abilities of
frontline staff. These challenges can become exacerbated when education
has an ideological significance, as it clearly does in President Kagame’s vision
of ‘high modernism’. As with competitive clientelist settings, education pol-
icymaking can therefore be subject to short-term political pressures, such as
when President Kagame scheduled policy reforms expanding access to educa-
tion in line with the electoral calendar, overriding bureaucratic policymaking
processes in much the same way as in Ghana. Moreover, it is harder to chal-
lenge bad policies in dominant political settlements, where political space is
limited, and where critique of the leadership can be risky. The same is arguably
true of PresidentMuseveni’s commitment to offering ‘free’UPE inUganda, at a
timewhen theNational ResistanceMovement (NRM) had a dominant hold on
political power. This policy brought significant benefits in terms of wider
access. However, the policy was introduced in a highly personalized way (as a
gift from the President, rather than as a right) and was designed to displace
local accountability structures, which had been based in part on co-financing
arrangements with local communities, with a more direct line of control
from the headteacher through to the ruling party.6 The political logic of
5 A similar problem is apparent in South Africa, where the strong belief in hierarchical modes of
governance is undermining efforts to promote learning, even in relatively high-capacity and well-
governed regions such as the Western Cape (see Levy, Hirsch, andWoolard 2015; Levy et al. 2018).
6 The fact that Universal Primary Education in Uganda (as elsewhere) was funded by external
sources rather than through a tax bargain with citizens, has likely further undermined the potential
for virtuous circles to be established between the politics of education and democratization in
contexts such as Uganda.
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these reforms, as tied directly to the personal promise of a particular leader and
premised on the return of political loyalty, undermined active local involve-
ment in school governance, and has made it politically difficult to discuss
alternative financing arrangements that might improve school performance
at both national and local levels.
It remains feasible that, once a dominant leader turns their attention to the
question of learning and quality, as now appears to be occurring in Rwanda
and Cambodia, this level of coherence and capacity to exert top-down forms
of discipline will enable swifter progress than inmore competitive clientelistic
countries. This contention is buttressed by the evidence that the statistical
outperformers in education league tables have tended to be led by countries
(including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam) which would all have
been described as ‘dominant’ during the period of their most significant
advances on this front (see Chapter 10).
Furthermore, our cases also indicate that political dominance, rather than
competition, can better enable productive coalitions to emerge at the school
and sub-district level. In the Ghana case, intense political competition under-
mined relationships between politicians and key members of the bureaucracy
and resulted in an incoherent and fragmented response to the problem of
teacher absenteeism. By contrast, in the district characterized by political
dominance and low levels of inter and intra-party competition, ‘development
coalitions’ emerged. These incorporated actors at different levels of the bur-
eaucracy and ruling party, enabling creative and consistent responses to the
problem of teacher absenteeism, and thereby ensuring appropriate levels of
teaching. The only direct example we found of intense electoral competition
playing a positive role was within certain parts of South Africa, a finding best
understood in relation to historical legacies of state building. This is in line
with the wider finding that electoral competition can tend to exacerbate the
politics of patronage, unless a longer-term process of state building has already
taken place (Fukuyama 2016; Grindle 2012).
Institutional and Policy Legacies
The influence of political settlements on the education domain is also medi-
ated by the institutional and ideational legacies within society. The signifi-
cance of political competition or political dominance for elite commitment to
education reform, and how these reforms unfold in practice, is partly influ-
enced by institutional arrangements such as bureaucratic capacity, pre-
existing in any given context at both the national and sub-national levels.
Similarly, policy legacies stemming from previous iterations of the political
settlement also influence the nature of pressures for reform that develop, and
how reforms are implemented.
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Comparative analysis of the performance of school systems in the Western
and Eastern Cape provinces of South Africa underscores the significance of
sectoral or domain governance in explaining learning outcomes (Chapter 6,
also Levy et al. 2018). Both provincial school systems are regulated by the
same national policy framework and receive the same per capita resourcing,
but differ widely in learning outcomes: the Western Cape performs at the top
and the Eastern Cape near the bottom of the country’s educational assess-
ments. The difference can be substantially explained by the better perform-
ance of the relatively impersonal education bureaucracy in the West,
buttressed by a competitive multiparty system. This is in contrast to the
more personalized and politicized bureaucracy in the East, where an appar-
ently dominant party system has in practice been subject to fragmentation
and intra-elite competition (Levy et al. 2018). Notwithstanding the argument
that less hierarchical and more locally oriented forms of governance arrange-
ments may be required for the Western Cape to generate even higher levels of
learning, this suggests that performance in the domain of education is closely
shaped by the dynamic interactions between institutional arrangements and
the political settlement to shape performance.
Policy legacies also shape the room for manoeuvre for alternative policy
reforms and agendas, and are themselves outcomesof earlier political settlement
dynamics that have now become entwined in contemporary iterations. The
major reforms undertaken to promote increased access to primary education
were often directly linked to critical junctures within the political settlements
explored here, from the establishment of post-independence governments
through the resolution of conflicts to the deepening of competitive pressures in
the 1990s. One outcome of this is that these reforms also frequently strength-
ened the position of stakeholders, whose interestsmay be inimical to aspects of
quality reforms. For example, the expansion of education has meant more
teaching jobs and school building, helping to grow teacher unions, and creat-
ing interest around procurement contracts that have enabled rent-seeking
behaviour within school management processes.
The means of financing the costs of schooling and the implications this has
for performance in the education domain has been politicized in different
ways in the case countries: in Uganda, debate continues about user fees as a
means of raising quality by re-engaging parents in school performance, in a
context in which UPE also abolished PTAs. In Bangladesh, financing has been
politicized to ensure that poorer children get stipends to offset direct costs,
and constitutes a major part of public spending on education. While the state
officially pays for schooling in all these countries, parental involvement is
expected, informally or not; additional fees may be charged for extra tuition at
the school level to raise examination performance. Those willing and able to
pay for a better service may pay for additional private tuition or exit to the
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private sector. However, some private schools perform on average worse than
public schools, including secondary schools in Rwanda and Bangladesh.
The strong emphasis placed on abolishing user fees to achieve the import-
ant goal of enabling poorer families to send their children to school may also
have undermined the mechanisms that historically played a role in local
oversight, for example, through cost-sharing with local communities and
their representatives in school management processes (e.g. PTAs). Poor,
uneducated people struggle to hold educators and officials to account
(Kingdon et al. 2014; Dunne et al. 2007), not helped by the fact that most
developing country education systems are highly but ineffectually centralized
(Pritchett 2013). We find some evidence that improved levels of performance
are correlated with schools forming co-productive arrangements with parents
around cost-sharing, in ways that run counter to the dominant narrative of
education being ‘free’. The abolition of fees is the easy way for governments to
signal commitment to UPE, but out-of-pocket spending tends to be signifi-
cant, even without official school charges.
Policy legacies thus influence the terrain on which reform agendas emerge
and are implemented. Yet political settlements themselves also differ in the
political space they enable for alternative policy agendas and ideas to develop
within the education domain. Weak dominant Uganda and the competitive
clientelist cases seem to display similar levels of policy (in)coherence and
short-termism, but the dominance of a single political principal in Uganda
makes it even harder to challenge certain policies which are holding back
improvements in quality. The continued presence in power of the party that
brought in ‘free’ UPE, and the growing power of lower-level factions who
frequently exploit the popularity of ‘free UPE’ for their political gain, makes
it difficult for school-level actors to resolve resource-based constraints (e.g.
through co-financing agreements with parents). Local political entrepreneurs,
keen to make political capital from (false) promises of ‘free education’ and to
align themselves with the dominant leader, often prevent other stakeholders
from exploring creative solutions to pressing problems of school financing.
Better-performing schools have tended to ignore the presidential commit-
ment to ‘free’ education and have entered deals with parents whereby they
share costs in return for greater oversight by parents, in so doing, behaving
more like schools in the more competitive and de facto decentralized systems
of Bangladesh and Ghana. In key respects, this marks a reversion to how the
education domain functioned prior to Museveni’s populist move to install
‘free’ UPE (Dauda 2004). Political settlements thus shape the room for
manoeuvre in terms of alternative agendas and approaches. Our cases of
dominant or weak dominant settlements demonstrate how such settlements
can inhibit alternative voices, and opportunities for reform. Alternative policy
coalitions are unlikely to emerge in dominant Rwanda in ways that could
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significantly alter the course of educational policy. The political space to
discuss alternative policy agendas is more open in our competitive settings.
Understanding Micro Variations in Education
Across many of our cases, there is significant variation in school performance
between andwithin districts, demonstrating that the local context is critical to
educational outcomes. As explored above, these differences stem in part from
variations within societies between district- or regional-level political settle-
ments, indicating the need to give analytical and empirical attention to how
settlements differ regionally. These local political settlement domains can
closely shape how formal institutions of governance actually function, and
influence whether or not developmental coalitions are likely to emerge. The
final domain of power to which our research drew attention concerned the
micro-sociology of schools themselves.
Accountability and Local-level Partnerships
With respect to the functioning of accountability mechanisms at the front-
line, school-level analysis indicates that school governance matters, perhaps
even more than sub-national governance. The characteristics of the sector
mean that headteachers are better equipped to monitor teaching and learning
on a day-to-day basis than are district administrators. However, where schools
were effectively supervised, the critical actors were often those operating at the
interface of local government and school-level management structures, as
with circuit supervisors in Ghana. Monitoring and supervision activities are
always under-resourced, and their costing is notional, so that budgets are
easily cut or re-purposed. Although we found little evidence of synergies
between the long and short routes to accountability identified in earlier
work (World Bank 2003), informal downward accountability mechanisms
appear to work better under the competitive clientelism of Ghana and Ban-
gladesh, where better-performing schools tend to be those where communi-
ties take control in decentralized or weakly centralized settings. In Bangladesh,
the focus has been on ‘carrots not sticks’ for teachers, and policy reforms to
increase bottom-up accountability through school-based management have
been implemented in a weakened form. Ghana and Rwanda also illustrate the
problems that arise where lines of oversight, accountability, and incentives
are misaligned on the central/local axis. For instance, teacher training and
advancement are controlled centrally, while other aspects of oversight are
nominally ‘decentralized’. Yet while decentralization and accountability
reforms have been stymied from the centre in Ghana, they have created
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space for local-level reform at school level, involving SMCs and PTAs. There is
some evidence to suggest that top-down pressure combined well with bottom-
up accountability measures in Uganda (Hubbard 2007), but as the focus of the
executive is on quantity rather than quality, efforts to promote higher quality
remain off the agenda.
The detailed Western and Eastern Cape comparative analysis again offers
confirmation of the significance of school-level governance in learning out-
comes. Although the Western Cape outperforms the Eastern Cape by some
distance, when socio-economic status is taken into account, it is no longer
clear that the ‘good enough Weberianism’ of the education bureaucracy adds
much value. When compared with the performance of far poorer Kenyan
children in far less well-resourced Kenyan schools, the notion that education
in the Western Cape is delivering comparatively high quality becomes ques-
tionable. It is also clear that parental involvement, in terms of contributing to
school building and maintenance, is more important in the Eastern Cape,
suggesting a far higher degree of local participation. Tracing these processes
down to paired school-level comparisons, the analysis indicates that:
a well-functioning bureaucracy can support success; but that there are limits to the
ability even of well-functioning bureaucracies to shape what happens at the
school level . . . [and] even where bureaucracies work relatively well, the presence
or absence of engaged parents and communities can be key to sustained strong
performance. (Levy et al. 2018, 29)
In Chapter 6 of this volume, Levy et al. argue that horizontal governance
mechanisms at the level of schools can play different roles within different
sub-national political settlements, offering complementarity within contexts
of higher bureaucratic functioning, and playing a replacement role in more
dysfunctional contexts. In line with these reflections on the more sociological
dimensions of the challenge and prospects of improving school quality, our
analysis draws attention to aspects of the educational domain that shape
learning, but which are more clearly shaped by factors that are not directly
linked to the political settlement per se, particularly in terms of how social
relations and basic issues of capacity affect quality outcomes.
Citizen–State Relations: The Sociology of Schools
The status and social relations of teachers play a role in accountability and
motivation, and therefore performance, at the local level. Where teachers are
accorded a high social status within the communities they serve, poorer and,
in particular, less educated parents may struggle to hold them to account for
their performance (Westhorp et al. 2014). But relative declines in teacher
status may be demoralizing and also have adverse effects (Barrett 2005;
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Avalos and Assael 2006). One example to emerge from our cases is the expan-
sion and feminization of the teaching workforce in Bangladesh, promoted as a
means of improving girls’ access to education, but implemented chiefly
through lowering teacher qualifications. This has contributed to a notable
decline in the authority and position of teachers in the social system, but
also (therefore) to an equalization of (poor, rural) communities, vis-à-vis
school authorities. It also appears, however, to have changed official percep-
tions of accountability for performance within the teaching profession, in that
perceptions of women teachers’ social reproductive roles contribute to effective
lenience with respect to teachers’ attendance and classroom performance.
The pull exerted by the private sector on parents and teachers alike has a
powerful and probably negative effect on public sector performance, largely
through the exit of educated parents able to hold schools to account for their
performance. Although this to some extent reflects the nature of the political
settlement (in terms of the absence of capitalists pressing for higher skilled
workers, the relative holding power of ‘middle-class’ parents, as against the
rural majority within our ruling coalitions, and the neoliberal ideas of political
elites), there are wider factors at play here, including the logics of class repro-
duction and status, which create incentives for middle-class parents to remove
their children from public schools that educate poor children.
The sociology of education matters also in helping to explain the interplay
between demand and supply, in determining the conditions under which
parents can in practice exert accountability pressures on schools. Under the
tightly controlled conditions of education provision in the dominant party
settlements (notably Rwanda), there is considerably less room for local
manoeuvre, so that poorer parents systematically lack power at the local
level, despite policies intended to promote their participation in school-level
governance. In the effectively deconcentrated settings of the two competitive
clientelistic settlements (Ghana and Bangladesh), there is more scope for local
collective action, where the governance of teachers and other school resources
can be coordinated and co-produced.
Human Resource Capacity
The problem of quality in education is cyclical and self-reinforcing, because
the graduates of poor schools go on to become the teachers in poor schools.
This is why teacher training has been a priority in most of these countries.
But teacher-training facilities are typically also sites of capture, as in Ghana,
where training has become a perk because of the allowances it involves. In all
of the better-performing schools in each of the countries studied here, it
emerged that good teachers can emerge out of, and teach well, even within
poorly governed systems with weak policies on teaching and learning quality.
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The analysis here supports education sector research that finds that innate and
professional motivations are vital incentives in all contexts (Bruns and Luque
2014). Headteacher leadership is critical. In the weakly dominant and com-
petitive clientelist cases, strong headteacher leadership emerged in situations
where they were sufficiently embedded to be responsive to local community
needs, but not so embedded that they lacked autonomy to discipline teachers
and enforce rules. The significance of such local relationships and personal-
ities to school performance indicates the importance of creative and local
responses to the challenges of improving learning outcomes (Pritchett
2013). Economic stability through small businesses (agriculture and livestock)
can enable improved school conditions, and the discretionary power of head-
teachers (including informal pressures, such as shaming), are often context-
ually important ways in which staff are motivated and discipline ensured.
Strategic and Analytical Implications
This volume reinforces the growing recognition that political economy factors
critically shape the adoption and implementation of reforms aimed at improv-
ing learning outcomes. The domains of power framework employed here,
with the emphasis on the links between the political settlement and domain
of education, can be deployed in other studies, in part to explore how far these
results are representative of the politics of education within other similar types
of political settlement. We reflect on how our approach and empirical cases
can inform the education reform agenda.
Realigning the Reform Agenda within Political Settlements
The fact that it is difficult to identify elements of the education sector that are
somehow free from the tendencies generated by the political settlement takes
on particular significance regarding the next steps that policy actors may seek
to take to promote higher levels of learning in developing countries. This lack
of relative autonomy is a considerable constraint to achieving significant
reforms in the sector, and suggests that responses will need to be closely
attuned to what is politically feasible, rather than to what might be seen as
technically optimal. In particular, and in the absence of system-wide pressures
to institutionalize the quality agenda in developing countries, we are wary of
advocating system-wide reforms as the solution in contexts where the config-
uration of power that shapes the incentives of the system is not changing in
progressive directions. The dynamics of political settlements mean that the
broad and ambitious scope of educational reforms, which are sometimes
facilitated and encouraged by international donors and development agencies,
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can lead to policy incoherence, delivery failures and despondency. Such
reforms are often insufficiently considerate of how politics influence the edu-
cation domain, and can thus be distant from, and misaligned with,
the operational contexts for which they are intended.
Where the quality agenda is under-emphasized (e.g. in Rwanda and
Uganda) policy changes may be required, although even here the first step
may not be to promote off-the-shelf policies associated with improved learning
outcomes, but to identify the actors and ideas around which coalitions in
support of higher-quality education might emerge. But in most cases the
problem is not policy per se, but implementation. There is also a case for
governance reforms in cases where the current configuration of decentraliza-
tion creates a great deal of incoherence at regional, district, and school levels
(such as in Ghana). The need to redress the balance between centralized and
decentralized mechanisms for oversight and accountability generally accords
with Pritchett’s (2013) warning that:
School systems in many countries are centrally controlled by large, top-down
national or state/provincial bureaucracies that hand down decisions about
which schools get built, where teachers get assigned, and what subjects are taught.
Well-functioning centralized systems can efficiently carry out logistical tasks and
scale up quickly and inexpensively, as the success in expanding the number of
school buildings shows. But a centralized system cut off from the judgment and
concern of local parents and teachers is doomed to succeed at schooling but fail at
education. [The lesson is]: don’t force centralized systems.
This would involve moving towards combining ‘thin’ forms of centralized
accountability (performance pressures) with ‘thick’ forms of localized
accountability (involving politically salient stakeholders), alongside measures
to reduce the tensions between such top-down and bottom-up mechanisms.
However, such ambitious reforms are unlikely to be successful in the short to
medium term, given the nature of political pressures within each system and
the absence of coherent, high-capacity policy coalitions pushing for higher-
quality education. This echoes the sense that
. . . for certain development problems the quest for the solution is itself the prob-
lem, and this is especially so in matters pertaining to political, legal and organisa-
tional reform, where combinations of high discretionary decision-making and
numerous face-to-face transactions are required to craft supportable solutions
(plural). (Pritchett, Sen, and Werker 2013, 11)
As we go on to argue, the capacity to craft supportable solutions to context-
ualized problems has often been best achieved by coalitions of politically
salient stakeholders within localised contexts.
Attempts to impose system-wide reforms within competitive and weak
dominant settlements are therefore highly unlikely to succeed, given (a) the
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incentives for politicians to use the sector for political purposes, and (b) the
wide range of veto players. System-wide reformsmay in theory bemore feasible
in dominant settings, to the extent that political principals turn their attention
to this policy goal, but they need to be geared towards matching strong top-
down forms of accountability with stronger bottom-up forms that empower
decentralized systems and actors at both local government and school level.
Building Coalitions
Our findings and analysis underscore the significance of focusing on the role
that coalitions play in shaping the extent to which reforms aimed at improv-
ing learning outcomes are adopted and delivered. We deepen and extend
existing work on coalitions in relation to the politics of education (Grindle
2012) and development (Leftwich 2010), by (a) showing that their roles differ
according to different types of political settlement, and (b) highlighting the
critical role of local-level coalitions in driving up performance at district and
school levels.
Coalitions play a critical role at multiple levels of governance in ensuring
the adoption and implementation of reforms aimed at improving learning
outcomes. This suggests that support for such coalitions might be the best first
step for those seeking to promote institutional reforms. An important con-
stituency here would be business actors, particularly those with requirements
for a more highly skilled labour force and which have sufficient autonomy
from ruling coalitions to be able to make demands for reforms around educa-
tional upgrading (Doner and Schneider 2016). Donors were critical actors
within the earlier policy coalitions that helped establish the access agenda,
and there is evidence that their focus has, belatedly but increasingly, turned to
issues of quality. Their difficulties in promoting the quality agendamay reflect
a lack of clear focus on this issue, as well as their generally declining influence
over developing country governments. Although their continued high level of
involvement in funding social sectors holds open the possibility of greater
influence in this domain than in some others, it suggests a need for more
creative (and arm’s-length) approaches to building alliances and coalitions,
with political as well as technical actors. Donors can play particularly import-
ant roles here as knowledge brokers, helping to create and promote a credible
evidence base around learning outcomes, and actionable means of improving
them. Civil society, particularly in the form of teachers’ associations, which
are mandated to work towards producing a higher-quality workforce, could
constitute a further ally within such coalitions. Shifting political settlement
dynamicsmay provide windows of opportunity (e.g. elections or other periods
of vulnerability) for reformers to promote reforms aimed at improving learn-
ing outcomes. A further implication of our analysis is that future studies
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should build in a strong focus on the potential role of business and middle-
class parents to form coalitions in support of higher-quality education, within
the context of a given country’s political economy profile and integration
within the global economy.
Decentralization and Accountability
The gap between policy formulation and implementation needs to be nar-
rowed in terms of the range of actors involved in each process. Greater
coherence is required between centralized and decentralized arrangements
for (a) teacher training and career advancement, and (b) monitoring perform-
ance and accountability. Top-down forms of performance management and
accountability are insufficiently embedded in local contexts and poorly
attuned to the specific challenges therein. These need to be joined by (and
joined up with) bottom-up and horizontal forms of accountability that
empower those working within both local government (e.g. circuit super-
visors) and civil society to hold frontline service providers to account. This
focus on decentralized forms of performance management and oversight,
from local government down to the school level, largely accords with the
most recent work on the links between governance and educational quality
(e.g. Pritchett 2013).
We would add, however, that there needs to be a stronger emphasis on
ensuring that accountability reforms fit with particular contexts. While we
know a lot more now about how accountability reforms operate—including
reforms to improve school-based management and to hold teachers to
account for performance (Bruns et al. 2011)—we also know that the success
of such reforms depends a great deal on the local political context into which
they are introduced (Gaventa and McGee 2013; Hickey and King 2016). Our
chapters on Ghana and South Africa suggest that different particular settle-
ments at sub-national levels can offer very different incentives and opportun-
ities for elites to adopt particular accountability mechanisms; this implies that
reform-minded implementers need to have a solid grasp of political economy
dynamics before promoting particular approaches. Capacity building is also
essential here: a government has to be capable of doing something before
it can be meaningfully held to account for performing a given task. Local
government bureaucrats are a key constituency to be engaged here.
Connected to this, accountability and performance mechanisms need to be
as much about carrots as sticks, primarily in the form of non-financial awards
for performance, and the building of professional norms and cultures of
performance at multiple levels. As noted earlier, teaching associations can
play important roles in generating and reproducing professional norms, and
could benefit from external support. The critical attention paid to teacher
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unions in the literature may have inadvertently drawn attention away from
the strong potential for a progressive role to be played by teacher associations
in making the case for, and helping to deliver on, higher-quality education.
Local-level Initiatives
In line with the arguments that reforms need to be more cognisant of how
local-level coalitions and accountability systems emerge and function to
improve educational systems, our cases also suggest that other local-level
initiatives to improve commitment to educational outcomes are important.
This may involve practices and coalitions that do not adhere to ‘best-practice’
models. Coalitions exist at district as well as school level, and help reveal the
extent to which informal fixes represent the kinds of ‘best-fit’ solutions
increasingly advocated within the new governance agenda (e.g. various fund-
ing mechanisms in Uganda or the employment of party loyalists as an auxil-
iary teaching force in Ghana). These appear to be most common in contexts
where formal arrangements are regularly undermined by the informal power
relations that underpin political settlements. While acknowledging the limi-
tations to such arrangements, particularly in terms of the degree to which they
can be institutionalized and remain stable, our analysis suggests the need for
openness to working with these.
Finally, our cases also suggest that political settlements contain varying
political dynamics at the regional or district level, pointing to the analytical
and empirical need for moving beyond national-level settlement analysis.
This indicates that national-level reforms will not only differ between settle-
ment types, but also lead to different outcomes across regions, interacting
with the dynamics of political competition or cooperation present there, as
well as the institutional and even policy legacy particular to specific regions.
Future studies should thus be attentive to differences in the political settle-
ment across regions, as well as to how these localized settlements interact with
that at the level of society as a whole.
Conclusion
Rapid expansion alongside poor quality are characteristics of most mass edu-
cation systems in most developing countries (World Bank 2017). Our focus
here has been on the extent to which governments acknowledge and address
the issue of learning, and whether, and how, this is shaped by the nature of
the political settlement. The general failure to promote higher-quality educa-
tion that we identify in our country cases directly reflects the dominant
incentives and ideas generated by the political settlement, both of which
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emphasize the quantity of provision in terms of access, rather than the quality
of provision via improved performance in the educational sector. The political
logics (popular legitimacy, votes), coalitions (populist leaders, rural poor,
teachers’ unions, global actors and agendas), and governance arrangements
(centralized) that underpin the strong focus on access are more powerful, and
are also more or less opposed to the drivers of a stronger focus on quality.
A drive for quality education would likely require long-term investments
beyond a given electoral cycle, a coalition that includes non-poor parents
and capitalists that need skilled workers, and decentralized mechanisms that
help ensure localised oversight of performance.
Many aspects of the politics of education seem to play out in the same way
across all of our different types of political settlement, although the room for
manoeuvre in terms of future reforms is more constrained in dominant than
in competitive settings. At the same time, the ways in which competitive
forms of electoral politics can exacerbate clientelistic tendencies underline
the need not to assume that democratization alone will eventually solve the
learning crisis in the global South. Arguably, the most powerful drivers of
educational quality in our countries come from the ways in which elements of
the two domains on which our framework centres—namely, the political
settlement, and the policy domain of education—combine with each other
over time. This in turn closely circumscribes what is possible in terms of
undertaking reforms aimed at improving learning outcomes in developing
countries. It also suggests the need for more politically attuned approaches
that focus on building coalitions for change and supporting ‘best-fit’ types of
problem-solving fixes, rather than systemic change. Higher levels of perform-
ance at the frontline seemed to emerge as localized solutions to specific
problems, often against the grain of dysfunctional sectoral arrangements
and the national-level political settlement, but in line with the contextualized
fixes devised by progressive local coalitions of politically salient stakeholders.
Our approach and findings converge strongly with the few comparative
studies of the politics of education in developing countries that exist, and
which also go beyond formal institutional analysis to include a focus on
underlying forms of power (Kosack 2012; Grindle 2004). We have attempted
to go further here by bringing together an analysis of national-level and
domain-level politics. We have also engaged with the governance arrange-
ments that operate at multiple levels of the education sector; on this our
conclusions largely support Pritchett’s (2013) suggestion that decentralized
systems are better suited to the transactional governance task of improving
levels of learning, rather than schooling. We would, however, add that sup-
porting developmental coalitions may be a more realistic first step than
undertaking systemic change within contexts where the configuration of
power runs counter to formal institutional arrangements being allowed to
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function effectively. By bringing these disparate strands of the literature
together, we have tried to offer a more holistic and multi-levelled account of
the politics of promoting higher-quality education in developing countries
and (in so doing) establishing a more realistic basis for policy interventions to
tackle the learning crisis in the global South.
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of the Learning Crisis
Steps Ahead on a Long Road
Lant Pritchett
Education has been a core component of the development agenda since
before there was a development agenda. In 1948, the UN Declaration of
Human Rights declared: ‘Everyone has the right to education’. In the seventy
years since there has been both massive action to expand education systems
and a massive academic literature from a variety of disciplines devoted to
education. What could a new drop add to this ocean of ink? This new volume
of case studies introduced and edited by Hickey and Hossain makes three
distinct and valuable contributions.
First, they orient the key question from the politics of ‘schooling’—explain-
ing why governments choose to expand children’s ‘time served’ in a building
called a school—to the politics of learning—why is it children learn so much
more in some countries’ schools than others? They address the question with
six country case studies: four African (Ghana, Uganda, South Africa, and
Rwanda) and two Asian (Bangladesh and Cambodia) using a common analyt-
ical framework.
Second, their framework allows for a ‘policy domain’ approach that
acknowledges that ‘just because the tyre is flat doesn’t mean the hole is on
the bottom’. That is, many approaches to the politics of education assume that
if the education sector is dysfunctional in producing learning the fault must
lie in the education sector as a policy domain itself—some deficiency in the
operation of the sector explained by characteristics or ideas or capabilities in
the sector. But the ‘domains’ approach suggests that perhaps the fault may
really lie in the stars—that the failures to promote universal learning are the
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/2/2019, SPi
result of structures in the larger domain of national politics that lead politi-
cians to have other goals and purposes for schooling (Panglayan 2017).
Third, the six country case studies assess how a particular approach to
‘political settlements’ helps explain successes and failures in orienting the
education sector around not expanding schooling but actually promoting
learning. The lessons are salutary, but bracing, as none of the ‘types’ of political
settlement reliably lead to an effective politics of learning. Some political
settlements that involve electoral democracy produce ‘competitive clientelism’
that makes it difficult to operate on the long-view of learning performance and
hence formulate and implement effective programmes versus the use schools
for short-term political advantage. While ‘dominant’ settlements have poten-
tial advantages in this regard over ‘competitive clientelism’ in being able to
enact longer-term reform agendas, this may or may not lead to effective,
learning-enhancing reforms as opposed to engaging in other political agendas
via schools, like Rwanda’s abrupt adoption of English asmediumof instruction.
From Schooling to Learning
In 1960, the typical adult (over age 15) in the developing world had only 2.1
years of schooling and 87 per cent of the population had not completed
primary schooling. But, by 2010, the typical adult in the developing world
had 7.5 years of schooling and only 40 per cent had not completed primary.
There was more expansion in schooling in these countries in the last fifty
years than the previous 5,000. Today nearly every child will, at some stage,
enrol in a school. This expansion in formal schooling is a revolution and will
be a milestone in human history.
While there are many studies about the politics of why governments have
expanded schooling, a truly astounding feature of this expansion is how
uniform it has been across countries. While everyone knows that the high-
performing East Asian countries expanded schooling rapidly—Indonesia by
4.5 years, Vietnam by 3.4 years, Thailand by 3.3 years—it might surprise some
to know that countries not widely known for stellar development perform-
ance such as Haiti expanded years of schooling by just as much as any of those
stars: 4.4 years. Malawi expanded years of schooling completed by more than
either Vietnam or Thailand.
So while a number of forays into the ‘politics of schooling’ want to explain
why some countries did more and others less, in my view, the key puzzle for
theories of schooling is why so many governments around the world—
including countries with corrupt, non-democratic, human rights-abusing
and otherwise pretty dismal and dysfunctional governments—chose to do so
very much of it.
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But the development goal was never ‘schooling’ for its own sake, the goal
was education. The declared purpose of schooling was that children learn and
acquire the skills, competencies, knowledge, and dispositions to be successful
adults. On this front, tragically, there has been enormously less progress and
the progress has been hugely more variable across countries. A couple of
examples, which add to those in Chapter 1 of this book, motivate the very
rapid recent shift in attention from ‘schooling to learning’.
Recently the Indian NGO Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) carried
out an assessment of Indian youth aged 14 to 18 to assess their skills (ASER
2018). While these youth were schooled—86 per cent had either completed
grade 8 or were still enrolled in school—a shocking number lacked even
rudimentary skills. Shown a picture of a girl going to sleep at 10:30 p.m. and
then waking up at 5:30 a.m. less than 40 per cent of them could say how long
she slept. Less than 40 per cent could calculate the price of a 300 Rupee shirt
after a 10 per cent discount. And 27 per cent of those with grade 8 or higher
schooling completed could not read a simple paragraph. A question arises:
‘how can schooling be so awful that eight years of attendance produces so
little in the way of conceptual mastery and competencies?’
The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) interview a national sample of
women aged 15 to 45 and in the newer modules they assess whether women
can read a simple declarative sentence such as ‘Farming is hard work’ in a
language of their choosing. In Ghana only 7.6 per cent and in Egypt only
18.2 per cent of womenwho had completed grade 6 (but no higher) could read
a single sentence versus 75.1 per cent Indonesia and 86.1 per cent in Tanzania
(Kaffenberger, Pritchett, and Sandefur 2018). So while Ghana’s completed
years of schooling is 7.7 and is more than Indonesia (6.1) or Tanzania (5.5),
a pressing question has to be why primary schooling’s ability to convey
retained literacy amongst women varies so widely across countries.
As a final illustration of the puzzle to be explained, a recent (and still
preliminary) data set has attempted the Herculean task of piecing together
all of the existing results from international assessments into a single compar-
able indicator of the ‘average’ learning in each country on a scale in which
the average OECD country is 500.1 Figure 10.1 shows the scatter plot of
that learning indicator against gross domestic product per capita (GDPPC),
just for those countries with (purchasing power adjusted) GDP per capita
less than US$10,000. While there is a tendency for richer countries to have
higher performance on learning, the differences across countries of similar
GDP are striking. Vietnam, for instance, is estimated to have learning of 524
1 This is the Altinok, Angrist, and Patrinos (2018) data in its May 2017 version. As this data is not
yet finalized nor widely available the specific scores for specific countriesmay change but the rough
points I make here are robust in the October 2018 version of the data.
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(equivalent or better than many rich countries) whereas based on its income
alonewe would have predicted 362, so it over-performs its income level by 162
points. In contrast, South Africa, with a GDP per capita more than twice that
of Vietnam, scores only 314, whereas its income would predict 418 and hence
under-performs its income level by 104 points. The Dominican Republic has a
GDP per capita of $8,700 but a learning score of only 363, placing it below
much, much poorer countries such as Kenya and Tanzania. Given the scale of
this measure of learning and its typical distribution across students, a rough
and ready calculation suggests that the average gap between Vietnam and
South Africa of 210 points means that the distributions of student perform-
ance essentially do not overlap—that is, nearly every 9th grader in Vietnam
has higher learning achievement than nearly every South African 9th grader.
The question this new book brings to the fore is: ‘Why have the politics
been such that (a) nearly all countries expanded schooling but that (b) some
did so with very low learning achievement and some did so with high learning
achievement (even at similar levels of national resources)?’ There are many
narratives about why expansion of basic schooling has become so widespread
(and of the timing of that expansion)—andmany simple ‘response to citizens’
or ‘political pressure from citizens’ models seem to explain that (although
these cannot explain the timing or universality of these expansions as many,
many, governments that were demonstrably not ‘responsive to citizens’
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Figure 10.1 Learning score and GDP per capita (countries with GDPPC <US$10,000)
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nevertheless expanded schooling (e.g. Pritchett 2004; Paglayan 2017)). But it
is not at all clear why ‘pressure from citizens’ would lead to a rapid expansion
of schooling but with schooling of persistently low learning quality. And, as
the authors point out, it is pretty obvious that the ‘high learning performance
conditional on income’ countries as shown in Figure 10.1 (where the top eight
learning over-performers (largest regression residual) are: Vietnam, China,
Moldova, Armenia, Singapore, Ukraine, Korea Republic, and Serbia) is not a
list of ‘well-functioning liberal democracies’ or even stars in generic measures
of ‘good governance’ (e.g. in the World Governance Indicators for 2011,
Vietnam was in the bottom third on indicators for Voice and Accountability,
Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, and Regulatory Quality).
This is very much the right question and, on the face of it a puzzling
question as it means many countries expanded schooling but without accom-
plishing at least some of the priority education objectives that were touted as
the purpose of expanding schooling—no country claimed they were trying to
expand schooling but not learning. This is also very much the right question
as one might hope it could lead to an answer of what might be done to
accelerate progress in learning.
Policy Domains
A first component of this book’s approach is to adopt a ‘domain of powers’
approach to explaining variation across countries in learning achievement.
There is a domain of the general political settlement of a country and then the
domain of education per se. This is important as it might seem natural to
explain education failures (or successes) by education factors. Of course, on
some proximate level in a causal chain that is near true by definition. That is, if
we can specify what leads to learning (starting from proximate determinants
as simple as ‘time-on-task’, and having teachers who know the material to be
taught and students motivated to learn) then, on a proximate level we can
‘account’ for improved learning via these proximate pathways. It is a (near)
truism that ‘if education reform doesn’t change what happens in the class-
room it cannot change outcomes’. But to trace differences in the sufficient
causes that explain persistent learning differences across countries one has to
push to the proximate determinants of the proximate determinants and even
to the proximate determinants of the proximate determinants of the proxim-
ate determinants.
Before you are convinced this is just excessive repetition of the word ‘prox-
imate’, let me give a concrete example. The Service Delivery Indicator data
have been collected on a nationally representative basis in seven African
countries. Figure 10.2 and 10.3 show two proximate determinants of the
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classroom experience that are widely regarded to be relevant to student learn-
ing: whether a teacher is present (Figure 10.2) and whether the teacher has
adequate subject matter knowledge (Figure 10.3).
As an explanation of why in the DHS data for Togo only 22.6 per cent of
womenwho completed grade 6 could read a sentence it probably helps to know
that at any given time there was a 1/3 chance the teacher was absent from
the classroom, reducing time-on-task, and that there was only a 2.5 per cent
chance the student was exposed to a teacher with minimally adequate content









































Figure 10.2 Per cent of teachers absent from the classroom during the scheduled period











































Figure 10.3 Per cent of teachers with minimum subject knowledge (as defined by SDI)
Source: World Bank Databank, Service Delivery Indicators.
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But this leads to the obvious question: why is it that Togo’s education
system is such that only 2.5 per cent of classroom teachers in Togo demon-
strate minimum subject knowledge (versus, say, roughly 20 per cent in
Uganda and Tanzania). Is this a feature of the education of the potential
labour force—there simply are not adequate candidates? Is it a feature of
something about the education sector and its policies that are the proximate
determinant of the low level of this proximate determinant? Is teacher pay too
low to attract good candidates to teaching? Are the methods of selection not
present to screen out candidates with low subject knowledge?
But even if we could explain the low level of student performance in Togo as
low subject content knowledge of teachers and even if that were explained as
the result of identifiable policy stances in the education sector, one would still
want to ask: What is it about Togo that leads it to have those education sector
policy stances? Was it something specific to the configuration of ideas, inter-
ests and powers amongst the relevant actors within the education domain of
Togo versus other places that explains the policy stance outcomes? Or what if
those policy stances are not determined by features of the education domain
unique to Togo but rather are determined by broader political factors outside
the education domain? What therefore explains low student performance is
both the low time-on-task and teacher subject knowledge (amongst other
proximate factors), and that is itself explained by features of policy stances
within the education domain that are themselves not exogenous or autono-
mous determinants, but are influenced by the general political context.
I think the ‘policy domains’ approach is a useful corrective. As one of the
authors of the World Development Report 2004, which introduced an
‘accountability’ framework, we had in mind something very much like this.
That is, in our framework outcomes of service delivery (and basic education
was included as a paradigm case) were the result of four distinct relationships
of accountability: politics (between citizens and the state), compact (between
the executive actors of the state and organizational providers), management
(between organizations and frontline providers) and client power (the direct
relationship of service recipients and frontline providers and organizations).
Our purpose in emphasizing an analytic approach with all four relationships
was that, at the time (early 2000s), far and away the dominant discourse at the
World Bank was to discuss only the ‘management’ relationship. That is, most
deficits in service delivery were treated as technical problems in organizational
design and implementation that were addressable by the leaders of the rele-
vant provider organizations who, it was imagined, both had sufficient auton-
omy to act and could be induced to do so with sufficient evidence that
specified action(s) of a policy, project or programmatic kind would lead to
improved outcomes. This was a natural bias of the donor-driven discourse as
the direct ‘client/recipient’ of donor loans and grants was the organization;
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hence ‘client-driven’ behaviour was in ‘partnership’ with the provider organiza-
tions, and hence the natural focus was on what these organizations could do to
improve the state of affairs, and the entirely natural (and not entirely undesir-
able) bias for optimism led to the idea that there was adequate space for action
within the ‘management’ relationship.
The idea that the deep causal determinants of poor education performance
is not in the ‘policy domain’ of education nor in the ‘problem definitions’ or
‘policy ideas’ within the education sector at all but is rather in deeper political
determinants, such as the nature of the political settlement, is an important
idea. This is a useful corrective to the (self-serving) bias of academics and
researchers that ‘rigorous evidence’ about ‘what works’ is, in and of itself, an
important causal binding constraint to improved performance.
Political Settlement
Themain contribution of this volume is applying an instantiation of ‘political
settlement’ to six country cases. As elaborated in Chapter 2 and drawing on
work by Khan (2010) and Levy (2014) they stipulate that the political settle-
ment is influenced by (1) power relations and orderings that structure the
ruling coalition, (2) material incentives, and (3) paradigmatic ideas. They offer
a two by two typology of political settlements with the dimensions of whether
‘elite cohesion’ is high or low and whether ‘organizational and institutional
complexity’, by which they mean the extent to which administrative pro-
cesses are personalized or determined largely by formal, impersonalized pro-
cesses, is high or low. The result is a classification of the political settlement in
a country at a point in time into a set of six categories (which I number by
Roman numerals to indicate these are categories that are not ordered on any
singlemetric or ordered on any expected sequence, for example, Type III is not
‘better’ nor necessarily comes after Type II).
This approach brings two important advances on what might be called the
‘typical’ approach of development experts. A description, perhaps a tad cari-
catured, of the ‘typical’ approach is to assume that problems can either (a) be
solved ‘technocratically’ within a given ‘policy domain’ by sufficiently clever
application of known sectoral approaches (something like ‘best practice’) or
(b) that if the problem is ‘politics’ then well-functioning electoral democracy
will, eventually, be sufficient to create the pressure for governments to adopt
solutions (or authorize those in the policy domain to adopt solutions) for the
quality of education.2 Relative to that, this approach brings two advances.
2 I owe this structuring of approaches into ‘fix the sector technocratically’ or ‘fix the politics with
democracy’ to Agustina Paglayan.
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First, it essentially never uses the word ‘democracy’. I think many have come
to believe uses of the word are mostly hoary or hortatory and that, without
predicates, the word ‘democracy’ conveys too little content to be of use. Note
that it is possible that any of the six types in Table 10.1 could have held an
election as ameans of determining the current executive—but it is obvious that
holding anelection in theDemocratic Republic ofCongo (DRC) in2006didnot,
in and of itself, magically move DRC from Type I and create a stable country-
wide political settlement. This book advances arguments, which have emerged
in other policy domains, that elections in weakly institutionalized environ-
ments can produce ‘competitive clientelist’ conditions that are inimical to
undertaking some type of reforms. The scatter plot in Figure 10.1 itself illustrates
that ‘democracy’ is neither necessary (Vietnam counter-example) nor sufficient
(South Africa counter-example) for high learning achievement in schools.
In contrast, ‘dominant’ settlements can create conditions in which major
reforms can be undertaken and implemented. That said, it is not guaranteed
that the reforms of dominant settlements will be conducive to improving
learning. Their case study of the overnight move to English language as the
medium of instruction in Rwanda is an example of the type of reform only
Table 10.1 Typology of political orders
Closed-Access Orders (all except Type VI)
Type I: Stable Political Settlement (Types II-V) Type VI:




















































Source: Adapted from Figure 10.2 and text, Chapter 2.
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possible in a dominant settlement but which is of at least dubious efficacy in
improving learning in the short to medium run due to its disruptive effects.
Second, it is, in and of itself, a major advance to acknowledge that the very
notion of ‘the politics of X’ (where, in this case, X is achieving high learning in
basic schooling) needs to be made specific to the type of government. In
particular, it is easy to assume that Type VI countries represent the ‘normal’
or ‘paradigm’ case and models and frames and tools developed for those cases
can be transplanted, with perhaps only minor tweaks, to other cases
(or, alternatively, that there is no useful ‘politics of X’ until a country reaches
Type VI). I am stunned at the frequency with which, in academic seminars
and the like, I hear the words ‘median voter theorem’ described as the ‘stand-
ard’ and expect the onus to be on the presenter as to why their predictions
would differ from this ‘standard’.
But to my view, the ‘politics of X’ are completely different in a ‘deals’ world
(Types I to V) than in a ‘rules’world (Type VI).3 In a rules world politics is about
rules which are expected to be neutrally and impersonally enforced by organ-
izations that (roughly) enforce the rules—which is itself amapping from facts to
actions—with rough fidelity. Rules, by creating groups of people who are simi-
larly affected, create ‘interests’ and ‘interest groups’ as people who have com-
mon costs and benefits from different rules. But this is precisely what ‘low
organizational and institutional complexity’ or ‘low state capability’ under-
mine. Precisely what ‘personalized’ implies is that expected outcomes are
indexed by who you are as a person not by what you do or by any determinant
factual condition, like actually complying or not complying with a rule.
This means we need, and the book pursues the goal of, something like ‘what
are the politics of learning in Type III (competitive clientelist) countries’ and
‘what are the politics of learning in Type IV (dominant rule of law) countries’
with no expectation that these are at all alike or that either is similar to the
‘politics of learning in Type VI (open access order) countries’.
It is a truism that ‘no battle plan survives contact with the enemy’ or, as the
sage Mike Tyson put it more recently, ‘Everyone has a plan ’till they get
punched in the mouth’. Having been involved in my academic career with a
number of exercises that attempted to use a framework to structure case
studies, my experience is that the raw phenomena of country/regional experi-
ences in all their messy contextual complexity survive collision with analyt-
ical frameworks, but not always vice versa.
In this instance, I had three reservations.
The first concern, and one that the researchers cannot be held responsible
for, is that there is just no data on learning performance that is comparable
3 On ‘deals’, see Pritchett, Sen, and Werker (2018).
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across countries or within countries over time. To do research on the question
‘What are the conditions under which countries adopt reforms that are effect-
ive at promoting learning?’ one would have to be able to have at least some
rough ability to get at learning performance ‘with’ and ‘without’. But precisely
what the focus on schooling has done is create international and national
systems in which data on schooling (e.g. enrolments, grade attainment) is
widely available across countries and over time with at least modest reliability
but data on learning is piecemeal, not widely comparable, and very, very few
countries have comparable learning assessments spanning more than just a
few years. This means all of the case studies can only really investigate ‘what
are the conditions in which countries adopt reforms which are claimed to be
about learning (or which conventional wisdom or our beliefs think are likely
to promote learning?)’ which is perhaps an interesting question, but recent
research encourages caution on that score. For instance, Indonesia recently
doubled teacher wages on the not implausible premise that this would be
‘quality improving’ but so far the evidence is that this has been ‘Double for
Nothing’ (de Ree et al. 2017). This is important because it is possible, if not
plausible, that effective and ineffective reforms have different politics and it is
possible, if not plausible, that effective reforms are more politically difficult
than reforms that are putatively and rhetorically justified by learning but
which are bound to be ineffective.
My second reservation is that one plausible conjecture from the distinction
between ‘dominant settlements—personalized’ and ‘Competitive clientelist’
and the raw fact that many long-term authoritarian governments have better
outcomes than ‘democratic’ governments (e.g. Indonesia versus India or Viet-
nam versus the Philippines) is that the longer-term horizon andmore ‘encom-
passing’ interests of the ‘dominant’ settlements allow a greater latitude for
creating and sustaining reform than do ‘competitive clientelist’ contexts. But
this does not come through the case studies clearly at all—not a fault of
method but of the sometimes very stubborn nature of the facts. So, for
instance, while the South Africa case study contrasting Western Cape and
Eastern Cape provinces is full of rich material (and draws on an additional
volume just on South Africa (Levy et al. 2018)), in the end while the config-
uration of socio-economic, political settlement and inherited institutions
between Western Cape and Eastern Cape (Table 6.4) may explain the superior
learning performance of Western Cape, it is not clear why the Western Cape
lags learning performance in say, Kenya (a much poorer place) nor why
progress has proven so fitful, even in Western Cape. Similarly, the ‘dominant
settlements’ of Rwanda and Cambodia had very different trajectories, but
neither of them is a clear success nor do they reveal a particularly common
‘dominant settlement’ politics. I would rate the claim in the conclusion that
‘Comparative analysis of our cases, each of which represented different types
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of political settlement, suggests consistent dynamics can be discerned . . . ’ as
‘not yet proven’.
Third, the framework emerges as helpful, but not granular enough yet.
I think the ‘domains of power’ and ‘political settlement’ approaches are an
advance over the (implicit) idea that the ‘politics of learning-oriented reforms’
can be usefully approached without a political settlement (or ‘nature of polit-
ics’) typology and that the first ‘lesson’ in Chapter 9 that ‘Elite commitment to
education reform is shaped by the political settlement’ is useful. However,
other ‘lessons’ in Chapter 9 reveal the distance the research agenda has yet to
go: ‘Diverse actors play important roles’, ‘Political competition and domin-
ance influence reforms in complex ways’, ‘Informal power and politics is
critical’, and ‘We need to acknowledge idiosyncratic factors’. All of these
statements are likely true (as their negation seems false) and perhaps useful
correctives—perhaps previous approaches thought informal power was not
critical or that only limited actors played important roles—but it is not clear
how such statements can inform concrete action.
The book makes a creditable and credible start down the path to identifying
the political drivers of the learning crisis. That it does not both start and arrive
fully in the same journey is my judgement from the reading of the six cases,
but cannot be taken as criticism, and I would encourage each reader to form
their own judgement.
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11
Similarities and Differences in
Policy Reform Destinies
What Do Political Settlements and
Domain Politics Explain?
Merilee S. Grindle
In Chapter 9, Sam Hickey, Naomi Hossain, and David Jackman compare the
six case studies of education reform brought together in this volume. They ask
to what extent a political settlements approach can explain how quality-
enhancing reforms played out in discrete contexts. They demonstrate import-
ant ways in which a focus on distinct elite coalitions can explain differences
across countries at a macro level. They are clear, however, that in order to
explain more fully why countries followed unique paths towards reform, it is
essential to explore politics and governance contexts within the education
sector and to understand the ways that these policy domain interactions are
influenced by the broader political settlement. By combining macro andmeso
levels of analysis, their insightful assessment of the six cases indicates that a
theory of elite bargains and domain politics provides a convincing and
nuanced story of how education reform happens—or fails to happen—across
a significant number of countries.1
1 Drawing on the work of Khan (2010) and others (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Levy 2014) on
the importance of political settlements for the development potential of countries, recent studies
have addressed the links between such agreements and the specific politics at sectoral levels (see,
for examples Abdulai 2017; Bebbington et al. 2018; Hickey and King 2016; Hickey and Lavers 2016;
Hossain and Hassan 2017; Levy and Kelsall 2016; Pritchett 2013). This effort responds to the
concern that many political economy discussions of why some development initiatives succeed
while others fail focus on either broad historical trends (a macro approach) or on specific
interventions to improve performance (a micro approach). This recent work is notable for
attempting to bridge this gap, and particularly for efforts to link macro and sectoral levels of
analysis (a domain approach; see Grindle 2017).
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In a separate reading of the case studies, this chapter confirms the import-
ance ofmacro settlements and domain-specific interactions in explaining why
‘politics matters’ in education policy and, importantly, in showing ‘how pol-
itics matters’ in accounting for differences across countries in what can be
accomplished through policy change. However, here there is added emphasis
on the observation that differences across the case studies are most apparent
when efforts are made to implement new approaches to problematic condi-
tions in the education sector. That is, this chapter suggests that the destinies of
education reform initiatives in Ghana, Bangladesh, Rwanda, South Africa,
Cambodia, and Uganda began to be most clearly determined when efforts
were made to put them into practice. While the intent of the new initiatives
was nowhere perfectly reflected in the policies activated, some countries
demonstrated greater commitment and capacity to implement reform initia-
tives, and to sustain them for some period of time. Others were less able to
manage effective national implementation of new policies, and the fate of the
reforms in these countries was to lie fallow, to be promoted in diverse ways at
the sub-national level, to have resources devoted to other ends, or to be
replaced by renewed emphasis on alternative policies.
There were, then, clear differences across countries in terms of how new
education policies were implemented. With a series of earlier education
reforms emphasizing access, however, and with the initial phases of problem
definition, agenda setting, policy design, and official adoption of quality-
enhancing reforms, important similarities characterized the politics of educa-
tion reform. Thus, by drawing attention to the histories of successful ‘easy’
education reform—those that provided schooling to large numbers of chil-
dren, and to the early phases of ‘hard’ education reform—those that focused
attention on improvements in learning, this chapter suggests that a general-
ized political economy of education reform can be advanced to explain some
types of education initiatives and some parts of the policy process. But a
general explanation proves wanting when efforts are made to implement
policies, as the case studies and comparative analysis make clear. Understand-
ing the implementation story when difficult policies are at stake requires a
more nuanced approach, one that can be found by exploring political settle-
ments and domain politics. Thus, the destiny of education policies can be
understood in part as a function of policy content and process, although it is
ultimately determined by the important political dynamics emphasized in
this volume.2
2 The distinction between access and quality in education achievement has received increased
attention in the 2000s. Earlier, a focus on ‘education for all’ encouraged a significant expansion of
the number of children enrolled in primary schooling (UNESCO 1990), but more recent
assessments have drawn attention to the problem that ‘Schooling Ain’t Learning’ and that
quality has lagged in educational achievement in large numbers of countries (Pritchett 2013;
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/2/2019, SPi
The Politics of Implementation
211
A General Story of Similarities
A useful explanation for the similarities in the experiences across countries lies
in the nature of the political benefits and costs of distinct policy regimes in
education. Moreover, most countries demonstrate significant similarities in
the ways in which national education problems become recognized as import-
ant policy issues, are reflected in policy designs, and are adopted formally by
political elites. Thus, there is a good general explanation in political economy
for the ways in which Ghana, Bangladesh, Rwanda, South Africa, Cambodia,
and Uganda followed similar paths in increasing access to education, recog-
nizing the limitations of this policy, and setting out a new agenda for enhan-
cing the quality of schooling. Regardless of the political settlement
characterizing the country, all moved along a similar path of first addressing
‘easy’ education reforms. Then as evidence and pressures mounted about the
limitations of the emphasis on access, political elites reacted similarly by
adopting new policy ideas and encouraging their elaboration into national
policy plans for ‘hard’ reforms.3
Of course, to call some education reforms ‘easy’ should not diminish the
effort involved—increasing access to schooling involved massive efforts by
public organizations and officials, often at multiple levels of government. It
required bigger budgets for Ministries of Education; introduced a significant
management challenge of transmitting policy goals into specific measures to
be taken by numerous actors; occupied a large number of administrators
overseeing specific initiatives; implied a Herculean effort to train a corps of
teachers; entailed building many new schools and classrooms as well as pro-
viding desks, textbooks, chalkboards, and pencils; and called for extensive
public information campaigns. Long chains of decisions and action extended
from central policymakers and administrators all the way to schools, class-
rooms, teachers, students, and parents and had to be coordinated. Moreover,
the goalposts moved over time, increasingly emphasizing the need to incorp-
orate rural children and then other groups often marginalized in their soci-
eties, such as girls and cultural minorities. Efforts to undertake these changes
were significant, not least for the political and bureaucratic elites who pro-
moted such changes in their societies, and the way was studded with planning
and logistical obstacles, mistakes, corruption, waste, and delay.
UNESCO 2006; World Bank 2017). The increased awareness of the difficulty of improving quality
has encouraged greater attention to the political economy of education reform (Bruns and
Schneider 2016; Corrales 2006; Grindle 2004; Kingdon et. al 2014; Kosack 2009; Moe and
Wiborg 2017; Wales, Magee, and Nicolai 2016).
3 The political differences between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ education reform are described in Grindle
(2004); (see also Bruns and Schneider 2016).
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Nevertheless, from a political point of view, education advances tied to
increasing access to schooling were by and large ‘easy’ because of the nature of
the policies themselves—they provided a range of benefits that could be distrib-
uted amongst important groups and broadly to communities that desired and
appreciated them.Universal education initiatives providedbudgets toministries
to employ more officials to undertake more programmes, and to hire and
train extensive numbers of teachers and school administrators—this kind of
job expansion was an important building block of a foundational middle class
in many cases. The reforms paid for the construction of teacher-training
institutes and schools and the production of teaching materials. Efforts to
get more children into school were visible and popular, and politicians and
parties were eager to claim credit at ribbon cuttings for new infrastructure
and the celebration of education campaigns. A paradigmatic idea for national
advancement and material incentives for multiple actors were aligned in
these kinds of reforms, regardless of differences in how political systems
functioned.
Thus, in Ghana, Bangladesh, Rwanda, South Africa, Cambodia, and Uganda
political elites were often eloquent in advancing education as a universal
public good—for them, education was a national project directly related to
the ability to undertake and achieve economic and social development. In
many cases, commitment to the idea of universal education was strong across
several decades and distinct political arrangements. And in fact, each country
made great strides towards providing this public good. Often encouraged by
international campaigns such as ‘Education for All’ and the Millennium
Development Goals, by the 2010s, each country had managed to get an
impressive proportion of its children into primary school; and in many cases
a significant number of students had advanced to secondary schooling. These
cases were not unusual; by early in the twenty-first century, a large majority of
poor countries achieved similarly significant results in providing universal
access to education. Where education policy had emphasized quality as well
as access, getting more children into school was invariably the primary
accomplishment.
By the early 2000s, elites in each of the six countries began to encounter
mounting evidence that getting children into school was only part of the
challenge of education. In the face of international and domestic concern
about human and economic development, data-based evidence of education
shortfalls, and middle-class flight from public schools, elites in each of the
countries began to acknowledge that something needed to be done about the
gap between two different measures of educational output—access and qual-
ity. The case studies show that in Ghana, Bangladesh, Rwanda, South Africa,
Cambodia, and Uganda, the definition of the education problem, and the
policy ideas needed to respond to it, began to shift in similar ways. Although
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the timing was distinct, political elites, technocrats, education specialists, and
donors set about reframing education policy to address the learning crisis.
Specific policy measures differed, but most new plans involved efforts to
decentralize the management of education systems and to improve teacher
training and accountability.4
At this point in the policy process, elites were responding to drivers such as
the direction of international discourses on education, increasingly available
data about failures of prior policies, the ideas of domestic policy reformers, and
pressures from groups favouring change. Across the six countries, there were
few political constraints on pulling together reform-minded officials, academ-
ics, planners, not-for-profit organizations, and donors to develop new policy
initiatives such as the NERP and the 2008 Education Act in Ghana, the PEDP3
in Bangladesh, the MINEDUC 2007 in Rwanda, the ELRC in South Africa, the
CFS or the TPAP in Cambodia, and the BRMS in Uganda—to invoke a veritable
alphabet soup of reforms. These changes amounted to a new policy agenda for
education. Again, these were not isolated cases, as the learning crisis became
increasingly evident in many countries around the world and as the paradig-
matic idea of universal public education was met by criticism of what that
national project had not been able to deliver.
A Particular Story of Differences
But implementing quality-enhancing reforms and sustaining them was a
much bigger challenge than getting more children in school or designing
new national policies because, from a political perspective, they were costly
to important political and bureaucratic interests. Ministries were no longer
as flush with resources as they had been in earlier decades and they resisted
pressures to become more efficient and accountable. School expansion
slowed, harming construction firms and workers; ribbon cutting became less
frequent; and political parties were deprived of many tangible resources and
jobs to distribute. Educators and administrators resented being tested, meas-
ured, and judged on their performance and looked to their associations and
unions to protect them from new standards. Parents and voters were asked to
trust that in a number of years, their children would be better prepared for the
future; many were unconvinced that this would occur. Middle-class and
4 For discussions of efforts to improve quality in education, see Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos
(2011), Evans and Popova (2016), and World Bank (2017).
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business interests—important in the development of public education in
many now-rich countries—were not major players in such reforms either
because they had deserted to private-sector schooling or because they did
not envision better public education as important to their economic future.
From a political perspective, commitment to these kinds of education reforms
was much more vulnerable to resistance, often from the same organized
groups—parties, politicians, unions, bureaucrats, local officials—that had
benefitted from access-enhancing reforms.
And, because the actors important to policymaking differed significantly
from those important in policy implementation, once an initiative addressing
the learning crisis was formulated and approved, its future became extremely
vulnerable to the nature of the political settlement and domain-level political
interactions and governance structures. Thus, when governments in the case
study countries—at least rhetorically committed to new policy initiatives—
reached the point of trying to put more difficult reforms into practice, char-
acteristics of their underlying political agreements emerged as important
explanations in howwell they were able to promote change. Multiple patterns
of capacity and commitment across countries, and within countries at the sub-
national level, became much more apparent. Teachers’ associations, bureau-
crats, local and regional elites and, in some cases, local communities became
much more important drivers of political interactions, and their intent was to
resist change rather than to promote it. This is when the legacies of prior
policies, the differential capacity of implementing organizations, the strength
and weakness of interests harmed through reform, and the degree of competi-
tiveness in elections became part of a more nuanced understanding of the
politics of education reform. In such cases, paradigmatic and policy ideas
about what to do to address a problem were no longer in alignment with the
material incentives to adopt change.
Thus, we find that Rwanda, with a dominant and development-oriented
political settlement spearheaded by a powerful central actor and a cohesive
party, had considerable capacity to introduce an education reform that had
high priority for this elite. The rapid switch to English as a medium of
instruction—and its unfavourable impact on education quality—can be tied
to core concerns of the political elite about domestic peace and international
alliances. But, despite rhetorical commitment to improved schooling, this
same elite did not use its considerable top-down discipline to pursue
teacher-training reforms; this initiative was not a high priority for it. In
Cambodia, a top-down approach to implementation within a dominant but
more personalized political settlement suggests relatively efficient manage-
ment of the introduction of reform, but one more sensitive to personalistic
trade-offs within the sector and across different districts and localities. The
likelihood of increased trade-offs and negotiations with elite factions and
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lower-level political actors during implementation increased in the case of
Uganda, where the elite settlement was less firmly dominant and personalism
was more prominent; decentralization as a feature of reform governance
increased the potential for variation across districts and localities by opening
up room for manoeuvre by lower-level political and bureaucratic elites who
were differentially motivated to accept or resist reforms.
Elite settlements in Bangladesh and Ghana were looser, and more competi-
tive and discordant than in Rwanda, Cambodia, and Uganda, supporting a
less cohesive implementation process characterized by more negotiation and
conflict around policy objectives and resources. Not surprisingly, especially
with governance measures that introduced more decentralization, greater
autonomy for district and local actors led to significant variations in imple-
mentation at the community and district level, with the effectiveness of
implementation depending much more on local and regional actors’ incen-
tives to adopt or reject the changes mandated by national policy. This same
tendency towards implementation variability at sub-national levels was evi-
dent in South Africa, where decentralization combined with distinct legacies
of bureaucratic capacity to emphasize not only provincial political settle-
ments, but also differences based on the institutions of governance.
The cases illuminate not only differences amongst settlements and
domain-specific politics but also distinctions in the implementation fault
lines related to distinct elite settlements. In Rwanda, for example, the top-
down style of decision-making and control also facilitated a misreading and
mismatch between the reforms introduced and the realities of conditions
within the education sector; the coherence of the dominant coalition inter-
fered with the capacity to appreciate and respond to issues that emerged
within the sector during implementation. Even in this case of a dominant
developmental settlement, the implementation phase of the policy process
was vulnerable; political and governance conditions in such contexts may be
opaque to central policy implementers, distinct from situations in which
ongoing negotiation and clientelistic arrangements are the norm. Con-
versely, the most insistent challenge to policy implementation in looser
and more conflictful political arrangements is greater diversity in the capacity
to implement as well as the use of policy resources for default options where
resistance to change is greater. The outcome of less coherent implementation
in these conditions can take the form of some resources being newly com-
mitted to access-type reforms; benefits increased to resistant stakeholders
such as teachers and administrators without emphasis on performance
accountability; or misuse for personal or partisan gain. In all cases, then,
implementation was the most fragile part of the policy process in education
reform, but for distinct political reasons.
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When Politics Defeats Policy, What Can Be Done?
Similarities and differences in the dynamics of the policy process suggest that,
for education policy, the point at which differences amongst political settle-
ments and domain politics is most evident is not at the point of rhetorical
commitment to change, the process of policy design, or even formal mech-
anisms of political approval, but at the point of implementing and sustaining
important changes. With the exception of South Africa, the case study coun-
tries, like most poor countries across the world, have relatively insulated
policymaking processes, weak formal institutions of governance, and import-
ant deficiencies in the hierarchical administrative capacity to exert compli-
ance from multiple officials and to hold a variety of other actors to legal or
administrative standards; South Africa demonstrates this reality at sub-
national levels. In some cases, strong coalitions of elites substitute for institu-
tional incapacities, a condition that does not occur in other countries. Thus,
differences amongst countries cannot be captured on a simple strong state/
weak state continuum but must address the nature of the coalitions con-
structed by national political elites and parties and the complex political
interactions and governance structures that characterize the education sector.
A focus on the political interactions of implementing difficult policies
suggests that, where policy change has a high priority for elites in domin-
ant/developmental settlements, the potential to impose policy costs on
important interests may be considerable. Nevertheless, policy initiatives
under these more authoritarian settlements depend significantly on the pri-
orities of the elite coalition—expanding their capacity to introduce policies
they are particularly concerned about, but hindering opportunities for change
in non-priority areas. Centralized power, then, can be advantageous for intro-
ducing quality-enhancing education reforms, but only when the elite itself is
committed to using its capacity to promote such change. Where such commit-
ment exists, democratic processesmay be ignored or undermined. Certainly it is
possible that, over time, more authoritarian coalitions might become more
open and democratic—the example of South Korea is emblematic in this regard.
Similarly, the historical experience of some countries such as Chile, Colombia,
Brazil, and possibly Ghana, suggest that clientelistic systems can evolve over
time into more coherent and programmatic democracies that have greater
capacity for implementing hard policy choices. Moreover, the case studies
suggest that while more cohesive and dominant coalitions might be more
efficient in setting out on policy implementation processes, they share a com-
mon flaw in being less sensitive to what is happening at sub-national levels.
More fragmented and clientelistic systems may be ‘smarter’ in terms of the
ability to adjust and negotiate some implementation efforts.
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Are there political avenues to encourage the implementation of ‘hard’
reforms, even in countries in which elite settlements are weak, fragmented,
and contested? As Hickey, Hossain, and Jackman confirm, the cases indicate
that for some countries, differences in political and governance arrangements
at sub-national levels offer opportunities for improvements in education in at
least some regions, districts, or localities. They suggest that one path towards
building effective change in countries that cannot count on a dominant
coalition to lead and implement reform is through initiatives to capitalize
on favourable sub-national political dynamics, or to encourage them to be
more supportive of quality-enhancing change. Building reform initiatives
beyond sympathetic sub-national contexts, however, would require major
efforts to create and strengthen parental, school-based, associational, polit-
ical, and bureaucratic leadership across sub-national units, linking them in
networks with national and international supporters of reform. Thus, to
scale-up sub-national achievements, policy reformers would need to reassess
where to focus their efforts—fewer, perhaps, on policymaking and processes
at national levels, andmore on building and linking more localized capacities
and leadership.
A complementary path towards reform in contexts of national political
weakness is suggested by the histories of education reform that initially pro-
moted education as a universal right as part of a national project or paradig-
matic idea. Such national projects have been important in many countries in
encouraging the development of national identity, industrialization, public
health, and the removal of barriers of discrimination against women and
minorities. As Hickey and Hossain indicate in Chapter 2, paradigmatic ideas
can ‘bind elites together, securing their commitment to upholding a certain
set of institutions whilst also being deployed more instrumentally by elites to
secure loyalty among followers’. National projects are not easily undertaken,
of course, but much of what promotes them is talk—insistent emphasis on
the universal benefits to be gained from broad initiatives; the use of ideas and
data in ongoing political communications; and the development of a narra-
tive to capture a national audience and filter into the rhetoric of political
parties, interest groups, and everyday conversation. These resources are avail-
able to reform proponents in many countries, even those that lack significant
implementation capacity. This strategy can be useful over the longer term in
building broad-based support for reform where political coalitions register
rhetorical commitment to it but lack commitment and capacity; strong pub-
lic discourse about the importance and direction of change in education
policy can be critical support for beleaguered reformists in countries around
the world.
The political facts of hard-to-implement reforms are stark, and perhaps
nowhere more apparent than in efforts to introduce and sustain quality-
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enhancing education policies. However much reformers wish to see schooling
enhanced by learning, they face major challenges that become most apparent
when they attempt to put plans into practice. The challenges are greater in
some countries than in others because political and bureaucratic conditions
exacerbate rather than counteract resistance and chip away at capacity and
commitment. Where the difficulties are greatest, pursuing implementation of
‘hard’ policies may ultimately be a function of strategies that work at sub-
national and national levels to substitute for weaknesses inherent in broad
political settlements and specific policy domains. Policymakers and analysts
alike might therefore focus additional attention on ways to subvert political
vulnerabilities that becomemost evident while implementing change initiatives.
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